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 i 
Abstract 
 
 
Fantasy other worlds are often seen as alternatives with which to critique 
the ‘real’ world, or as offering spaces where child protagonists can take 
advantage of the otherness they encounter in their own process of maturation. 
However, such readings of fantasy other worlds, rather than celebrating 
heterogeneity, implicitly see ‘other’ spaces as ‘unreal’ and there either to support 
the real in some way, as being in some way inferior to the real, or in need of 
salvation by protagonists from the real world. This thesis proposes a reading of 
such texts that draws on social theories of constructed spatiality in order to 
examine first how, to varying degrees, and depending upon the attitude of 
authors towards the figure of the child, such ‘fantasy’ places can be seen as 
potentially real “thirdspaces” of performance and agency for protagonists, and 
thus as neutral spaces of activity rather than confrontation or growth and, second, 
how such presentations may be seen as reflecting back into the potential for the 
spatial activity of readers. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
No story, irrespective of type or genre, is ever really placeless. Whilst the 
time of a story may be unclear or ambiguous (as is the case with those fairy tales 
that start with “once upon a time”, or with the non-linear texts in what might be 
termed postmodern fiction), place will always have a specific presence of some 
kind (even if it is the space of the human mind). In fantasy novels in particular, 
there is “a very strong sense of landscape” (Manlove, Fantasy 1) and, here, I will 
be examining a very particular type of fantasy narrative landscape: the ‘other 
worlds’ in fantasy fiction for children. More specifically, this type of fiction 
presents worlds that are, in theory, “outside the realm of the possible” (Doležel, 
Heterocosmica 165), worlds that are different from the represented world of 
quotidian consensus reality, but which connect to that consensus reality in some 
way (which includes those instances where the ‘other’ realm erupts into 
consensus reality). To a large degree, the spatial nature of such fantasy texts 
remains largely unexplored. It is true that attention has been given to questions of 
place and space in individual texts.1 However, it remains the case that children’s 
literature criticism generally “has not paid enough attention to questions of 
spatiality [...] and has rarely attempted to theorise the nature of place and space 
in children’s literature” (Bavidge 323).2 My aim in this thesis is to redress this 
general lack. 
As Franco Moretti observes, “each space determines, or at least 
encourages, its own kind of story,” such that “what happens depends a lot on 
where it happens (70, original emphasis). Moretti’s observation argues for an 
importance for space in the novel that is not always matched by the attention 
given to it. Clearly, writers make conscious choices about situating narratives 
 2 
within these multiple world contexts, which inevitably places an additional 
emphasis on their spatial nature beyond their being merely “the theatre, the 
disinterested stage or setting, of action” (Lefebvre 410), as simply back-drops for 
the adventures of the child protagonists. This way of thinking about the spatiality 
of fiction argues for the spatial in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction as being an 
important textual element in the communication and reception of meaning for, in 
fantasy fiction, “it is the spatial that determines the realm of textual dynamics” 
(Armitt, Theorising 5). Indeed, in some fantasy novels, “the fantastic worlds 
generate the action,” whilst in others, “[t]he world is the action, and, therefore, 
the fantasy” (Hume 160, original emphasis). As such, these worlds demand 
considered attention because, clearly, they have a significant function in the 
texts. 
Understanding fantasy ‘other world’ fiction’s places (as fixed, physical 
locations) and spaces (as constructed and used sites of activity) is important 
because, as Jenny Bavidge notes, studying the spatiality of children’s literature 
can reveal “the discourses by which places are made visible in children’s 
literature,” and how “narrative logics and representative strategies of children’s 
literature have their own spatial politics” (323).3 Thus, the spatial analysis I set 
out will examine both how, to very varying degrees, the spatial may (or may not) 
be generated by protagonists, and how protagonists negotiate and use, manipulate 
and transgress places and spaces, whether that is to offer ways to evade efforts to 
discipline and regulate them, or as a more subtle expression of control.  
Taking Roger Schlobin’s point that “the key to the fantastic is how its 
universes work, which is sometimes what they are, but is always why and how 
they are” (para. 16), this thesis examines how and why spatiality is represented, 
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how it functions and is used in fantasy ‘other world’ novels for children, and how 
that spatiality operates both for and against child protagonists in differing ways. 
To undertake this examination, I have avoided categories such as parallel, 
alternate, mirror, or secondary worlds because often these can be synonymous in 
practice and function, if not in design. Instead, I will approach this narrative 
spatiality in terms of the degree to which an entirely separate thirdspace of action 
and activity is opened up, a type of space that can be actualised (or not) by child 
protagonists in different ways, including as a performance of play.4 
In addition, the degree of child protagonists’ involvement in the 
construction of spaces within such fantasy novels can also reveal a number of 
things. These include the extent to which the texts embed and manifest shifting 
and various views of adult-child power relationships on a spatial level, what is 
made available to the protagonists (and, in turn, readers), and how they operate 
both for or against the child protagonists, and for and against readers (both child 
and adult). On a simple level, these possibilities can be seen when comparing the 
spaces of ‘other world’ fantasy fiction to that of fairy tales since ‘fairyland’ is a 
“space where things happen, not a place of itself” (Hunt, “Introduction” 12). A 
fairy tale setting is more often than not undefined, but singular, and “fairy tales 
take place in one magical world, detached from our own both in space and in 
time,” observes Maria Nikolajeva, placed in an “imaginary world, which does 
not have any connection with reality, at least not the reader/listener’s reality” 
(“Fairy Tale” 141, 142). This separateness is not the case with fantasy ‘other 
worlds’ at all, where some kind of connection, however tenuous is generally 
present. 
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This spatial approach will also work very broadly within David Rudd’s 
suggestion that the “problematic of children’s literature lies in the gap between 
the ‘constructed’ and the ‘constructive’ child” (30) on the basis that child 
protagonists can have, as Rudd says, “subject positions available to them” (31), 
positions that can operate outside traditionally conceived power structures. This 
analysis of the spatial dynamics in fiction will show, sometimes in contrast to 
accepted readings, that a spatial approach to children’s fantasy fiction reveals 
much in terms of the degree to which it provides the potential for autonomous 
action (and the nature of that action), and the opportunity for agency on the part 
of child protagonists.  
The need to attend, as Mavis Reimer and Clare Bradford point out of 
texts generally, to “how texts work, to the discourses circulating within texts and 
to the ways in which such discourses produce meanings” (215, original 
emphasis) begs the question of how to discuss this spatial element and how it 
operates in ways that offer most potential for approaching children’s fantasy 
other world fiction. As Lucie Armitt suggests of fantasy, “while it projects us 
beyond the horizon on the level of content,” at the same time it “harnesses us 
within clearly defined constraints on the level of narrative structure” (Fantasy 7). 
The first problem, then, is how to approach the spatiality of ‘other world’ fantasy 
novels for children through the narrative structure and in more than just a 
descriptive fashion; what means are available to afford due attention to these 
narrative representations of spatiality?  
Traditionally, narrative theory has argued that a work of fiction need only 
really be analysed in terms of its plot events and, to a lesser extent, 
characterisation: “[t]he setting ‘sets the character off’ in the usual figurative 
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sense of the expression; it is the place and collection of objects ‘against which’ 
his actions and passions appropriately emerge” (Chatman 138–9). In effect, the 
predominant narratological perspective, as Susan Stanford Friedman points out, 
is that “[w]hat happens to characters in time is the ‘figure’ we pay attention to; 
where the plot happens in space is the ‘ground’ we can ignore at will” (194).5 
This somewhat dismissive narratological approach to the spatiality of fiction is 
no less true in children’s literature, where a common perspective is that, “while 
children’s stories contain descriptions of setting and character, they concentrate 
on action—on what happens next. Their main focus is always,” says Perry 
Nodelman, “on the events of the plot” (Pleasure 160–1), and the places and 
spaces where those plot events take place are of minimal concern.  
Even Nikolajeva, whilst arguing the case for narratology’s benefits in the 
study of children’s literature, and despite asserting that narrative theory “is 
particularly applicable in children’s literature scholarship” (“Beyond” 5), does 
not consider the spatial at all. As a result, although Mieke Bal does observe that 
“few concepts deriving from the theory of narrative text are as self-evident” as 
the spatial (Narratology 132), the spatial has often been regarded as a part of 
description in general and, therefore, as “quite naturally the ancilla narrationis, 
the ever-necessary, ever-submissive, never emancipated slave” (Genette, 
“Frontiers” 848). Narratological theories, at least in the past, have largely ignored 
it, seeing it as being a descriptive, rather than a discursive, element of texts, “a 
fixed element of the text, added to provide emotional coloring or decor, and thus 
of secondary importance” (Martin 122).6 This approach to the spatiality of 
narrative has been the case even though it would seem axiomatic that “spatial 
reference [is] not an optional or peripheral feature of stories, but rather a core 
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property that helps constitute narrative domains” (Herman, Story 296, original 
emphasis).7 The spaces of fiction, as constitutive, are surely impossible to 
overlook. 
Recently, there has been something of a narratological re-thinking about 
the spatiality of fiction, with efforts made to find ways to account for its value 
within the text.8 However, the earlier lack of narratological attention to the 
spatial is understandable in many ways since, at first sight at least, it is the case 
that “narrative space is clearly less amenable to discursive manipulation than is 
narrative time” (O’Neill 47). How can the spatial be discussed when, compared 
to time, its presence in the text defies ways to approach it? Indeed, on the point 
of a grammar of narrative space, at least one critic has gone so far as to suggest 
that “literary theory is unprepared to respond to this challenge or invitation,” 
thereby ignoring “the full potential of spatial language in narrative discourse” 
(Kort, Place 10), a damning indictment indeed, if it is deemed true.  
The apparent difficulties should not, however, make understanding the 
operations of the spatial an altogether impossible task. Certainly, as Edward Soja 
notes, 
[t]he discipline imprinted in a sequentially unfolding narrative 
predisposes the reader to think historically, making it difficult to 
see the text as a map, a geography of simultaneous relations and 
meanings that are tied together by a spatial rather than a temporal 
logic. (Postmodern 1) 
 
However, an emphasis only on novelistic time denies that people (and literary 
protagonists) are always “out there” in the world(s), engaging with it spatially in 
some way. In this regard, Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the chronotope, arguing 
as it does for “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships 
 7 
that are artistically expressed in literature” (“Forms” 84), would seem to offer a 
useful analytical tool.  
Unfortunately, even despite Bakhtin’s insistence on the “inseparability of 
space and time” (“Forms” 84), the use of his concept of the chronotope in 
analyses of children’s literature has done little to come fully to terms with the 
implications of topos; reliance has been largely on chronos.9 Perhaps this is not 
surprising since, as Bakhtin observes, “it has been temporal relationships by and 
large that have been studied—and these in isolation from the spatial relationships 
indissolubly tied up with them” (“Forms” 258). Indeed, despite some claims to 
the contrary, even Bakhtin himself seems to spend most of his efforts discussing 
the concept of the chronotope in terms of time and temporality rather than the 
spatial.10 This does not mean, however, that Bakhtin should be ignored, quite the 
contrary in fact. 
As David Herman notes, “spatialization in narrative is [...] inextricably 
linked with perspective” (Story 301), and Bakhtin, too, has observed that the 
spatiality of the novel generally operates on different levels of perspective. Thus, 
Bakhtin differentiates between what the protagonist sees and experiences and the 
background or spatial setting that is seen by the authors since, as Bakhtin says, 
“the spatial form of the hero expresses the author’s relationship to the hero” 
(“Author” 96, original emphasis).11 In terms of the spatiality of the novel, 
therefore, Bakhtin posits an important difference between a character’s 
perspective and the environment in which the character is situated. This is a 
reminder that at least one element of the spatiality of the novel is spatiality with 
particular respect to the protagonist. The protagonists’ perceived spatial 
environment, the protagonist’s self-location, depends upon the interrelations 
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between perceptual experience of, and some form of purposeful interaction with, 
the perceived environment; that is, there is a context of basic spatial action and 
experience within the protagonist’s perceived world.  
Understanding the spatiality of fantasy ‘other world’ fiction requires, 
therefore, not just attention to the fixed frame of reference that relates to start and 
end points (useful though that may be in some respects). It also requires an 
alternative perspective different from the critical gaze that takes a position from 
outside the text and, as such, imposes itself on texts, a position that might lead to 
a neglect of the protagonist’s perspective of the spatial environment. What is 
more pertinent to an understanding of the spaces of ‘other worlds’ is a 
perspective that is more properly related to the protagonists and their movement 
and actions within the different spaces that are presented.  
Bakhtin aside, in children’s literature criticism, approaches to the 
spatiality of fantasy ‘other world’ texts have largely rested on identifying 
difference rather than seeking to understand the spatial itself. In this separation, 
‘real’ and ‘unreal’ belong to distinct orders in that there are “two worlds, a real 
one (primary) and a magic one (secondary)” (Nikolajeva, Magic 13, original 
emphasis).12 These “two distinct worlds,” says Ann Swinfen, are “inevitably 
thrown into sharp juxtaposition” (44). On this separation, as China Miéville 
points out, the general consideration of fantasy is that it “has as its impossible the 
never-possible” (45, original emphasis), which requires an oppositionally posited 
real for its existence.13 The irony is, of course, that ‘reality’ has been historically 
been set in opposition to fantasy, and yet the ‘real’ is also depicted as a 
somewhat unstable state itself and, often enough, one from which escape is 
sought. 
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Nevertheless, this reliance on binaries is no accident. The organisation of 
social thought in patterns of opposites is certainly very common and “is clearly a 
kind of system that human beings keep inventing and living by, independently of 
each other” (Maybury-Lewis 1). Unfortunately, however, as Moretti notes, 
despite the growing complexity of the novel, this binary model “has never been 
really challenged” (107).14 Moretti argues, therefore, that “the precondition of 
narrative is a binary opposition” (107). Given the likelihood that academia does 
have an “inherited tendency to construct and thereby think in terms of binary and 
hierarchical categories” (Preston x), then Michel Foucault’s assertion that “our 
life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that remain inviolable, 
that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down” (“Of Other” 
23) has a degree of validity. This does not, however, make recourse to binaries 
an absolute, and nor is the seemingly entrenched position of binary structures an 
unassailable one. 
An understanding of the spatial as a binary (particularly the spatial in 
children’s fantasy fiction) arises because, however varied the narratives might be, 
home-away-home is indeed an evident feature, at least on one level of 
examination, of most children’s novels of this type. The fantasy journey in 
particular is commonly of this departure and return type, and so “the action often 
ends where it began (Manlove, Alice 197). A protagonist either wants something 
or someone, or needs to get to a certain place—whether it be an actual location, 
or some form of metaphorical place—and reaches that point before returning to 
the place from which the journey began. The pattern’s eminent applicability to 
children’s literature and the way it is approached is a common thread that weaves 
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through the criticism of children’s fiction, particularly the notion of the 
importance of the return, specifically the return to home. 
This adherence to a formulaic pattern is not surprising given the nature of 
the protagonists as children, and given the standard view that, ultimately, 
children are in need of protection and a place of safety; these narratives, then, 
almost invariably do offer a circular journey that returns home.15 The ‘other 
worlds’ in fantasy fiction do seem to offer a ready-made location wherein the 
child protagonist(s) can develop or mature in an ‘away’ space, with the real of 
consensus reality temporarily left behind but always returned to in the end. This 
argument broadly suggests that travelling from one world to another mirrors the 
child protagonists’ path from childhood (or adolescence) to adulthood or at least 
a greater degree of knowledge or experience. 
In addition, the home-away-home theme implicitly functions from a 
standpoint that accepts the notion of place and space as being largely immaterial, 
as a narrative background with which to highlight the events of the formulaic 
plot structure in the process of the child’s enlightenment in some way. In doing 
so, it inherently conceives of the interaction between the child protagonist and 
the places and spaces that the child protagonist encounters as a passive one in 
that the landscape is simply a given that is neither shaped by nor, less often, 
shapes, the protagonist. Whilst such a generalisation not only ignores the 
importance of landscape for protagonists in a number of fantasy texts, in essence 
it also follows the standard narratological position whereby spatiality is seen as 
no more than a descriptive element of the text. 
Moreover, whilst this general perception of the nature of such fiction 
applies on one level, the binary is likely to posit home (or consensus reality) as 
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best inasmuch as binaries tend towards hierarchical oppositions. Its application to 
readings also operates to bolster the belief that the purpose of children’s fantasy 
fiction is ultimately a conservative one and, for Nikolajeva at least this even 
applies to cases where the protagonists do not return home. For what she terms 
the “linear” journey, and its variation, “[t]he so called ‘open ending’” (Children’s 
81), Nikolajeva argues that the standard home-away-home pattern is still in 
operation (Children’s 80). Perry Nodelman also recently concluded that 
children’s literature “is binary and oppositional in structure and in theme. Its 
stories tend to have two main settings, each of which represents one of a pair of 
central opposites” (Hidden 243). Thus, the formula of the structural binary seems 
to operate, in a basic sense, as a set of rules to follow. 
The logical conclusion is that the pattern implicitly, but not necessarily 
correctly, represents the writer as being no more than a vehicle for the 
archetypes. To some degree at least, this understanding thereby inherently 
invalidates the conscious decisions, peculiar techniques, and singular vision that 
the writer might have had in employing such elements towards any particular 
end, whilst simultaneously wresting any initiative away from the reader and into 
the hands of the critic. Whether this organisational system stands or falls, it also 
inherently expects that the reader will inevitably ‘see’ the pattern and its import, 
thereby failing to acknowledge whatever schema each individual reader will 
bring to the reading process (something which I discuss further in chapter four). 
Whilst charting the narrative within a binary understanding of departure 
and return, home and away, may satisfy a certain desire for an ultimate sense of 
order, in effect, the binary retains a view of the spatial in ‘other world’ fantasy 
literature that is, to use Gaston Bachelard’s terms, a matter of “[t]he dialectics of 
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here and there,” whereby “these unfortunate adverbs of place are endowed with 
unsupervised powers of ontological determination” (212, original emphasis). In 
effect, here, “[t]he inside needs the outside in order be inside” (Owen 264, 
original emphasis) because “conventional deployment of this pattern,” says 
Richard Gooding, “usually imposes strict boundaries between real and fantasy 
worlds, thereby containing uncanny effects within the fantasy realm” (393). The 
binary elements support and protect each other even though ne’er the twain shall 
meet within a critical paradigm so tightly tied to binary oppositions that the 
ground is created for the abjection of the other place using the child protagonist 
as proxy. 
The theoretical limitations of adhering to the kind of formulaic approach 
the pattern indicates can also place limitations on its value as an interpretative 
tool, for 
[w]ithout clear empirical evidence for the existence of the pattern 
claimed, such models find it hard to escape the charges of being 
arbitrary, methodologically naïve, poor in actual explanatory 
power, and insufficiently generalisable to account for more than a 
modest class of traditional or traditionalist narrative types. (Lowe 
10) 
 
This apparent failing to fully and properly account for texts is not necessarily, 
therefore, able to offer an appropriate tool for analysing varied textual 
representations, and yet the structuralist approach, as Ross Chambers argues,  
has rarely displayed any suspicion of the objective status of its 
analyses: it believes in a stable and immediately knowable text, 
directly available to classificatory operations that are themselves 
natural and innocent of interpretive bias. (18–19)  
 
Ultimately, too, the binary approach does not lend itself to readings of the spaces 
that comprise the bulk of the narratives, those spaces that are not the beginning 
and ends points, and nor does it explain the how and why of the spatial itself.  
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As Sarah Gilead observes, “[d]espite its commonness, indeed its seeming 
naturalness, the pattern is surprisingly varied in dramatic mode and in meaning” 
and, consequently, “[t]he simple aesthetics of parallel or circular narrative 
framing may function for obvious interpretations but falter on closer scrutiny” 
(277, 278). Useful, therefore, as the structural approach might be in terms of 
identifying patterns within novels, it says little about either how the texts work or 
the perspective of the protagonists. It is not, then, the case that this ‘other’ 
dimension offers up a world that is conceived as a counterpoint to the world in 
which the normal life is lived, a dissociation from the ordinary world of 
consensus reality. This view would seem to be far too simplistic, and the 
difference, here, is between taking either a surface understanding of the spatial, 
or a deeper one. 
The problem of binaries also applies to that which poses an opposition 
between real and unreal. As Mark Bould argues, fantasy worlds “are not only not 
true to the extratextual world but, by definition, do not seek or pretend to be” 
(81). Certainly, fantasy ‘other world’ novels, full of talking animals, ogres, giants 
and a host of other non-human beings and events as they are, would seem to 
epitomise the distinction between the unreal and the real as John Morris suggests:  
The characteristic features of fantasy—invention, unreality, the 
unearthly, and the imaginative—show us that a distinction should 
be drawn between the literature of fantasy and fiction. (77) 
 
This fantasy/realism dichotomy has been identified by John Stephens as “the 
most important generic distinction in children’s fiction” (Language 7). In this 
binary, realism lays claim to superiority over fantasy, says Stephens, on the basis 
that “realism typically illuminates life as it is” (Language 242). By the middle of 
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the twentieth century, says Stephens, the desire to “polarize fantasy and realism 
into rival genres” (Language 241), had resolved itself  
into an identification of seriousness with realism and a 
concomitant consigning of fantasy to non-serious or popular 
literature for those audiences, such as children, deemed incapable 
of complex aesthetic responses. (Language 241–2) 
 
Thus, fantasy literature has regularly been placed in opposition to rationalism and 
the approaches to knowledge that have predominated in the western world since 
the Enlightenment, approaches that inevitably work against the establishment of 
divergent modes of knowledge. 
However, the realism/fantasy split is a superficial one in itself. In very 
basic terms, of course, “[a]ll fiction is fantasy, insofar as narrative scenarios 
comprise an interiorised image (one having existence only in the author’s head) 
projected outwards onto a blank page” (Armitt, Fantasy 2). All novels provide 
settings that are ultimately imaginary; they all present a “storyworld,” which is 
“the world evoked implicitly as well as explicitly by a narrative” (Herman, Basic 
106). Even so, although Stephens rightly acknowledges that “[a]ll fiction is of 
course, at least one remove from reality,” he adds that this necessarily implies 
that “fantasy is presumably at least twice removed, in that it is a representation of 
something which does not exist in the actual world” (Language 242) a separation 
that pushes fantasy fiction further and firmly away from the real.  
Arguing for this distinction also reinforces the possibility that fantasy will 
be less highly considered as a form since, if the real and unreal of fiction are 
polarised through the transfer of the character of the ‘real’ lived world to the 
fictional ‘real’ world, it automatically confers upon the ‘other world’ the status of 
‘unreal’: fantasy as opposition. In contrast, for John Timmerman, “the world of 
fantasy matches our world in reality. It is not a dream world, a never-never land” 
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(49), and the positioning of an unreal fantasy as a contrast to realism can be 
problematic. One reason for this problem is that, as Bould observes, the real 
“extratexual world” is “itself an ideological—and, arguably, therefore a 
fantastic—construct” (81). As a consequence,  
what used to be called empirical reality , or the world, seems to 
have become more and more unreal, and what has long been 
regarded as unreal is more and more turned to or studied as the 
only “true” or “another equally valid” reality. (Brooke-Rose 4) 
 
Moreover, as Yi-Fu Tuan notes, “although ‘realism’ and ‘fantasy’ have clear and 
opposite meanings conceptually, their application to real-life situations is often 
ambiguous and problematical,” and thus, says Tuan, “we would do well to 
hesitate before placing people or a cultural manifestation in the camp of realism 
or of fantasy” (“Realism” 435). Things, it seems, are not what they appear to be. 
A corollary to this conventional dualism is that fantasy fiction, as Lucie 
Armitt notes, has “often been considered more frivolous than the mimetic” 
(Theorising 2). Daphne Kutzer also points out that “[f]antasy, more than realistic 
fiction, is often considered to be escapist in the most negative sense of the word, 
and hence to be devoid of any serious purpose whatsoever” (79). With regard 
more specifically to ‘other world’ fiction, Ann Swinfen is critical of what she 
sees as this type of text’s decided lack of substance, and she suggests that it has  
neither the firm underpinning of realism found in the fantasy set 
entirely in the primary world, nor the combination of imaginative 
freedom and logical discipline which shapes the creation of the 
pure secondary world fantasy. (74)  
 
This lack of substance is compounded, it would seem, by the fact that children’s 
fantasy fiction, as Nikolajeva says, “is sometimes regarded as purely formulaic 
fiction” (“Fairy Tale” 138); ironically, Nodelman suggests that this 
understanding impedes analysis and interpretation since “so few children’s 
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novels move much beyond the formulaic or stereotypical” (“Interpretation” 5, 
original emphasis), at least in a structural sense.  
This attribution of simplicity may be a virtue for some for, as Margery 
Hourihan suggests, one possible reason for the popularity of fantasy novels “is 
their very predictability; the formula to which they conform is so familiar that 
they present no challenge to the reader’s interpretive or critical skills” (9). 
However, appeals to this formula surely only confirm the arguments of those 
who, as Hunt notes, condemn fantasy literature as “formulaic, childish, and 
escapist” (“Introduction” 2), and whose aesthetic displeasure with children’s 
literature arises precisely from the claim that it is indeed a simple pattern for 
simple texts for simple readers. These critical (in both senses of the word) ideas, 
as Hume points out, denigrate fantasy literature (and, more specifically here, 
‘other world’ fantasy fiction) on the basis that it “does not push us to think” and, 
therefore, that it “needs no explication and provides no opportunity for 
sophisticated analysis” (60, 59). In turn, this kind of thinking questions the 
choice of the aesthetic safe ground by appealing to exactly the kind of approach 
to the genre that is used by its critics to denigrate it. 
If fantasy literature is belittled, children’s fantasy literature must fall 
somewhere even lower on the scale within a western intellectual tradition that 
often works to deny, and defend against, the establishment of alternative modes 
of knowledge. Such thinking also ignores Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
identification of the need “to explore the irrational and integrate it into an 
expanded reason,” which he saw as “the task of our century” (63) (the twentieth 
century). It is also a way of thinking that, as Gordon Slethaug points out, has led 
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to “an inherently dualistic and limited way of defining and perceiving reality, one 
that has not allowed for aleatoric principles” (190). As Slethaug adds,  
[t]his self-enclosed frame of reference cherishes all the 
philosophical and idealistic concepts of rationalism—cause and 
effect, coherence, order, and balance—and specifically denigrates 
or excludes those aspects that are irrational, animal like, orderless, 
and chaotic. (190) 
 
One might add that irrational, animal-like, orderless and chaotic are terms that 
could be applied to both the figure and world of the child, as well as to fantasy 
worlds, for as Rosemary Jackson has noted, “[f]rom a rational, ‘monologic’ 
world, otherness cannot be known or represented, except as foreign, irrational, 
‘mad’, ‘bad’” (Jackson 173); that is, the place of the real is the only location of 
the rational and objective order.  
However, whether this binary mode of understanding can or should still 
be maintained is open to question. As Louisa Jones comments,  
[t]he fantasy-reality duality was one of many conventional 
nineteenth century oppositions: objective-subjective, adult-child, 
work-play, matter-spirit, belief in progress-nostalgia for an 
innocent past, and, particularly, science-art. (238)  
 
Jones’ comment implies that not only is there something anachronistic in 
maintaining the binary, but also that the terms themselves are in need of re-
evaluation. On the question of how one might consider the superiority of the real, 
for instance, Jacques Ehrmann has argued that 
it is legitimate to wonder by what right “reality” may be said to be 
first, existing prior to its components [...] and serving as their 
standard. How could “reality” serve as a norm and thereby 
guarantee normality even before having been tested and evaluated 
in and through its manifestations? (33, original emphasis) 
 
This contestation of the supremacy of the real applies equally, I believe, to 
fantasy ‘other world’ texts.  
 18 
A dualistic response and the notion of distinct separation between the 
literary realist and fantastic has been argued against. As Hume suggests, rather 
than opposing binaries, literature can be seen as “the product of two impulses,” 
whereby “[w]e need not try to claim a work as fantasy any more than we identify 
a work as a mimesis. Rather, we have many genres and forms, each with a 
characteristic blend or range of blends of the two impulses” (20). Following 
Hume, Matthew Grenby also notes the need for a more nuanced understanding of 
the connection in this case, one that recognises, at the very least, that “the 
supernatural and the normal exist together in fantasy texts, in various proportions 
and combinations, but there is no ratio which governs their relationship” (150). 
Here, Hume and Grenby argue for something akin to Mircea Eliade’s 
“coincidentia oppositorum,” which for him is “the paradox of divine reality” 
(419) which, for my purposes, has no spiritual resonance but does refers to a 
“coinciding of opposites,” where “contraries are reconciled (or rather, 
transcended)” (420, 419), where the two extremes of the binary are seen as 
mutually reflexive and interdependent.  
This fluidity in the nature of what is real or unreal is fundamental to my 
discussions in subsequent chapters since it leads towards Eliade’s claim that the 
coincidentia oppositorum is also a state where “actual and potential” exist at the 
same time (419) and, in a literary context, this idea of coinciding creates a 
position where it should be possible to comprehend the spatial from the 
perspective of both the material and mental domains simultaneously. This 
possibilty opens up because “fantasy and our conception of what is fantastic 
depend upon our view of reality,” and thus “the fantastic will therefore 
necessarily vary with the individual and the age” (Landow 107). This 
 19 
perspectival approach does, of course, open up the possibility of removing such 
antithetical categorisations as ‘fantasy’ and ‘realism’ altogether for this lack of 
fixity of meaning means, as Ehrmann states, that “there is no ‘reality’ (ordinary 
or extraordinary!) outside of or prior to the manifestations of the culture that 
expresses it” (33); the real can thus be differently understood.  
It would appear that the binary that sets real against real needs to be 
broken down since, “[w]hen the actual or real is moved out of its exclusive 
identification with the external world” says Richard Frankel, it is possible to 
rethink the notion of the real to the point where “fantasy processes, in their 
capacity to create coherent and organized worlds, can be viewed as bearing 
qualities of the real” (9).16 In what Frankel proposes here, it is possible to see a 
way to approach the nature of fantasy ‘other world’ fiction since, as Paul Fox 
asserts, “[t]o maintain this discrete separation between the imaginary and the real 
is to preclude the capacity of the fictive for imagining new, mutually beneficial 
relationships and identities beyond oppositional binaries” (255); the distinction 
works to foreclose any understanding of how the spaces of fantasy ‘other’ world 
novels might open up the possibility for other kinds of spatial practices. 
What is required, therefore, is the creative faculty “to see beyond the 
concrete universe and to envision other ways of living and alternative mindsets” 
(Pierce 180). This envisioning requires moving beyond binary readings of real 
and unreal, home and away, and looking for a way to approach how these texts 
operate spatially as constructed worlds that do not operate as specifically real or 
unreal, one that removes fantasy from “its role as an illusory opposition to the 
events of our actual historical reality” (Frankel 9). In this way, when fantasy “is 
no longer considered merely fictive and imaginary, the antithesis of what is real, 
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it takes on a life force and coherence of its own” (Frankel 9), and it becomes 
possible to establish a different mode of thinking about fantasy ‘other world’ 
literature for children. Thus, if I can appropriate, here, the words of the character 
Gollum when speaking to Frodo in J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings 
(1968), “O yes, O yes, there is a third way” (667). 
To borrow from Teresa de Lauretis, what is needed is “a new 
perspective—a view from ‘elsewhere’” (25), and this basis for this new 
perspective, this third way, lies within the how the notion of spatiality has been 
re-envisioned in recent times. This new perspective on spatiality works with 
“another mode of thinking about space that draws upon the material and mental 
spaces of the traditional dualism but extends well beyond them in scope 
substance and meaning” (Soja, Thirdspace 11) in order to consider how an 
alternative locus of spatial activity might provide that view. 
Such a view from elsewhere requires not so much an identification of 
fantasy as a separate, different place; rather, it is that the fantasy ‘other’ world 
structures and maintains a reality. Social theories of spatiality in recent years 
have tended to move away from the notion of Cartesian certainties to 
considerations of the world as not simply ‘there’ as a natural and objective 
phenomena, but as constructed by a range of different social practices. As Alison 
Waller notes, understanding the spatial as a social construction recognises that  
there is no simple distinction between reality ‘out there’ and 
imagination within; rather, the world we experience is formed by 
our interactions with it while our subjective selves, in turn, are 
partially created through those interactions. (304)17  
 
There is nothing new in this idea of reality as a construction, of course. As 
Waller points out, “[t]his is a commonplace of cultural studies, of course, and 
represents a constructionist stance that has been influential in literary criticism 
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since the 1960s” (304). What has not been done is to take such ideas and operate 
with them within the realm of literary studies of fantasy worlds in children’s 
literature. Doing so affords an opportunity to reconsider the notions of real and 
unreal as spatial absolutes in these texts and to see their constructedness and thie 
more fluid identities. 
This is useful because the spaces in these texts can be more or less 
divergent from the world of consensus reality, more or less fantastic, and, as with 
Hume’s understanding of fantasy and reality mixing in varying degrees, the 
nature of spatiality and the manner in which it operates in various novels can be 
seen as operating in a variety of ways. However, this variety does not rely upon 
catgories of real and unreal (on the basis that such a binary fails to recognise 
fully the nature of the space-making that can occur), but is manifested in 
differing mixtures of the spatially dynamic (as a narrative unfolding of space 
within the authorship of child protagonists), and the spatially inert (where space 
is made available at the will of the author, and often, too, where the protagonist 
has little or no control over access to it). Here, however, the term “spatially inert” 
does not suggest that there are no spaces to be found in these texts, and nor is it 
meant to imply in any sense that the narrative is necessarily lessened, for each 
text will have its own special qualities and considerations over and above the 
nature of the spatiality it shows.18 At the same time, however, there is a need to 
assess the extent to which authors allow that spatial imaginary to be dwelt in and 
for agency to be displayed, agency for my purposes here being a “constitutive” 
action that “implies the idea of ‘causal power’ through which we realize the 
potential of the world” (Karp 137), a potential that includes the locative.19  
 22 
What is needed, therefore, is a way to assimilate the fantasy topos, and an 
understanding of its implications, within the wider possibility of approaches 
available with which to study fantasy ‘other world’ novels for children (which, in 
turn, also suggests the need to re-think notions of spatiality in children’s 
literature generally). The problem is how to effect such an assimilation without 
simply withdrawing into descriptions; what words and discourse are available 
when narratologist have tended to ignore the spatial, and when fantasy has itself 
been persistently denigrated. Where existing approaches are often based on 
patterns or ways of knowing that only really give a cursory nod to the spatial in 
pursuit of other objectives such as the affirmation of a maturation process or the 
confirmation of the return home as the ultimate goal, it is necessary to 
differentiate between defined geographies (descriptive) and the spatial 
imaginaries (discursive) that re-evoke and appropriate, or reterritorialise that 
geography for a purpose or function other than originally intended.  
One way out of this seeming critical straightjacket, therefore, may be 
quite a disruptive one, as Soja suggests: 
Critical theory and Western Marxism have been so muted with 
regard to spatiality for so long that the inclusion of a theoretically 
meaningful spatial dimension may not be possible without 
shattering many well-established interpretive assumptions and 
approaches, especially those associated with the deeply ingrained 
primacy of historical versus geographical modes of explanation 
and critique. (Postmodern 44–5) 
 
Soja’s suggestion would seem to be equally applicable to any effort to try to go 
beyond the ascription of sameness and understand what the spatial imaginary is 
in children’s fantasy fiction, and how it might actually operate.  
Thus, rather than taking an approach that would focus only on a static 
point (the beginning and end point), and which effectively closes off accounts of 
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any other spatial processes that might be evident, the focus will shift. As Gilles 
Deleuze argues, “[i]t is never the beginning or the end that are interesting; the 
beginning and the end are points. What is interesting is the middle” (Dialogues 
39). To explore these middles, the focus needs to move away from “the end-
weighting of much critical reading by concentrating on middles, both in temporal 
terms of the middle of a narrative and in the spatial terms of ‘in-between’ 
locations” (Reimer and Bradford 215).20 Given this perspective shift, it seems 
appropriate that some other way of looking at the spatial in fantasy other world 
novels for children requires an expanded conceptual framework within which to 
deal with its multifaceted nature.  
It is important, however, not to open up the possibility of another 
binary—that of new/old—in terms of approaches to children’s literature, for this 
move risks leading to “a paradigm-trashing replacement strategy that reinforces 
and reifies one component at the expense of the other,” one that “privileges the 
new over the old, usurps intellectual territory, and severs connections with the 
past” (Rowntree 582). Instead, as Ricardo Gullón suggests, there is a need  
to understand space as part of a whole which gives it meaning. Its 
relation with time, with the characters, with the narrator, with the 
readers and their relation to it, are all together more important than 
a separate consideration of each of these elements. (28) 
 
What is required is that the often neglected spatial aspect of the chronotope be 
brought into sharper focus because, in Wesley Kort’s opinion, 
if we recognize the constitutive role of spatial language in 
narrative discourse and do that without denigrating the other 
languages of narrative, we end with a more complex and variable 
understanding of narrative discourse than is otherwise available. 
(Place 14)21  
 
In an effort to work towards a way to incorporate spatial language as Kort 
suggests, the spatial approach I take here seeks to supplement, rather than 
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supplant, other approaches in seeking to understand fantasy ‘other world’ texts 
for children. 
Rather than simply discarding traditional ways, therefore, I will follow 
Soja’s suggestion to look at ways of “opening up and expanding the scope and 
critical sensibility of [one’s] already established spatial or geographical 
imaginations” (Thirdspace 1). In doing so, I will not be concerned with 
describing the depiction of the spatial creations that are the ‘other’ worlds found 
in fantasy fiction for children, worlds such as Oz or Narnia (although not all of 
the worlds in fantasy fiction for children are actually named and, often enough, 
detailed descriptions are, in any case, distinctly lacking). I refrain from such 
descriptive work partly because it has already been attempted, but also because, 
apart from it being a huge task in itself, simply providing descriptive or 
classificatory assessments of fantasy worlds would tend to generalise, and it 
would not seek to understand how the wide variety of places and spaces in 
fantasy fiction for children might function or operate.22  
In order to examine the shape of the spatial in texts for children, I have 
freely borrowed from diverse fields: sociology, philosophy, and geography, 
archaeology. These theories and ideas are, speaking generally, neither directly 
related to literature nor to childhood, but rather to adults and real world 
experiences and issues. They emerged originally as part of a postructural 
movement away from grand narrative explanations that encompassed a belief in 
an absolute space and that material spaces could be truthfully, accurately and 
objectively represented. In a critical re-evaluation of space and spatiality in social 
thought that, much as with literary approaces to settings, had previously seen 
space and place as pre-existing givens playing a a passive role as a setting for 
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social action, these newer theories of spatiality began to see space as a relational 
social construction lacking stability and fixedness. This also meant that space 
was also seen as subject to issues of gender, power and control, issues that are an 
integral part of discussions about children’s literature. 
Inherently, of course, there are potential pitfalls in making use of 
theoretical positions that seem to have no immediate relationship to the subject in 
hand. Clearly, the theories of place and space I draw upon to develop a literary 
understanding of textual space-making reference the ‘real’ world—the actual 
Cartesian world of consensus reality—and particularly the ‘real’ world of the 
adult. Recent spatial theories still largely fail to account for the child (however 
that term might be conceived) and, more specifically, the literary child 
protagonist, or even to address children’s literature itself. Indeed, even the more 
“politically correct” theorists and critics still largely ignore children’s literature.23 
Moreover, studies of the production of the spatial and how it shapes, and is being 
shaped by, power relationships, practices, identities, and subjectivities do not 
always show how spaces are actively used and reconstructed by those who are 
not necessarily the original makers of these spaces. Children very much fall into 
the latter category and children as protagonists in literature even more so. 
However, although there may be no obvious connection with fantasy 
worlds in children’s fiction, I have located theoretical foundations that can help 
to explain what is happening spatially in texts, how spatiality is represented and 
constructed through narratives of different types and at different times. The 
literary approach I adopt, therefore, takes note of the theoretical perspectives that 
focus on social space, deny the privilege of time over space, argue for the 
constructed nature of space in the world of consensus reality—theories which in 
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themselves look back to the nature of space in past times as well as to the 
present—in order to shed light on textual productions on the basis that texts 
themselves are, in their presentations of constructed spaces, effectively no 
different from constructions of spaces in the quotidian.  
Moreover, as Mieke Bal observes, concepts move “between disciplines, 
between individual scholars, between historical periods, and between 
geographically dispersed academic communities” (Travelling 24), and this is 
something that needs to happen “if we are to elude the constraints of our 
immediate intellectual environment” (Said 241). In part, therefore, I have made 
such borrowings in order to offer a new way to approach children’s literature. 
However, this is not the only reason for, as Pamela Gilbert has recognised, 
[l]iterary studies are interested not only in how literature reflects 
such understandings of space—how they operate thematically and 
at the level of plot and setting—but also in how literature shapes 
the understanding of space, how it intervenes in culture to produce 
new understandings. (105) 
 
Rather than simply recycle these theories and apply them as they stand, however, 
I have adapted them where necessary in order to relate them to literary 
representation in children’s fantasy fiction. The rationale behind this adoption of 
concepts from outside the field of literary studies is also premised upon the 
notion that no work of art (including, of course, children’s literature, regardless 
of any claim to its inferiority) is wholly innocent of its social context whether it 
mirrors it, reacts against it, or seeks to ignore it entirely.  
To develop the notion that spatiality, as Henri Lefebvre suggests, should 
be seen as being “less and less neutral, more and more active, both as an 
instrument and as goal, as means and as end” (411), Chapter One sets out to 
theorise the spatial within fantasy ‘other world’ fiction for children. It does this 
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on the basis that “[f]antasy texts and landscapes are not purely fantastic, or rather 
neither more nor less so than other texts or landscapes; rather they are located 
within, and inscribed by, particular social, geographical and cultural discourses” 
(Balfe 75–6). I therefore draw upon theories of spatiality from other fields of 
study to see how they might usefully be employed in order to provide an 
alternative position on the nature of the spatial in this type of fiction. By finding 
a different way to examine how the spatial operates and is utilised in ‘other’ 
world fantasy novels for children, interpretative tools will become available to 
use that have rarely been applied in the study of children’s literature. 
To work through these ideas, I start from the premise that something that 
is generally conceived of as imaginary or unreal can, in fact, be constructed as a 
‘real’ space, a literary thirdspace; in effect, reality is only a trusted fantasy. I will 
then proceed logically from there to examine how, although these texts represent 
spaces that are ostensibly beyond the possibilities of consensus reality, they do 
not transgress real-world experiences and actions of space-making. This 
approach will draw upon and amalgamate various notions of thirdspace as a 
space that is socially constructed: Lefebvre’s Lived Space, Perceived Space and 
Conceived Space, Soja’s trialectic of the spatial, the historical and the social (a 
reworking of Lefebvre); ideas of the nature of space from Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari; and D. W. Winnicott’s concept of the transitional space and 
playing.24 Tying these together will be the work of Michel de Certeau on the 
everyday, social use of space by taking Certeau’s understanding that “every story 
is a travel story—a spatial practice” (Certeau 115), whereby a spatial narrative 
imagination (and, by implication, other narrative forms) offers a way to see 
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beyond what is immediately visible and to actively create spaces, without which 
individuals are restricted by and to the quotidian places of the world. 
Chapter Two will then make use of the theoretical perspective outlined in 
Chapter One. In particular, I will investigate the extent to which such fantasy 
texts can give the impression of opening up the spatial for protagonists, and yet 
ultimately work to close down the possibility of spatial agency. The texts chosen 
for discussion cover a broad time period. In particular, I will examine Mrs 
Molesworth’s The Cuckoo Clock (1877) as an early example of ‘other world’ 
fantasy that explicitly eschews the process of space-making in favour of the 
contained, restrained and regimented world of the adult. I will also examine C. S. 
Lewis’ The Chronicles of Narnia series (1950–1956), together with Philip 
Pullman’s more recent His Dark Materials trilogy (1995–2000), both of which, 
although separated in time by nearly half a century (and perhaps seen as worlds 
apart ideologically), posit the spatial as ultimately controlled by the adult and 
ultimately unavailable to child protagonists other than for their contribution to 
the existing space’s well-being. Finally, there will also be a discussion of Neil 
Gaiman’s Coraline (2002) in terms of the nature of home, and the way in which 
protagonists can often be seen to learn the lesson that home is best, and that the 
urge to explore other spaces needs to be contained. 
Chapter Three will look at texts that, in differing ways, offer fantasy 
‘other’ worlds that are more spatially open, and which show protagonists as 
active agents in the construction or use of spaces. Again, the texts have been 
chosen to represent a wide range over time. Thus, the chapter opens with a 
discussion of Edith Nesbit’s The Magic City (1910) as an example of a Nesbit 
text that has a protagonist constructing his own world and thus presenting an 
 29 
early instance of space-making. The chapter will also discuss Maurice Sendak’s 
Where the Wild Things Are (1963), and William Mayne’s A Game of Dark 
(1971), as additional instances of the construction of thirdspace through the 
agency of the protagonists. The chapter will also consider The Homeward 
Bounders (1981), by Diana Wynne Jones, as an examples of a protagonist taking 
control of movement and the spatial even when it is not originally of the 
protagonist’s making. N. E. Bodes The Slippery Map (2007) is also examined as 
an instance of creative space-making that involves not only a child protagonist, 
but also adults, and considers the implications this has for the ongoing creation of 
spaces throughout life rather than confining them as only the activities of the 
child. 
Not only are the texts I discuss in Chapters Two and Three representative 
of a wide range in terms of their date of publication, but they are also quite 
diverse in terms of the intended reader, from texts aimed at younger child readers 
to those for older readers (although I have attempted to allow for the age of 
protagonists as an element of my discussions). In terms of my discussion of these 
texts, I should note at the outset that, for the most part, my reading of the texts is 
not historical. This choice of approach is primarily taken because, as Hume 
points out, “[i]f the non-real is your focus, you have no stable point of reference, 
and the individuality of each departure from reality, each creation of something 
new, renders chronology irrelevant” (xii). Whilst this approach may have its 
drawbacks and detractors, and whilst it may limit readings in certain respects, I 
follow Hume on this occasion precisely and specifically to tease out the spatial 
elements of the different texts I consider.25
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I should also note, here, that the texts I discuss are all by Anglophone 
writers. This choice is a matter both of personal ease and because the vast 
majority of writers of this type of fiction are British or from the USA, something 
which does, in one sense, represent a noticeable bias, and one that is not easy to 
overcome. In addition, the texts have been chosen not only for their various 
presentations of the spatiality of other worlds, but also (and quite simply) 
because I enjoyed reading them, and the pleasure of the text is something all too 
often forgotten when academia lays claim to a body of work, as has been done 
with children’s literature.  
Finally, in Chapter Four, I will broaden the discussion and bring the 
notions that I outline in terms of literary spatiality back to the ‘real’ world by 
looking at how the textual operations of place-making and readings of that place-
making experience might open up possibilities for readers (both child and adult), 
in terms of meaning making, and their own subjectivities and potential for spatial 
agency. This chapter recognises that “human experience of space is always 
mediated by human relations with the world, material and discursive” (Gilbert 
103). Implicitly, too, it will consider a perennial argument in children’s literature 
studies as to whether children’s books are written “for the purpose of socializing 
their target audience” (Stephens, Language 8), or whether these texts should be 
treated as the vehicles for individual and social change. Regarding these possible 
role for children’s texts, I will consider the possibility that fantasy fiction does 
not necessarily have to be seen as a process of explaining (although it can, of 
course, be effectively employed as a didactic tool); rather, it can be an unfolding 
and revealing that occurs regardless of the author’s original intent. The chapter 
also includes a section on a more visual presentation of the fantasy spatial—the 
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endpaper maps that often accompany fantasy ‘other world’ literature—in order 
further to illuminate the reader’s involvement in the active process of spatiality 
and space-making. It will also consider a non-fantasy textual representation of 
thirdspace, Katherine Paterson’s Bridge to Terabithia (1977), which will both 
illustrate, and act as a meta-commentary on, what I have discussed throughout 
the thesis.  
Without doubt, a fantasy narrative “sets up worlds that genuinely exist 
beyond the horizon, as opposed to those parts of our own world that are located 
beyond that line of sight but to which we might travel, given sufficient means” 
(Armitt, Fantasy 8, original emphasis). If narrative, as Stephens says, is “a form 
not only of representing but of constituting reality” (“Narratology” 60), then 
fantasy worlds are no less real than any other world (be it in fiction, or in the way 
individuals view and construct their own world-spaces in consensus reality); 
those “[f]ictional worlds, like reality, are ‘out there’ to be investigated and 
explored if we choose and to the extent that we are able” (Walton 42), and 
explore them is what I shall do. 
This thesis, then, is a journey within the spaces of the many ‘other’ 
worlds of fantasy fiction for children. It is both a celebration of the magnificence 
of imagination that has gone into constructing these marvellous worlds and, at 
the same time, a somewhat more considered and expansive study of their purpose 
and function than I believe has hitherto been undertaken. At the very least, this 
thesis will seek to remedy, in part at least, the complaint that, for a good part of 
literary critical history, “English literary criticism has been notoriously 
untheoretical in its approaches to works of fantasy” (Jackson 2), and that it is 
“either taken seriously (and enthusiastically), or seriously rejected” (Hunt, 
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“Introduction” 2).26 These are harsh claims, but not without merit, particularly 
when it comes to considerations of children’s fantasy fiction.  
It may prove to be the case, of course, that an understanding of the 
spatiality of fantasy ‘other’ world fiction will only provide a means to confirm 
and complement already held critical views, and this is not in itself a bad thing, 
for different approaches providing similar results will strengthen existing 
readings. However, it may also be that taking a spatial approach will add to and 
enhances those understandings or, more importantly, challenge them and offer 
new ways to examine these texts, ways that can also give more importance to 
fantasy ‘other world’ fiction for children generally. The exploration starts, 
therefore, with a consideration of how to approach the spaces of the middle. 
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Chapter One: A Third Way 
 
 
In my introduction, I pointed to the need for a different way to examine 
the nature of the spatial in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction, one that looks both to 
narrative middles, and seeks to situate the spatial within a framework that works 
outside of a formal, structural approach. It is all well and good, of course, to 
suggest such a spatial turn, but such a move is nothing without a way to approach 
the integration of spatial thinking with an approach to the textual narrative. To do 
this—and wary of putting forward some form of overarching, all-inclusive 
theory—I draw on, adopt and adapt different social theories of spatiality in order 
to approach the spaces in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction for children and, in 
particular, their middles.  
In this chapter, then, I set out a theoretical framework that first considers 
Lefebvre’s understanding of spaces as socially constructed in different ways. I 
then move on to how Soja reworks Lefebvre to produce his own concept of 
thirdspace as a combination of both the real of the everyday and the imagined. I 
will then consider how Soja’s concept has connections to ideas of the nature of 
space from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and the work of Michel de Certeau 
on the everyday, social use of space and the way people actively experience and 
make use of existing places to create their own spaces within the world of 
consensus reality. I will then move on to understandings of an experienced 
spatial presence, and how the practices of space-making are a part of the 
everyday experience of individuals. These social theories are then used to 
develop a theoretical foundation for examining fictional spatiality on the basis 
that, although the constructed spaces may be fantastic, they must, to a greater or 
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lesser degree, draw on understandings of the way space is created and used in the 
world of consensus reality.  
This will lead me to consider the nature of ways into and out of spaces in 
fantasy ‘other world’ fiction, taking as a basis the ideas of George Simmel’s 
metaphor of the door as a connecting force rather than a separating one. The 
chapter will then move on to eschew ideas of other worlds as liminal locations in 
favour of D. W. Winnicott’s concept of a transitional third space which, whilst 
premised upon the psychoanalytical, moves beyond notions of a repressed inner 
self and considers how both inner and outer human spaces are reconciled in the 
production of a space of playing as a cultural practice. I then connect this concept 
to the space-making practices of literary protagonists and incorporate ideas from 
Certeau on the tactics and strategies of the creation of space as a part of the 
notion of playing I develop. Utilising these social theories of the spatial will 
serve two purposes. On the one hand, it will allow me to connect readers’ 
practices of the everyday with literary and specifically fantasy texts, a theme I 
develop in Chapter Four. On the other, in this chapter, it will point to an idea of a 
constructed spatiality that is individual and contextual, and, therefore, will bring 
a new focus to bear on the texts, one which questions the nature—whether real or 
unreal—of the literary spaces depicted in fantasy fiction. 
 
Real and/or Unreal 
When Grenby talks of the role of the Pevensie children in C. S. Lewis’ 
Chronicles of Narnia series as “the reader’s representative in Narnia” in that 
“[t]hey conduct us through this world, mediating our encounters with the 
fantastic until we become acclimatised to this weirdness” (151), the first question 
to ask is what “weirdness” it is that Grenby might be referring to? Speaking 
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generally, what one person takes for reality, another might consider in a totally 
contrary way, based on a whole host of factors (including, for example, age, 
gender and cultural background), and this is something that also merits attention 
in fictional settings when considered from the perspective of different 
protagonists. Thus, As Franz Stanzel has suggested of fiction generally, there is a 
narratorial impulse “to make the fictional world appear as reality” (17), and 
fantasy writers are clearly no less concerned with this reality-making.  
The distinction between real and unreal lies at the heart of the issue of the 
spatial in fantasy fiction. Western myths and legends—and the narratives that 
have been derived from them—have long shown us fabulous and fantastic places, 
from the homes of gods on mountain tops, to mystical places such as the 
Arthurian Isle of Avalon, with many of these places, at one time, being 
considered real locations. So, too, in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction, where it is 
often the case that there is a concerted effort—either explicit or implicit—to 
show that the strange is not strange at all, and that any apparent lack of substance 
or verisimilitude is counterbalanced by either authorial claims to be presenting 
the real, or by the responses of protagonists. When it comes to questions of 
‘reality’, therefore, common sense is not necessarily a faithful guide. 
 In Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865), for example, when Alice 
is sitting on the river bank, the White Rabbit runs past in Alice’s consensus 
reality, talking to itself. However, says the narrator, 
[t]here was nothing so very remarkable in that; nor did Alice think 
it so very much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to itself, ‘Oh 
dear! Oh dear! I shall be late!’ (when she thought it over 
afterwards, it occurred to her that she ought to have wondered at 
this, but at the time it all seemed quite natural). (5) 
 
 36 
Alice, it seems is nonplussed by such an event. In fact, rather than being hesitant 
at this sight, Alice is “burning with curiosity” (5), and she follows the rabbit to 
its hole. Initially, Alice even sees her long fall down the rabbit hole as taking her 
nowhere strange, believing that she will most probably emerge on the other side 
of the world, in New Zealand or Australia (6). The reason for this lack of surprise 
is explained by the narrator in the following way:  
For, you see, so many out-of-the-way things had happened lately, 
that Alice had begun to think that very few things indeed were 
really impossible. (8)  
 
These “out-of-the-way things” are not detailed in the narrative, but it does indeed 
seem, here, that the strange and unfamiliar have become almost indistinguishable 
from the known, and that all things are possible. 
John Kornfeld and Laurie Prothro have observed of the nature of British 
fantasy novels that “it seems that a major purpose of the ‘real’ world is to show 
how much more real the magical world is” (192), and the claim to a real 
(although not necessarily the real) is a common thread in fantasy ‘other world’ 
fiction. J. M. Barrie, for example, is very clear in Peter Pan (1911) that there is a 
difference between the Darling children’s dreaming in the past and what happens 
to them when they move to Neverland: “Of course the Neverland had been 
make-believe in those days; but it was real now” (44). Similarly, in Norton 
Juster’s The Phantom Tollbooth (1961), the narrator explains that, for the 
protagonist Milo, “What had started as make-believe was now very real” (14). 
Clearly, however, what Milo experiences is no longer the real of a normative, 
consensus reality, which suggest that it must be a new, different kind of real. 
Such examples of fantasy narratives laying claim to reality are not 
isolated. The author, Ursula Le Guin, however, is somewhat more circumspect 
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when she declares that fantasy “isn’t factual, but it is true” (40), which has a 
certain validity if a fantasy is considered to be “the narrative result of 
transforming the condition contrary to fact into ‘fact’ itself” (Irwin x). Indeed, 
author Philip Pullman, for instance, goes so far as to claim of the first book in the 
His Dark Materials series that “Northern Lights is not a fantasy. It’s a work of 
stark realism” (Parsons and Nicholson 131) although this assertion has been 
challenged.27 However, if fantasy narratives can be seen as presenting ‘fiction’ as 
‘fact’ or, as China Miéville calls the fantastic, “the impossible-but-true” (43), 
how might this “impossible-but-true” be conceived? To answer this question, I 
turn now to look at social theories of space. 
 
Thirdspace 
At this point, it would be useful to introduce certain ways of 
conceptualising space that will help to address the question of the impossible-
but-true. As I noted in my Introduction, the social theories of space I utilise 
broadly revolve around the idea of the constructedness of the spaces individuals 
inhabit. This approach does not deny the existence of a solid Cartesian location 
or place; rather, it argues for social practices being employed to create different 
spaces that people can subjectively occupy. Such spaces will be replete with 
figurative meanings but, at the same time, they still locate the body physically as 
an actor and subject. In short, such spaces open up the possibility for imagining 
the real of consensus reality as being different than it is and acting as subject 
within that differently imagined space.  
In Henri Lefebvre’s classification of different social spaces, he puts 
forward the notion of what he calls “representational” space as a space of 
imagination (which he also connects to symbolic and artistic practices). More 
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importantly, however, Lefebvre sees this representational space as being “space 
as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space 
of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’,” and it is the realm, too, of “the dominated—and 
hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and 
appropriate” (39, original emphasis). Lefebvre’s position argues for the spatial as 
the combinatory product of social practice, human perception, and the 
imagination, and it suggests that the same spaces may be repeatedly reproduced, 
represented and experienced in different ways by different individuals, an 
understanding that inherently contests oppositional or binary notions of 
subjective and objective spatiality and, therefore, between the real and the unreal.  
Lefebvre’s understanding of this particular kind of spatiality is, perhaps, 
more concisely identified in bell hooks’ statement that “[s]paces can be real and 
imagined” (152) which, importantly, is a process of co-occurrence rather than a 
choice of either/or. It is, for this reason that understanding the spatial must be 
something undertaken on “several levels,” according to Darko Suvin, “crucially 
including the level of imaginary space and its interaction with empirical space” 
(320), or what might be loosely configured as ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’ space.28 It is 
this call for interactive nature of the real and the imagined spaces of existence 
that Edward Soja also argues for when he notes that the imaginary and the 
physical are interconnected, but that spatiality, being socially produced, is quite 
different. This difference exists, for Soja, even though, in the production of social 
space, physical and mental spaces are both “used and incorporated into the social 
construction of spatiality” (Postmodern 120). Importantly, what Soja sees as 
emerging from this process of interaction is the production of an entirely 
different kind of space. 
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This different space is what Soja refers to as a ‘thirdspace’ of spatial 
activity, a space that is not wholly imaginary as a contrast (or even an equivalent) 
to consensus reality, but one that is not entirely bound to that reality either. 
Thirdspace is, says Soja a spatial consciousness that is “an investigation into a 
multiplicity of ‘real-and-imagined places’” (Thirdspace 6). By reworking 
Lefebvre’s theory of spatial production, what Soja envisions, here, is a space that 
is “a creative recombination and extension” of both the “‘real’ material world” 
and the “‘imagined’ representations of spatiality” (Thirdspace 6).29 It is a space 
that belongs, at the same time, to both, or neither, categories of the real or unreal, 
the mental and the physical, but it is a space where, says Soja, the actions of an 
individual in respect of the spatial are “both space-forming and space-
contingent” (Postmodern 81); individuals, even children, both operate on and are 
operated on by this new space.  
Space-forming, here, relates to what Cornelius Castoriadis terms, “the 
radical imagination,” where imagination has the sense of invention or creation. 
This kind of imagination is not, says Castoriadis, the “secondary” imagination 
which is “imitative, reproductive, or combinatory,” (319) because the radical 
imagination is “before the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’” (321, 
original emphasis). In this process, Castoriadis stresses “the creative function of 
the imagination in the cognitive [...] domain” (327). This cognitive process 
works because, as Jerome Bruner suggests, “[w]e know the world in different 
ways, from different stances and each of the ways in which we know it produces 
different structures or representations, or indeed, ‘realities.’” (109).30 Doreen 
Massey, too, notes that “the social relations of space are experienced differently, 
and variously interpreted, by those holding different positions as part of it,” and 
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the identities of place, rather than being “bounded, as in various ways a site of an 
authenticity, as singular, fixed and unproblematic in its identity,” are always 
“unfixed, contested and multiple” (3, 5). This understanding of spatiality argues 
that place should always be considered in the plural. 
A more concrete example of how this plurality works is to consider the 
case of blind people, who are able “to recognize a traveled route and to represent 
spatial information” (Kupers et al 12716). Unable physically to see the places in 
the physical world around them, they construct individual spatial representations 
of the spaces based on their own passages through the places, often from the 
spatial practice of repetition of the routes they need to follow. As well as 
auditory, tactile, and other cues, the blind use “allothetic signals” and these are 
“fixed to the environment itself or to individual objects. These require that the 
subject encodes the relationships between environmental landmarks, motion, and 
goal location,” and where “the location of objects within allocentric frameworks 
does not change when the subject moves in the environment (Kupers et al 
12719). It seems logical that these routes that blind people map out for 
themselves are not wholly dictated directly by the path set out for sighted people, 
but are their own trajectories, and each blind person will have his or her own 
spatial understanding of the same place; in effect, through the practice of 
changing place into space, a thirdspace of their own construction is achieved. 
In this respect, Siegfried Schmidt’s observation that “we construe our 
world by and through living it,” and that “this world is a world of experience, not 
an ontologically ‘real world’” (92) seems to take on greater relevance for what 
literary protagonists are shown as experiencing (as I shall discuss later in this 
chapter), for “however the human mind imagines the world, that is how the 
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world tends to become” (Meeker 27), and this propensity can also pertain to the 
depiction of the activities of literary protagonists.  
However, making use of the space in this way is not necessarily about 
subverting the real; “[f]antasy re-combines and inverts the real, but it does not 
escape it” (Jackson 20), and this escaping without leaving is a movement that is a 
kind of narrative nomadism since it is not referenced by markers of here and 
there, nor by recourse to a particular, fixed path. Thus, the spatial can be seen as 
an interpretative practice generated by means of a human facility that situates 
individuals in a personally authentic space, a thirdspace, one that emphasises the 
particular and contingent perspective of the viewer (or, in the case of a literary 
text, the protagonist).  
The spaces, therefore, are not topologically real in a Cartesian sense, nor 
do they seek to portray actual places in the world of consensus reality; rather “it 
does not seem that the real and the imaginary form a pertinent distinction,” and 
they are, therefore, “like two juxtaposable or superimposable parts of a single 
trajectory” (Deleuze, Essays 62, 63). In that these spaces are conceived of, 
constructed, and shaped by individuals in the course of their motions and 
activities and, in turn, they have an actual effect in terms of shaping the ways 
individuals understand and act upon and within the space that has been created, 
for “[t]he trajectory merges not only with the subjectivity of those who travel 
through a milieu, but also with the subjectivity of the milieu itself, insofar as it is 
reflected in those who travel through it” (Deleuze, Essays 61). As a result, the 
existence of these spaces has a purposeful reality, and thus a consequential 
substance based upon the individual’s actual being there, in the space, and 
moving within it. 
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Spatial Practice and Spatial Presence 
Different spatial realities can be conceived, constructed and experienced 
as real by individuals as an active and subjective act of shaping (and, in turn, 
being shaped by) movement, and by how people act upon and within the space 
that has been created. This interaction means that “the creation of space is itself a 
matter of practices, and practices that take place in places” (Curry 102); spatial 
practices actualise the space, and thus the nature of this thirdspace is, then, 
“practiced place” (Certeau, original emphasis, 117). The idea of spatial practice, 
here, refers quite simply to the way that space is made use of by individuals (or 
protagonists in the case of the literary). In social life, the practice of the spatial 
recognises the importance of both the built environment and the representations 
that are constructed from the perception of that environment; it is the product of 
conceptions about and utilisations of, the place in which individuals operate, and 
it is from the activities of actors within that space that the spatial as thirdspace 
emerges from both the built and the created.  
In line with my earlier distinction between place and space, Certeau sees 
places existing only in the abstract, as unrealised sites for narrative action, as 
locations that have not yet been utilised, and which only become meaningful 
when acted upon by ‘narrative’ agents. Spaces, on the other hand, are places that 
have been acted upon (practised) and which are, therefore, the location of 
narrative events.31 As such, the spaces come into existence as a result of a 
creative act of movement, a creative act of world-making, on the part of 
individuals in the world and, in the case of children’s fiction, as depicted through 
the actions and movements of the child protagonists. This concept is not such an 
unusual one, however, for, as Gullón points out of life, “[e]very day we 
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experience the dual or triple space which we occupy and in which we function. 
Distinct personae live simultaneously in different worlds” (19). This existence, 
however, is not one based on the illusory, but on an imaginative capacity to 
locate oneself in multiple locations; although sitting in an office, one can create 
the space of the house at dinner time and the supermarket where the ingredients 
for the evening meal will be bought. Indeed, as Michael Curry suggests,  
it is not just possible, but inevitable that at a given moment we are 
in more than one place. One might go so far as to say that humans 
are the animals, and the only animals, that can be in two places at 
once. (103)  
 
Why should literary characters not be shown as possessing such a recognisable 
human capacity within the limits of the text? 
Given the capacity for fictional characters to operate experientially within 
multiple spaces, therefore, thirdspace in this literary context can also be seen as a 
contingent, unfixed, created and experienced space. It is a dynamic, contiguous 
and, very importantly, lived and experienced space, one that exists as part of a 
multiplicity of (sometimes unactualised) virtual spaces. For protagonists, the 
environment of the thirdspace is not, therefore, a replication of the real, nor is it 
in itself a recognisably physical, objective phenomenon. It is akin to what Fox 
terms a “fictive” space, one that moves beyond oppositional binaries “of the real 
and the fictional, the true and the false, and also the synonymous relationship 
between the fictional and the imaginary,” and refers, says Fox to “the relational, 
creative, and ludic ground between the real and the imaginary” (267). Although 
this argues a space between, a liminal location, which is something I discuss 
later, what is important, here, is, as Fox says, that “[t]he function of the fictive is 
to undetermine the real, to afford a space wherein the imagination can operate 
upon it” (256).32 It is, therefore, an authentic, constructed space in which to act, 
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and the agency that creates that space, and therefore the ownership of that space, 
can be see in terms of there being a “sense of place” that is “a knowing that is the 
result of conscious effort” (Tuan, “Rootedness” 8), in this instance, on the part of 
the literary protagonist. 
Thomas Schubert refers to such a sense of place as “spatial presence” and 
he notes that, regardless of the form of mediation, “the sense of being there” that 
can arise “in virtual environments, mediated real (remote) environments, or real 
environments” (163, original emphasis). Schubert argues that spatial presence “is 
a feedback of unconscious processes of spatial perception that try to locate the 
human body in relation to its environment, and to determine possible interactions 
with it.” (170). Once this feedback is processed, it take on the form of an actual 
and real understanding of the whereness of the individual. As a result, says 
Schubert, “[i]f the spatial cognition processes are successfully able to locate the 
body in relation to the perceived environment, and construct possible actions in 
it, the feeling of spatial presence is fed back and becomes available for conscious 
processes.” (170), which ultimately recognises the lived experience of the space 
as a lived experience.33  
With this understanding, space seen as “practiced place” requires an 
emphasis on how the individual both understands and utilises the surroundings 
from an experiential perspective, how the individual’s perception, experience, 
and practice turns the physical space into and individual space. This actualisation 
results from the movement of the protagonist within the thirdspace, a movement 
that can be seen to operate in much the same way that Certeau considers 
individuals in New York walk through the places of the city as “the ordinary 
practitioners of the city,” but who “make use of spaces that cannot be seen” (93), 
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and whose walking reveals newly-made spaces by traversing paths of their own 
making rather than simply following the routes officially prescribed and marked 
out for them. 
Another way to look at this spatialisation is in terms offered by Deleuze 
and Guattari, who suggest the difference between “a smooth (vectorial, 
projective, or topological) space and a striated (metric) space” (Plateaus 399, 
original emphasis). This description of spaces does not posit them as 
oppositional, however, because they “exist only in mixture: smooth space is 
constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is 
constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space” (Plateaus 524). Here, 
smooth space is the movement that Certeau suggests as breaking up the formal 
pattern of the city, and which Deleuze and Guattari equate with nomad space. 
Striated space is sedentary and equates to the fixed, the ordered, and the 
controlled, the fixed plan of the city, because striated space is “limited and 
limiting” and because it is “the geometry of the immovable” (Plateaus 442, 430). 
Smooth space, in contrast, “is directional rather than dimensional or metric,” and 
this smooth, nomad space is “localized and not delimited” (Plateaus 528, 442) 
and thus allows for a freedom of movement.  
Certainly, the physical organisation of a place will make certain choices 
of movement unavoidable (or will at least seek to do so) but, in Certeau’s 
understanding of such movements, 
[t]he long poem of walking manipulates spatial organizations, no 
matter how panoptic they may be; it is neither foreign to them (it 
can take place only within them) nor in conformity with them (it 
does not receive its identity from them). It creates shadows and 
ambiguities within them. (101) 
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Curry’s view is that “it would make more sense to compare a place to a 
conversation” (101), and Certeau, too, writes of the city walkers’ movements as 
“pedestrian speech acts” that can re-make the space in new and different ways, 
and where such walkers can become “poets of their own acts, silent discoverers 
of their own paths in the jungle of functionalist rationality” (xviii) and thus 
creators of their own spaces. 
In Certeau’s reading of the way the spatial can be interpreted by 
individuals walkers in their everyday lives, people can make use of what are, in 
effect, the unseen places of their environments and, in so doing, alter “the clear 
text of the planned and readable city” (93). As Certeau argues, 
if it is true that a spatial order organizes an ensemble of 
possibilities [...], then the walker actualizes some of these 
possibilities. In that way, he makes them exist as well as emerge. 
But he also moves them about and he invents others, since the 
crossing, drifting away, or improvisation of walking privilege, 
transform or abandon spatial elements. (98)  
 
Ordinary people thus create and construct their own movements within and 
through places that are not necessarily constructed by them, and “their 
trajectories form unseeable sentences, partly unreadable paths across a space,” 
trajectories that “trace out the ruses of other interests and desires that are neither 
determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop” (xviii).  
Certeau does note that individuals’ movements within the city can be 
traced subsequently but, as he says, “[t]he trace left behind is substituted for the 
practice” (97); that is, such tracing is actually an act of forgetting the original and 
real practice that it seeks to mark out. However, as Fran Tonkiss puts it, 
[i]f the official order of the city is written down as so many rules, 
codes, maps and plans, the individual’s version is a spatial story 
told as if out loud in the streets of the city, leaving no trace other 
than a movement in the air. (115) 
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These spatial stories are instances of individual space-making, and Certeau’s 
discussion of what are everyday practices involve the transformation of place 
into space is, therefore, closely linked to Soja’s Thirdspace since “space arises 
from purposeful social practice” (Soja, Postmodern 80), and thirdspace 
corresponds to lived space, the space in which people experience their existence.  
 
Literary Thirdspace 
The next avenue to explore is how these understandings of social space 
might relate to the fictional texts of fantasy ‘other world’ novels for, “[i]n fiction, 
the reality creating potential of language comes to the fore particularly clearly” 
(Knowles and Malmkjær xi). Certeau has outlined a particular connection 
between the spatial and narrative forms in his understanding of narrative as a 
product of spatial interactions, a “complex network of differentiation” and “a 
combinative system of spaces” (126). Seeing narratives in this way, as 
“treatments of space,” where narratives open a “legitimate theater of practical 
actions” (Certeau 122, 125), reveals the process by which characters act upon, 
and gain control over narrative spaces. Certeau argues that stories “traverse and 
organise places; they select and link them together, they make sentences and 
itineraries out of them” (115); what we see in these (and other) novels are what 
Certeau would term “fragments of trajectories and alterations of spaces” (128). 
Such utilisations of place are, says Certeau, “contradictory movements that offset 
each other and interact outside the purview of the panoptic power” (128), and 
these appropriations of space point to spatial relations as a central organising 
principle of all narratives.  
For Certeau, narrative “is made of movements: it is topological, 
concerning the deformations of figures, rather than topical, defining places” 
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(130). A protagonist in a narrative such as a fantasy ‘other world’ text can 
therefore be seen to travel across a space that is produced in the space of 
narration and, once the notion of a ‘barrier’ between spaces has been dissolved, 
this thirdspace has no set limits. It is not, then, a question of “roots,” being fixed 
in a single location, one that relates to home and the real, but rather one of 
“routes,” movements which establish the spatial as fluid.34 If protagonists are 
enabled by writers to grasp this opportunity to “author” the world through 
movement, they will to a greater or lesser degree shape and reshape the space. 
Thirdspace, then, as an indeterminate space—neither absolutely this, nor 
that—should more specifically be understood as being not a state in between 
binaries, not as a marginal location (other than by seeing that, in effect, every 
space is marginal), but as a created space that can no longer be referenced by the 
concepts of real and unreal, or by such locative terms as here and there, for ‘here’ 
is always a shifting space (as is ‘there’). It is a space that incorporates a/the 
‘other’ or the ‘not here’ into the current (rather than consensus) reality situation 
as if it were already part of it, and does so as part of a constructive process of 
movement on the part of the individual.  
This situation is no less the case when it comes to fantasy for, as Judith 
Butler comments, fantasy is the “the articulation of the possible,” and “it moves 
us beyond what is merely actual and present into a realm of possibility, the not 
yet actualized or the not actualisable” (29). To develop Butler’s point, however, 
what actually needs to be considered is not the possible as it relates to the real, 
but the virtual as it relates to the actual. This is because, as Deleuze states, “it is 
the possible that resembles the real, because it has been abstracted from the real 
once made,” and thus the possible “only gives a real that is ready-made, 
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preformed, pre-existent to itself, and that will pass into existence according to an 
order of successive limitations” (Bergsonism 98). Deleuze argues, instead, that it 
is the virtual that awaits actualisation and, “in order to be actualised, the virtual 
cannot proceed by elimination or limitation, but must create its own lines of 
actualisation in positive acts” (Bergsonism 97, original emphasis). The 
constructive act is, therefore, a vital element in the process. 
Actualisation, as Deleuze suggests, “is always a genuine creation. It does 
not result from any limitation of a pre-existing possibility” and the process of 
actualisation creates “divergent lines which correspond to—without 
resembling—a virtual multiplicity” (Difference 212). In many ways, there is no 
great difference between this understanding of thirdspace as an actualised spatial 
and Jackson’s suggestion that fantasies open up another realm of existence since, 
for her, “the fantastic exists in the hinterland between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’, 
shifting the relations between them through its indeterminacy” (35). Whilst 
Jackson’s suggestion nods once again to the notion of binaries, it does give a 
closer understanding of what might be happening in fantasy spaces than would 
an absolutist separation of the two domains.  
Jackson’s understanding of the way the spatial emerges also works 
towards Hume’s understanding of a shifting mix between fantasy and the real 
but, more importantly, Jackson does also suggest the existence of a “paraxial 
area,” another realm of existence, which represents for Jackson “the spectral 
region of the fantastic, whose imaginary world is neither entirely ‘real’ (object), 
nor entirely ‘unreal’ (image), but is located somewhere indeterminately between 
the two” (19). Although Jackson’s very specific notion of fantasy does not 
consider children’s literary fantasy as of value, and Hume also chooses to focus 
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on adult fantasy fiction, what they both suggest is that a consideration of fantasy 
fiction—including, therefore, fantasy fiction for children—is no longer a simple 
matter of real versus unreal. This consideration, in turn, suggests that Manlove is 
right to assert that it is mistaken thinking to “maintain that the other world exists 
only as a symbolic commentary on this one” (Alice 213 n1) in fantasy fiction for 
children. 
Although Jackson’s sense of the spatial in fantasy still largely retains the 
notion of binaries as a basis for the “paraxial,” she does take this idea further 
when she argues more specifically that “[f]antasy is not to do with inventing 
another non-human world;” instead, she says, it concerns “inverting elements of 
this world, recombining its constitutive features in new relations to produce 
something strange, unfamiliar and apparently ‘new’, absolutely ‘other’ and 
different (8, original emphasis). Thus, with this added understanding, fantasy 
operates to “explode or transgress the frame of the ‘real’ and thus opens up a 
space of uncertainty” (Shires 267) which, in turn, argues again for the spatial as 
“an unstable terrain” (Oakes 525), one that does not necessarily have the 
fixedness that it might seem to have. 
In much the same way that Soja sees space as being “simultaneously real-
and-imagined and more” (Thirdspace 11), Jackson’s understanding of fantasy 
spaces as a new and altogether different space allows for a consideration of the 
spaces of fantasy ‘other world’ fiction, in terms of the degree to which they 
operate as ‘real-and-imagined’ places, as newly formed, and in the degree to 
which they present a spatial openness that is constructed by protagonists as, to 
borrow Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s words, “a new part fabricated 
separately” (Anti-Oedipus 44).  
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When considered in terms of its application to the analysis of fiction, this 
also argues for other worlds that have substance not as separated realms of 
otherness, but rather as locations where the spatial operates as a multiplicity of 
heres and theres, an interconnected array of potentially available spatial locations 
all awaiting actualisation through the agency of protagonists and their 
movements into and within those spaces. This argument assumes, of course, that 
it is enabled since, at the same time, non-actualisation ought not to be taken to 
signify non-existence, for aspects of the virtual may remain unactualised as 
elements of the not yet narrated.  
Although this notion of the spatial might seem to be what happens in 
modern video games, with players seemingly having some degree of control over 
environments that can be explored at will, players can actually only interact with 
spaces in ways already envisaged and coded by the game’s designers: 
“[s]pecifically, commercial games try to make it as hard as possible for players to 
figure out why something happened (i.e., to enable the player to fully understand 
the game’s underlying Imaginary World) so that they will play a long time and 
feel that they got their money’s worth in entertainment value” (Black 204). In 
truth, there is more of a connection with fantasy role playing games.35 
This idea of spaces being, in some way, created by protagonists could be 
what Grenby is suggesting when he comments that, “in books like The Lion, the 
Witch and the Wardrobe, we get the impression that the fantasy world lacks an 
independent existence, that it has only been created for the benefit of the central 
characters” (159).36 However, there is, in fact, an important distinction to be 
made, here, since worlds being created for characters are unlikely to operate in 
the same way as those spaces whose existence cannot be separated from the 
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characters who, within the context of the narrative, are seen to effectively create 
them. Conversely, texts that tend towards the less spatially open for protagonsts 
will not present actualisations. Rather, they will be likely to offer concretised 
spaces that are either fantastic representations of empirical space, or that can be 
truly considered as alternative ‘other’ places that exist only to show protagonists 
that the home or consensus reality is the best place to be, and I will look at 
examples of such texts in the next chapter. In sum, not all novels will present the 
spatial as a thirdspace, and even those that do will represent this thirdspace in 
different ways.  
A true literary thirdspace is neither real nor fantasy, but an entirely 
separate, thirdspace of action and activity, a constructed narrative of self-in-place 
that has no immediate reference other than to itself within a process driven by 
plausibility for the protagonist(s) rather than by any measure of externally 
imposed accuracy. In this respect, therefore, fantasy other world fiction can be 
seen as something of a misnomer because these novels are not presenting a 
“geography of the non-existent” but rather, to varying degrees, an “anti-
geography of the existent” (Appelbaum 12.1). Robert Appelbaum is actually 
referring to early modern cartography, “a system of imaginary geography, a 
geography beyond geography, as it were—a system of fantasy with roots in 
classical antiquity” (1), but this description also opens up the possibility of 
seeing textual ‘other worlds’ as an imaginary geography of places and spaces 
outside the ‘known’ universe (that is, the singular ‘real’ of consensus reality), but 
which fill that space as though it were similar to or continuous with the known. 
By removing the dualism that distinguishes between real and unreal, it becomes 
possible to see that ‘other worlds’ are not necessarily ‘other’ at all.37  
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Thus, the spatiality of fantasy ‘other world’ fiction should not be viewed 
in terms of such binary references as centre and margin, real and unreal, self and 
other. Instead, it should be seen in terms of the degree to which a thirdspace can 
be actualised, where the ‘fantasy’ process becomes not one of dissolving or 
opposing a putative and given ‘real’, but rather an instance of fixing a real. It is a 
real that is appropriate to the moment as a product of the protagonist’s creativity 
and experiences, rather than being simply the unreal product of the protagonist’s 
“dreams, visions, hallucinations, or imaginings” (Nikolajeva “Fairy” 153), and it 
is a real that can be lived in and through. 
This suggestion regarding the real of protagonists’ experience does not 
overlook what Nikolajeva has called a “profound problem” regarding the 
ontology of characters in fiction in terms of the “strong tendency to treat and 
judge characters in children’s books as if they were real,” which raises, she says, 
the following question: “are we to treat them as real people, with psychologically 
credible traits, or merely as textual constructions?” (“Beyond” 9, 8). What is at 
stake, however, is the extent to which literary characters are seen to be in control 
of the real and imagined spaces they move within (which points to the approach 
of the author towards the nature of childhood as controlled or open) and the 
degree to which this represents possibilities for spatial agency on the part of 
readers either by recognition of the way protagonists are given opportunities to 
create spaces, or by readers understanding that spaces might be actualised 
regardless of how authors position protagonists or intende to direct readers (a 
point I will return to in Chapter Four). 
Considering this potential difficulty, and to explain more clearly how this 
space-making might operate, Gullón’s reference to James Thurber’s literary 
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creation, Walter Mitty, provides a ready example. As Gullón points out of Mitty, 
he 
is physically in his city and engaged in its daily insignificance, but 
at the same time his mind soars through the clouds of fantasy and 
there he is whatever he wishes to be. It is not necessary to decide 
exactly where he truly is at any given moment: both spaces are 
part of his life, locales of his existence. (19, original emphasis)38 
 
I am not trying to suggest, here, that child protagonists in fantasy other world 
fiction should be viewed as Walter Mitty types, for the traditional view of Mitty 
is as the archetypal fantasist, whiling away his time daydreaming rather than 
attending to his real world; that is, he is purely an escapist. Moreover, this move 
is not an attempt to re-establish the child (or, in Mitty’s case, perhaps, the 
childlike) as the repository of an imaginative process that harks back to a 
Romantic notion of the fanciful child. Viewed in terms of the spatial, Mitty’s 
space-making is not simply capricious or whimsical, the stuff of fanciful 
imagining or daydreaming (for that would be a misunderstanding of the 
imagination as something less than solid and powerful, when clearly Mitty 
actualises spaces and then acts within them). Instead, what Mitty’s spatial 
practices show is that the individual worlds he experiences and operates in are 
available and exist as a part of his—that is the protagonist’s—realm of actual, 
lived experience. 
What Mitty’s experience suggests is that, rather than taking the basic 
premise of fantasy as only being “a literature of possibilities [that] opens the door 
to the realm of ‘What If’” (Pierce, 180, original emphasis), it should more 
concretely be seen as a projection which, once actualised, becomes a moment of 
‘as if’ because “[t]o be in fantasy is to live ‘as if’” (Riley 13). In an “as if” 
understanding of the real, “the object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the 
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portrayal of reality [...] but rather to provide us with an instrument for finding our 
way about more easily in the world” (Vaihinger 15). To survive, people construct 
systems of thought, based on needs and then act “as if” the real were what the 
fictions claim it to be. In effect, as William James summarises this notion of 
lived realities, “[i]deas (which themselves are but part of our experience) become 
true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts 
of our experience” (30). Such constructed understandings function to enable 
lived lives to be led. 
Living “as if” is not, therefore, a simply a matter of daydreaming or 
reverie, or even escapism. As Fox states, “[i]t is important that an as if method of 
reconceiving reality is understood not to be an indulgence in pretence but rather 
the practice of actualizing fictions that consequently and incontrovertibly alter 
reality itself” (260).39 Such an approach, then, constantly recreates present 
contexts rather than projecting future unknowns and, in so doing, the primary 
purpose of the process is not to portray or mirror reality, for“[w]e are absolutely 
unable to compare ‘reality as such’ with the products of our cognitions” (Schmidt 
92), but to create a realm of real.  
In effect, this realm is very much a reality for the protagonists who are 
enabled as makers of that space and this can be envisaged because, as Nikolajeva 
has pointed out, “following the development of natural science, fantasy literature 
tends to view parallel worlds as equally real, so that nothing is, positivistically, 
acknowledged as the utmost reality” (“Fairy Tale” 154). If it is possible to 
conceive, as does Gullón, that “the invented space exists starting from the 
moment of invention itself,” and that “[i]nvention confers substance, and 
substance reality” (12), then this moment of invention can apply equally well to 
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the moment of creation of the thirdspace within the text world, a moment that 
can be understood as a matter of creating only a contingent real; there is no 
unreal to be considered by the protagonists since any ‘unreal’ is seen only from 
the outside looking in.  
It is from this outside-in critical perspective that Grenby refers to the 
protagonists “willingness to suspend disbelief” (151), but the notion of a literary 
thirdspace militates against the idea that fantasy is a willing suspension of 
disbelief, of characters knowing full well that the site of their activities is a 
fantasy but acting as if they do not know this to be so.40 This is because, rather 
than thirdspace being an illusory mental projection, it operates as a deliberately 
conceived of, lived, practiced and experienced space of activity; it emerges from 
a cognitive process of construction rather than a flight of fancy.  
In terms of this cognitive aspect of the construction of spaces, Ruth Byrne 
has noted how the process that underlies the imagination of alternatives to reality 
“shares the same principles as rational thought” (209), suggesting that 
imagination—and therefore fantasy creation—is itself rational. Byrne also points 
to how “the principles that underlie rational thought guide the sorts of 
possibilities that people think about,” and that “[p]eople think about possibilities 
and the sorts of possibilities they think about are true possibilities” (208, 214). 
Byrne is discussing, here, the creation of counterfactual alternatives to reality, 
which is an essential element in the construction of a space that can be lived and 
experienced and, most relevant, is the way that individuals rationally construct 
“truths” in the process of creating alternatives to reality; they are, in effect, 
imagined but real for the purpose they serve.  
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Writing in 1946 of the post war trend for fantasy, Edward Wagenknecht 
was clear that “[t]he countries of the mind are real countries, legitimate to build, 
legitimate to inhabit” (437). Such worlds should not be seen, however, simply as 
whimsical musings on sites that are insubstantial and unable to be experienced, 
nor should they only be considered as creations of the author for, by and large, 
those that emerge as a thirdspace exist for and by the activity of the child 
protagonists. Thus, “fantasy becomes imagination, an actual region or place of 
awareness possessing substantiality, embodiment and some degree of autonomy” 
(Frankel 9). If this type of fiction is seen not as simply imitating reality, or 
holding a lamp up to it for the purposes of critique, but as actually creating a 
reality, then what is in play here is not a case of suspending disbelief, nor is it 
simply one of make-believe; it is about making belief for, as Nikolajeva notes, 
“[c]ontrary to the straightforwardness of fairy tales, fantasy accepts more than 
one reality and more than one truth” (Nikolajeva, “Fairy” 154). Thus, 
protagonists do not so much willingly suspend their disbelief as they willingly 
believe.  
This understanding of willing belief is more the case given that one 
tendency in fantasy literature has been to multiply the number of possible worlds 
available. Diana Wynne Jones, for example, has often drawn on the notion that 
there might be many realities. Indeed, the multiple-worlds structure is a 
particular feature of many of Wynne Jones’ novels and, referring to Jones’ work, 
Colin Manlove makes the point that the “large number of such ‘secondary world’ 
children’s fantasies” are the result “precisely [of] the postmodernism of the 
[1980s], and the multiplication of realities, whether temporal or spatial” (Alice 
161).41 In her The Merlin Conspiracy (2003), for example, Wynne Jones also 
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posits the multiverse of a myriad other worlds; as one of the protagonists, Nick, 
remarks, “there are lots of worlds. I know, because I’ve been to some” (34). 
Roddy, the co-protagonist of the novel, comes from a different ‘world’ (her 
consensus reality is England, with but a few changes to the “real” England), and 
the fact that Nick comes from an Earth that most closely resembles the Earth of 
the twentieth century does not disguise the ambiguity that lies behind the term 
consensus reality, and also calling into question the “consensus” of consensus 
reality. 
Importantly, this concept of multiple possible worlds suggests both that 
the fixedness of a locatable and knowable ‘objective reality’ is an unsustainable 
concept, that “[e]verything in speculative universes, and by association the real 
world, is mutable” (Pierce 180), and it points to how individual protagonists as 
agents might make and re-make their own spaces; that is, through an act of 
creating a thirdspace, or even many thirdspaces. On this matter, Nelson 
Goodman has argued that the lived world of consensus reality is created, “not 
with hands but with minds, or rather with languages and other symbol systems” 
(42) such that no one world is ultimately the real one and, this being so, it is 
necessary to question “a single, stable model world” (Herman, “Toward” 136). 
This need to question is also the case when it comes to fantasy fiction. 
The opening up of a thirdspace makes it difficult, therefore, to conceive 
of the ‘real’ as a single world. This has been dealt with in terms of Possible 
Worlds theory and, as Joanna Gavins points out, “[t]he central notion underlying 
all possible-worlds theories is that the world we recognise as our actual world is 
only one of a multitude of possible-worlds” (11).42 Tempting as it might be to 
follow this comment into the application of the Possible Worlds theory to such 
 59 
fiction, it does not provide an adequate means of assessing the created spaces. In 
fantasy fiction, there are always gaps in the construction of the spaces, but the 
model for possible worlds requires any possible world to be logically complete 
and already a given. Instead, it is necessary to view potential world spaces as 
always being contingent since this still allows for the possibility of a multiple 
spaces being potentially there to be constructed and actualised. 
Such a multiplicity of spaces awaiting actualisation, rather than be pre-
existing, again argues the case for each of these constructed spaces being 
imagined and actualised individually by protagonists, although it is also 
something that can be a collective activity. Both aspects of this can be seen, for 
example, in J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan (1911), when the narrator is describing each 
of the Darling children’s imagined worlds such that, quite clearly, there is not 
just one Neverland, but many individual, and yet interconnected, Neverlands:  
Of course the Neverlands vary a good deal. John’s, for instance, 
had a lagoon with flamingos flying over it at which John was 
shooting, while Michael, who was very small, had a flamingo with 
lagoons flying over it. John lived in a boat turned upside down on 
the sands, Michael in a wigwam, Wendy in a house of leaves 
deftly sewn together. John had no friends, Michael had friends at 
night, Wendy had a pet wolf forsaken by its parents; but on the 
whole the Neverlands have a family resemblance, and if they 
stood in a row you could say of them that they have each other’s 
nose, and so forth. (7)  
 
Indeed, as Susan Ang suggests, Neverland is “the amalgamation of all [the 
Darling children’s] thoughts and something more than that” (111), the real and 
imagined and more, perhaps.  
Of course, this individual (and also collective) creative process of 
actualising spaces also includes the moment of access to that created thirdspace 
and, along with the multiplication of available world spaces in more recent texts 
(although earlier texts are not without multiple possible other spaces), the 
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possibility of more than one way to gain access to thirdspace has also become 
more common; no longer should it be seen, therefore, as being simply a matter of 
dreams or moments of magic. 
 
Exits and Entrances 
The spaces that protagonists experience and operate in must also, in some 
way, include the moment of creation, the getting there. “Fantasy fiction, in both 
its broad and narrow senses, draws upon [...] continual location and dislocation” 
(Bould 81) and, in an obvious, structural sense, the transition emerges in fantasy 
other world fiction for children through a recognisable change, most noticeably, 
although not consistently, in the form of a portal of some description, which may 
or may not be magical. These ‘ways in’ should also be considered in the light of 
the notion of thirdspace, for it is important to be aware of the nature of the 
transition or movement between, or more properly within spaces, and the 
difference between real and perceived borders. 
As with the variety and complexity of the different worlds that can open 
up in fantasy fiction for children, the variety of ways into and out of fantasy 
worlds—which thereby open up the possibility of movement—is also 
impressively diverse. Nikolajeva believes that “[t]he door is the most important 
passage fantaseme in fantasy” (Magic 76), and it is the case that such portals 
have been seen to operate as what Iver Neumann would term “boundary-markers 
of identity,” or “diacritica” (4). If seen in this way, as limina or thresholds, 
portals can indeed reinforce a binary perspective in their marking and absolute 
separation of real and unreal places. 
Bakhtin says of the threshold chronotope that “[i]t can be combined with 
the motif of encounter, but its most fundamental instance is as the chronotope of 
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crisis and break in a life” (“Forms” 248, original emphasis). However, this 
moment of crisis or break is not necessarily the case with children’s literature 
and its protagonists. In terms of the notion of thirdspace, rather than seeing 
portals as always creating or maintaining a barrier between separated spaces, it is 
also possible to connect them to thirdspace in terms of the metaphor of the door 
as proposed by Georg Simmel, who sees the door as a significant sign and space 
of what he terms the human “will to connection” (171). For Simmel, “life flows 
forth out of the door from the limitation of isolated separate existence into the 
limitlessness of all possible directions” (173), and the door thus offers “the 
possibility at any moment of stepping out of this limitation into freedom” (174); 
the door, then, is a significant space, one that discloses how “separating and 
connecting are only two sides of precisely the same act” (172) and are no longer 
to be considered as contrary terms. 
The gaps that portals open up (be they doorways or any other kind of 
portal) can allow both the ‘outside’ in and the ‘inside’ out. In effect, “there are no 
insides or outsides, only openings and ways through” (Ingold 35), in a process of 
reimagining of borders that can position outside as inside and vice versa, as one 
contiguous space, for “in the unity, the bounded and the boundaryless adjoin one 
another,” says Simmel, “not in the dead geometric form of a mere separating 
wall, but rather as the possibility of a permanent interchange” (172–3). 
Following Simmel’s approach argues for a fluidity of movement between spaces 
and, as Massey points out, 
the particularity of any place is, in these terms, constructed not by 
placing boundaries around it and defining its identity through 
counterposition to the other which lies beyond, but precisely (in 
part) through the specificity of the mix of links and 
interconnections to that ‘beyond’. Places viewed this way are open 
and porous. (5) 
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Putting this notion in relation to literary fantasy, in postmodern fantasy fiction, 
“the boundaries between reality and the Otherworld become more elusive, and 
the passage often subtle” (Nikolajeva, “Fairy” 154), although the way such texts 
operate should not detract from the nature of portals or moments of transition 
into thirdspace in earlier texts or those not considered to be postmodern. 
Returning to the example of Peter Pan for a moment, it is notable that, 
when the Darling children leave the house, they simply leave through the nursery 
window and fly to Neverland with Peter Pan. Getting to Neverland, it would 
seem, could not be easier: “second to the right, and straight on till morning” 
according to Peter (39), although, since Peter “just said anything that came into 
his head” (39), it seems that these directions are completely irrelevant. As to the 
real direction the Darling children take, it emerges that had, in fact,  
been going pretty straight all the time, not perhaps so much owing 
to the guidance of Peter or Tink as because the island was out 
looking for them. It is only thus that any one may sight those 
magic shores. (43) 
 
That is, there is no actual portal, as such, on this occasion; there is just the 
moment of movement into a potential thirdspace, a movement that starts within 
the nursery room of the Darling children rather than when they actually arrive at 
the island. Other moments of actualisation, of course, can be more obvious and 
more substantial. 
The key, here, is that any magical vehicle that might be present is 
representative of a number of possibilities for movement into thirdspace. Fredric 
Jameson sees magic in such novels  
not as some facile plot device (which it no doubt becomes in the 
great bulk of mediocre fantasy production) but, rather, as a figure 
for the enlargement of human powers and their passage to the 
limit, their actualisation of everything latent and virtual in the 
stunted human organism of the present. (278)  
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Magical devices, therefore, operate not as portals or limina or setting the 
boundary between real and unreal; rather, they become significant of the moment 
at which the creation of the spatial is opened up. The magical elements can thus 
become moments of movement that indicate the potential for spatial practice to 
occur. 
 Portals of all kinds, whether they are doors, or the result of potions or 
magic of some kind, can thus be seen as a space that is not between opposing and 
different realms of (the same) experience (if anything, the space of the portal is a 
part of each of the areas it accesses), but rather as indicative of the moment of 
construction of thirdspace as an act of movement; “[i]t is in this sense,” says 
Homi Bhabha, “that the boundary becomes the place from which something 
begins its presencing” (5). It is, too, an integral element of the thirdspace, rather 
than separating different spaces, since it is a spatial position that can also be 
occupied (however briefly). Perhaps this is why Farah Mendlesohn sees the 
“portal” in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland as “a passage and space [...]. The 
transition is not instant, but it is to be explored as much as other spaces” (27). As 
with other such spaces, therefore, these ‘portals’ need not necessarily be present 
as a separation or divide; this space can be a part of the whole, and the movement 
into and within in it is a part of the wider activity of creating and experiencing 
thirdspace as a moment of ‘being there.’  
This consideration of the nature of portals does also argue against the idea 
of the portal being a boundary or threshold into a liminal space. On one level, of 
course, the notion of the liminal could be seen as closely related to the notion of 
a literary thirdspace. The liminal space is, as Victor Turner puts it, 
“interstructural” (“Betwixt” 93), where individuals are in a state that is, he says, 
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“ambiguous, neither here nor there, betwixt and between all fixed points of 
classification” (Dramas 232). The analogy can be taken further because Turner 
also sees the liminal phase as one of separation from a previous status or social 
state (“Social” 154), a period of seclusion during which those going through the 
process are “submitted to ordeal by initiated seniors or elders” (“Social” 154) as 
a part of the transformative process: “a becoming” (Ritual 94), a passage into 
adulthood.  
Certainly, this does still seem to match very closely to the events within 
fantasy ‘other’ world novels. Commonly, there is a separation from the original 
social state (home, or the ‘real’ at least), with adult guides often present to assist 
young protagonists. In particular, of course, the ‘away’ place is generally 
decidedly unpleasant and full of ordeals for the protagonists to endure. This 
process has been perceived as being significant of some form of maturation, a 
theme that “saturates children’s stories” (Watson, “Introduction” 1) such that 
rightly or wrongly, “the idea of growth—the investigation of which characters 
have developed and which have not—is one of the most common principles in 
the study of children’s and adolescent literature” (Trites 10). In addition, Turner 
also suggests that an important condition of this liminal state is that “hierarchical 
orderings of values and social statuses” (“Social” 162) are altered, a reversal that 
puts individuals outside their “everyday structural positions” (Dramas 242), 
which itself is an element which can be related to Bakhtin’s concept of carnival, 
a theory that has also been freely applied to children’s literature.  
It can be argued, as Victor Watson has done, that “children grow wiser, 
braver and more generous as time passes” in the ‘other’ world (“Introduction” 1), 
an idea that Watson broadens to children’s literature in general in that “[m]ost of 
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the characters in children’s fiction are wiser at the end of their narratives than 
they were at the beginning” (“Introduction.” 1). It is certainly the case that the 
experience of the other world brings new knowledge and experiences or various 
kinds, but the extent to which child protagonists grow—rather than merely 
utilising characteristics and qualities they already possess—is debatable. 
Moreover, when the novel is not genuinely a rites of passage narrative, not 
genuinely descriptive of a process of maturation, the reader is rarely, if ever, 
afforded the opportunity to see if that experience or knowledge has effected any 
significant change. On the matter of whether maturation occurs or not, as 
Nikolajeva comments, 
[a] crucial question in the discussion of any magical there-and-
back-again adventure is whether protagonists indeed mature 
through the exercises in liberation, whether they gain knowledge 
and experience, and draw conclusions: that is, whether these 
adventures prepare them for the definite step toward adulthood in 
the future. (Mythic 134) 
 
Indeed, for Nikolajeva, “[c]onventional fantasy novels, whether they actually 
have an explanation of the adventure as a dream or not, let their protagonists 
remain totally unaffected by experience in the Otherworld,” although she also 
suggests that “[t]o allow the protagonist to remain unaffected destroys the impact 
of the story (Mythic 134), an outcome that is only problematic if one considers 
the main purpose of such fiction to be the depiction of growth or maturity.  
In the case of Alice, for example, “we are never given any background 
facts about Alice, except that she has a sister and a cat, and in the context of the 
novel, it is quite fruitless to speculate what her life is like before and after her 
adventures in Wonderland” (Nikolajeva, “Beyond” 9). This lack of prior or 
subsequent information is generally the situation in other fantasy novels too, 
where return brings no obvious signs of change, or where it is impossible to 
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make a judgement on the matter because so little is known about the protagonists 
before the events of the novel. Even if, while the child protagonist is in the other 
world, there has been a learning process of some kind, after the return, the reader 
is rarely ever privy to the impact that such development (if indeed it has occurred 
as result of the new things learned and experienced) has on the child protagonist 
and the child protagonist’s ‘real’ world.  
In fact, it is difficult to find a fantasy ‘other’ world novel where the 
notion of change, or development, or even maturation, is not largely inferred 
rather than read or explained as a part of the narrative itself. This need for 
inference and supposition is most often because the story frame ends at the 
moment of return, thus denying the reader access to any insights as to future 
ramifications. It can also be that protagonists are very often heroes because of the 
qualities they already possess before setting out, as is the case with Frodo, for 
example, in The Lord of the Rings, where their already existing and intrinsic 
qualities are what primarily carries them successfully through their adventures. 
Any claim to substantial development or maturation on the part of the child 
protagonists is, very often, a speculative endeavour. Child protagonists always 
return as child protagonists; they might have learned new things, but they 
ultimately remain children, which marks the away spaces as less likely to be 
liminal. 
It is true that arguing for a liminal nature to a separate ‘away’ place does 
seem to match Turner’s understanding of the liminal location as an “in-between” 
place (“Social” 159), one with “few or none of the attributes of the [individual’s] 
past or coming state” (Dramas 232). Significantly, however, Turner also points 
out that, while in the liminal place, individuals have nothing; they have “no 
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status, insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship position, nothing to demarcate 
them structurally from their fellows” (“Betwixt” 98). In contrast, in ‘other’ world 
fantasy, however temporary the condition might be, child protagonists can be 
kings and queens, knights and warriors, if only for a day, or take on any role they 
might wish; “however short, fat, unbeautiful, weak, dreamy, or unlearned 
individuals may be, they find a realm in which those things are negated by 
strength” (Pierce 181). Thus, although there are the trials that are associated with 
the liminal, as Grenby suggests, in fantasy writing, “in a new world where 
nobody knows the rules, children are not placed at a competitive disadvantage, 
and consequently feel the equal of adults in a way they do not in their real lives” 
(166). This process is not one of becoming adult, therefore, nor one of 
temporarily being adult either.  
A further problem, here, relates to the mobility, or freedom of movement, 
that comes with the notion of liminality. In the original formulation of the 
liminal, there is no freedom to travel back and forth between states and places. 
The liminal is the ambiguous location where the individual is outside and 
preparing to return; the ritual process demands that no return is possible unless 
the individual has completed the process of transition. In children’s ‘other’ world 
fantasy fiction, however, protagonists are very often able to go back and forth at 
will between worlds (which itself could be considered as a marker of the level of 
constructedness) and should this freedom of movement not be the case, it would 
be indicative of spatial control having been removed from the protagonist. 
J. E. Malpas suggests that movement is always “grasped from within a 
particular subjective point of view—and so related to that point of view and to 
the capacities for activity with which that point of view is associated” (166). If 
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Malpas’ understanding is right then, in fantasy ‘other’ world fiction, a 
protagonist’s movement through the places and spaces (both through and away 
and to the originary location, be it home or some other locus, and the ‘other’ 
place or places) can also be seen to be related to the location(s) of that movement 
rather than fixedly connected to the start and end point alone. As Malpas adds, 
[m]ovement, or activity in general, is thus the means by which 
space is grasped in its complexity, while the possibilities of 
movement enable the ordering of things in space, since such 
ordering is always an ordering dependent on our own capacities 
for moving and acting. (166) 
 
The point Malpas is making is very much evidenced by the degree to which 
protagonists do, or do not, have mobility, or freedom of movement, within the 
world space.  
In children’s ‘other’ world fantasy fiction, protagonists do usually have a 
varying degrees of freedom of movement through spaces, and, although some 
may have little choice about this movement—which in itself speaks to the 
author’s view of the child and the nature of the space that is available—many of 
them are able to traverse the available spaces at will. Portals being available only 
to particular individuals is, of course, a common theme in children’s fantasy 
‘other world’ fiction and, in a thirdspace context, it suggests that only those with 
the critical capacity to see the potential can actualise the space, which does not 
necessarily mean only child protagonists. However accessible the portals are, it 
does not deny the fact that “[m]ovement is therefore intrinsic to place” (Casey 
280, original emphasis), as an integral part of the spatiality of the fantasy 
narrative, for it is the dynamic of free movement (when it is available) that 
allows protagonists to operate within alternate and potential recreations of space. 
This freedom to move also argues against the idea of the liminal as the main 
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purpose of the spatial for, in its original formulation, the liminal offers no 
freedom to travel within spaces. The liminal has the individual as outside and 
preparing to return (with the return commonly to acceptance as an adult within 
the group), with no return possible unless the individual has fully completed the 
process of transition to adulthood. 
Given this understanding of liminality, the formulation of ‘away’ as a 
liminal space between other places (which, in children’s ‘other world fantasy is 
most likely to be based around the home-away binary) is somewhat problematic. 
It is the argument that such spaces are proving grounds for adulthood, and that 
children’s fiction essentially relates the necessity and process of growing up. 
However, as Nikolajeva has observed,  
[a] crucial question in the discussion of any magical there-and-
back-again adventure is whether protagonists indeed mature 
through the exercises in liberation, whether they gain knowledge 
and experience, and draw conclusions: that is, whether these 
adventures prepare them for the definite step toward adulthood in 
the future. (Mythic 134) 
 
Nikolajeva’s answer is no, and she explains this by noting that “[c]onventional 
fantasy novels, whether they actually have an explanation of the adventure as a 
dream or not, let their protagonists remain totally unaffected by experience in the 
Otherworld,” (Mythic 134). If there is no change towards adulthood, then the 
concept of liminality, of that state of becoming adult, would seem to have the 
very slenderest of connections to many fantasy ‘other’ worlds.  
In light of this apparent inapplicability, the formulation of ‘away’ as a 
liminal space between other places (which, in children’s ‘other world fantasy is 
most likely to be based around the home-away binary) is somewhat problematic, 
not least because such a notion places the focus of the narrative on how outside 
forces (including the extra-literary critics it should be said) influence protagonists 
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towards change rather than on the more appropriate understanding of how the 
protagonists experientially deal with the different worlds.  
It is understandable, however, that the idea of the rite of passage is 
favoured in the literary world, with western myths and more modern narratives 
often depicting or approximating this self same process. However, a rite of 
passage and the liminal do not always fit snugly when applied to literary 
narratives for children, especially as a rite of passage really relates to the process 
of becoming an ‘adult’ member of the social group, and so its application to 
younger child protagonists is tenuous at best unless, of course, there is a desire to 
have the return as an act of incorporation.43 It is, then, something of a 
misunderstanding to describe child protagonists as always having liminal status, 
not least because, for liminality, the intent is actually and specifically a re-
incorporation into the adult mainstream. 
Reassessing the liminal in this way, therefore, argues against a notion of 
in-betweenness for thirdspace since the spatial condition of childhood in fantasy 
‘other’ world novels need not necessarily be located in the shadows of a liminal 
‘nowhere’ as the model might suggest. On the contrary, it can also be found as a 
function of the familiar, of a ‘now here’ as “a space of intervention in the here 
and now” (Bhabha 7) that is a transitory contingent space of movement and 
agency, invested with meaning or significance.44 As such, rather than a liminal 
process always being at work, it is perhaps better to apply Turner’s 
term“liminoid” because the liminoid is not only removed from a rite of passage 
context, but it is also, says Turner, “individualized” (Ritual 52), it is uniquely 
expressed by each person.  
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Turner argues that liminoid phenomena develop “along the margins, in 
the interfaces and interstices of central and servicing institutions—they are 
plural, fragmentary, and experimental in character” (Ritual 54), and “the liminoid 
can be an independent domain of creative activity” (Ritual 33).45 In a liminoid 
space, the child protagonist must manufacture, produce, and ultimately ‘perform’ 
the space as a part of their self-emplacement within it (although, at the same 
time, the space also acts upon the performance and performer of the space in a 
dynamic interaction) for, as Turner suggests, “[o]ne works at the liminal, one 
plays with the liminoid” (Ritual 55, original emphasis), and this notion of space 
and its connection to play is one that I will now develop. 
 
A Space of Play 
Turner’s notion of the difference in how the liminal and the liminoid are 
approached—the difference between work and play—brings me to one further 
way to understand how the spatial modalities of thirdspace might operate in 
fantasy fiction for children: the idea of games and play.46 The relationship 
between children and play is, of course, somewhat axiomatic, but here it seems a 
useful analogy to consider the thirdspace as a space of either controlled or free 
enterprise, for only do many children’s fantasy novels have games or play as an 
important element or motif, but the difference between the nature of games and 
play can be seen as integral to the agentive action of protagonists in literary 
spaces.47 
On a simple level, as Peter Smith suggests,  
‘[g]ames’ can be distinguished from ‘play’ by the presence of 
external rules: that means, rules that are established by 
convention, to a greater or lesser extent codified, and that provide 
constraints on what the game players can do. (11–12)48  
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Thus, the more rule-bound and confined the player is, the more likely the action 
is a game rather than an instance of play. In similar vein, Roger Caillois 
particularly distinguishes between games and play as a difference between 
paidia, “a kind of uncontrolled fantasy,” and ludus, which is based on 
conventions and rules (13).49 Although Caillois considers that ludus is “a 
refinement of paidia, which it disciplines” (29), Ryan picks up on the distinction 
made by Caillois, noting that ludus games “are strictly controlled by pre-existing 
rules accepted by the participants as part of a basic game contract, they lead to 
clearly defined states of winning or losing” (“Narrative” 46). In spatial terms, 
games that posit a delimited playing area, such as a playground, may offer up a 
space of and for activity, but it is a ludic space, a specifically designated area, 
often structured and controlled by adults, and with predetermined outcomes.  
This notion of limit and control is also true of board games where, 
although those such as chess may require the input of the player in response to 
the situation, they are always played within a fixed area and with fixed rules of 
conduct. For board games whose outcome relies upon the roll of the dice or 
similar mechanism, movement is dictated by chance alone in that games such as 
snakes and ladders, for example, require no decision-making process on the part 
of the player at all.  
In defining play, Caillois also argues that it is “a free and voluntary 
activity, a source of joy and amusement” (6).50 Similarly, for Johan Huizinga “all 
play is a voluntary activity. Play to order is no longer play” (7). Play that is 
mandated is not play, but a game (one played by the rules of another, such as the 
controlling author) whereas, as Huizanga argues, the primary characteristic of 
play is “that it is free, is in fact freedom,” and children play “because they enjoy 
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playing, and therein precisely lies their freedom” (8). Playing can be seen, 
therefore, as being about the pleasure experienced in the performance of the 
activity without regard to measures of success and with no concern for winning 
or losing. Thus, real play is for the sake of it, and it is not predicated upon some 
ultimate goal, which argues for protagonists’ spatial experience as being either 
ludic or not related to the freedom allowed for play.  
Play as free choice, as a self-motivated and self-organised activity, is no 
longer within the control of adult authority or adult understandings of the real. As 
such, when playing actually takes place and is outside of adult control, play itself 
cannot relate to the idea of children desiring to be (or become) more mature, 
more wise or more adult. The act of playing is not the act of maturation or 
growth. This idea, of course, runs counter to conventional wisdom that sees play 
as part of a process of becoming adult. However, for A. D. Pelligirini and David 
Bjorklund, “aspects of childhood are adaptive for that time in development only 
and not as preparations for adulthood,” and they conclude that “the practicing of 
adult roles in a non-threatening context” (24) is very much a deferred benefit of 
play, not an immediate one. Indeed, the idea that children play to master skills or 
their environment seems, say David Cohen and Stephen MacKeith “not just a 
drab way of putting it, but slightly wrong” (103).51 
 When exercised in playing, therefore, the creative process of creating a 
thirdspace out of the real and the perceived is, for Margery Franklin, a “reality-
creation paradigm” (202), one that is a “complex interweavings of realistic and 
fantastical elements, basically creative rather than codified, directed toward the 
creation of new realities” (217). For Ryan, “[t]he pleasures of paidia reside in the 
free play of the imagination, in adopting foreign identities, in forming social 
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relations, in building objects, in exploring an environment, and above all in 
creating a representation” (“Narrative” 46). Indeed, as Nesbit suggests, 
[t]he prime instinct of a child at play—I do not mean a child at 
games—is to create [...]. He will make as well as create, if you let 
him, but always he will create: he will use the whole force of 
dream and fancy to create something out of nothing—over and 
beyond what he will make out of such materials as he has to hand. 
(17) 
 
Real play, therefore, “requires no instructors or umpires or spectators; it uses 
whatever space and equipment are at hand; it is played for no other reason than 
pleasure” (Postman 4), and this sentiment is echoed by D. W. Winnicott for 
whom “[i]t is in playing and only in playing that the individual child or adult is 
able to be creative” (54).52  
Indeed, Winnicott distinguishes between ‘play’ and ‘playing,’ noting that 
‘playing’ relates to adults too (40) because nobody can escape “the strain of 
relating inner and outer reality,” a strain relieved only in “an intermediate area of 
experience” that is “in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who 
is ‘lost’ in play” (13). However, rather than seeing the unconscious as the 
Freudian locus of repressed sexuality, Winnicott views it as a creative resource 
related to a sense of self, and thus, playing is “supplementary to the concept of 
the sublimation of instinct” (39). In Winnicott’s terms, creativity includes artistic 
production, but also happens when anyone (young or old) “looks in a healthy 
way at anything or does anything deliberately” (69), and, as such, is more 
specifically belongs to “the approach of the individual to external reality” (68). 
Thus, play arises from human cognition and, far from being confined to 
childhood, evolves throughout life. This also argues for an ongoing access to 
playing rather than seeing games as being the product of a shift from the more 
free forms of child’s play into to a more orderly, rule-governed adult form. 
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Thus, a child at play is creating, but the child is not entering into “a sham-
reality,” but rather “a realization in appearance” (Huizinga 14), where “play is 
not ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ life. It is rather a stepping out of ‘real’ life into a 
temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own” (Huizinga 8). This 
stepping out, when coupled to the idea of playing, gives a constructive approach 
to the real for, as Ira Nadel puts it, 
[i]nventing, creating, imagining—these are the real values that 
result from play. When unsure how to act or to deal with reality, 
create your own rules [...], establish your own reality which can 
then be incorporated into your own experience. In this way, play 
becomes self-discovery; it remains instructive but in personal 
rather than public terms. (21) 
 
In such play, “children intentionally produce transformations of reality according 
to their own specifications, mentally transcending their current time, place, and 
surroundings” (Richert et al. 62), something that Artin Goncu and Frank Kessel 
call “world building” (24), and thus “[t]he minimal changes that characterize 
counterfactual imagination may not reflect a limitation, they may be its strength” 
(Byrne 211) since they draw on the quotidian as part of the resources available to 
create a space of playing. 
Moreover, as Winnicott says, “playing has a place,” and this place “is not 
inside” and “[n]or is it outside,” since “it is not a part of the repudiated world, the 
not-me, that which the individual has decided to recognize [...] as truly external, 
which is outside magic control” (41, original emphases). Thus, for Winnicott, the 
child at play inhabits a “potential space,” a space which Winnicott contrasts with 
both the “inner world and also with external reality as it is commonly perceived” 
(41); as he says, “[t]his area of playing is not inner psychic reality. It is outside 
the individual, but it is not the external world” (51). For Winnicott, it is a space 
that develops into one that is available to all as part of “a direct development 
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from transitional phenomena to playing, and from playing to shared playing, and 
from this to cultural experience” (51). This provides the connection between the 
private spatial and the social.  
In addition, Winnicott also argues for a heterogeneous understanding of 
this space in that 
the area available for manoeuvre in terms of the third way of 
living (where there is cultural experience or creative playing) is 
extremely variable as between individuals. This is because this 
third area is a product of the experiences of the individual person 
(baby, child, adolescent, adult) in the environment that obtains. 
(107, original emphasis) 
 
In essence, then, it is a thirdspace, the range of which, says Winnicott, “can be 
minimal or maximal, according to the summation of actual experiences” (107). 
James Britton takes up Winnicott’s notion of a third area to argue for seeing play 
as “an area of free activity lying between the world of shared and verifiable 
activity and the world of inner necessity—a ‘third area’,” one that is 
“assimilative” (43, 44).53 This approach to the world and how it operates can be 
seen in the way that children do actually play.  
It is clear that children do engage in activities that, at one level, have no 
obvious educational or learning purpose. Although Joanne Thomson and Chris 
Philo suggest that “the notion of play is very much an adult construct, invented to 
help adults make sense of what it is that young people seem to be ‘up to’ for 
much of the time when not following adult instructions” (111), this does not deny 
that children are doing something active, and often that something involves a 
creative element. As Bill Michaelis observes, [a]s children, most of us lived in a 
‘never-never land’ where we externally acted out our fantasies (57). It is, says 
Michaelis, a part of playing to create spaces from the spare resources around us: 
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It may have been the backyard, the imaginative worlds of dolls or 
cars, the forts built on bunk beds, the pickup games where the 
rules constantly changed, or the abandoned lot down the Street. In 
many ways the whole world was accessible and limited only by 
imagination. We were not locked into a narrow conceptualization 
of everyday objects. A table would be a fort, or, turned upside 
down, a ship or motorcycle. (57) 
 
In fact, children are masters of the craft of creating a space for playing—be it as 
a castle, or a space-station or a desert island—which they can inhabit, but which 
is clearly operating for them as both a real space (such as the child’s bedroom, 
for example) and their created space at the same time.  
Michaelis’s recognition of this creative space-making in playing also 
relates in many ways to unpublished ideas on the spatial and children’s inventive 
playing by Foucault that were originally part of a twelve-minute radio broadcast, 
made in 1966. Later, via a lecture to architects in Paris in 1967, the ideas were 
published as “Of Other Spaces,” which presented Foucault’s concept of a 
heterotopia. A heterotopia operates, says Foucault, to “create a space of illusion 
that exposes every real place, all the sites of inside of which human life is 
partitioned, as even more illusory,” or else to create “a space that is other, 
another real space, as perfect and meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, 
ill-constructed and jumbled” (“Of Other” 27). This is almost a thirdspace.  
Of more interest, here, however, is Foucault’s reliance on the nature of 
children at play. As Peter Johnson describes it, Foucault’s broadcast opened with 
an illustrative example of  
various children’s imaginative games, mentioning tents and dens 
in gardens as well as all the games played on or under the covers 
of the parents’ bed. The children’s inventive play produces a 
different space that at the same time mirrors what is around them. 
The space reflects and contests simultaneously. (76)54 
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“Of Other Spaces” did not retain Foucault’s original references to children’s 
creative space-making. Nevertheless, what Foucault clearly recognises here is the 
real and imagined nature of the space of playing that children create from the 
every day that surrounds them, a space that Foucault also sees as operational 
(albeit in a largely binary manner) in the social every day of adults. More than 
this, however, is the observation that, even when children play as a group, whilst 
in one sense they all play within that same created space (knowing it to be both 
real and unreal at the same time), for each player there is a singular and 
individual understanding of that space within which they are operating, however 
similar it might be to the way that others who playing in the space see it (a 
literary case in point being that of the different Neverlands as discussed earlier in 
this chapter). 
This space is also one, as Winnicott states, that “depends for its existence 
on living experiences, not inherited tendencies” (108, original emphasis). In 
order to have control over playing in this third area, says Winnicott “one has to 
do things, not simply to think or to wish, and doing things takes time. Playing is 
doing” (41, original emphasis); it requires movement. To borrow from Deleuze 
here, games are “sedentary” whereas playing is “nomadic” (Difference 282, 
283).55 Winnicott’s “third area” of playing, as a space that clearly connects an 
individual’s imaginal understanding of their world with their actual perception of 
that space, is also a space that is consistent with Soja spatial trialectic and 
Certeau’s notion of everyday (spatial) practices. 
Seeing playing in this way, it is possible to see that, in some cases, the 
child playing a game is marshalled to move within the striated spatial patterns 
that Deleuze and Guattari mark as confining and limiting, whereas, in playing, 
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there are possibilities for nomadism, a breaking out of the fixed patterns of place. 
Indeed, in this difference between the mobility of games and playing (and the 
mobility of child protagonists within their environments), it is possible to see 
control of movement as an adult technique for controlling the child for such 
nomadic mobility is potentially transgressive. This is so with children since 
the very requirement of having to seek permission to move in and 
across certain kinds of space is emblematic of children’s 
subordinate status. The spatial restrictions which adults 
experience, on the other hand, most often arise from status 
differentials other than those premised only upon an age-
dependency nexus. (Cook 149) 
 
It is also evident in fiction where child protagonists are often confined and 
constricted, and whose subsequent attempts at personal mobility are often 
represented as unacceptable, which is a point I develop in subsequent chapters 
when discussing specific texts.  
To end this discussion of thirdspace as a space of playing, I will return to 
Certeau to mention his distinction between the spatial actions of strategies and 
tactics, terms commonly applied to games and playing. In spatial terms, 
however, these terms are distinguished by the kinds of “operations and the role of 
spaces” (Certeau 30). Strategies, says Certeau, “conceal beneath objective 
calculations their connection with the power that sustains them from within the 
stronghold of its own ‘proper’ place or institution” (xx). They are, therefore, 
largely equivalent to the structured and controlled spatiality of the board game 
within which the player’s movement are confined but, at the same time, they 
relate to the space of consensus reality. A tactic, in contrast, is “a calculus which 
cannot count on a ‘proper’ (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a 
border-line distinguishing the other as a visible totality” (xix); tactics, therefore, 
“involve a kind of ordinary magic that transforms space when nobody is looking” 
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(Tonkiss 138). A tactic thus “insinuates itself into the other’s place, 
fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it 
at a distance” (Certeau xix), and a tactic is a transformational ‘magic’ for that 
moment and purpose.  
While strategies can create, arrange, and control spaces such as the 
limited space of the board game, or the equally fixed locus of a spatially inert 
world (be it a home or away space), tactics use and manoeuvre within these 
spaces. It is, however, not in the strategies, but in the tactics of the spatial that 
thirdspace is created. If playing is, as Brian Edwards suggests, “the principle of 
energy and difference which unsettles arrangements, promotes change and resists 
closure” (xiii), it thereby “affirms freedom and possibility against restriction, 
resignation and closure” (17), and the child in creative playing realises a 
thirdspace space that simultaneously creates a contingent spatial reality. In the 
same way, the “tactics” and “strategies” available to child protagonists in fantasy 
fiction empower them, or control them. 
The conventionally demarcated space of ludic games is, therefore, the 
space regulated by logic and rules, whereas a real space exists only in the spatial 
practice of playing with reality. In such a playing space, boundaries, as I noted 
earlier when discussing portals, can be seen as arbitrary and subject only to the 
agency of the actors who utilise that space and its physical characteristics. This 
understanding means that thirdspace can be a space of playing. This playing, 
however, is not part of a process of maturation within strictly confined rules of 
play, nor is it a frivolous pursuit as simply an escape from boredom, but rather ti 
is a performances of childhood agency. Thus, a thirdspace of playing can be seen 
as a display of the tactics of space-making which relate, on one level at least, 
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simply to activity for the sake of activity, and to creating a place of their own in a 
world of consensus reality that is not that of the child. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have looked to social concepts of the spatial as being 
constructed as having relevance for understandings of the nature of children’s 
other world fantasy fiction. The ideas from social theorists that I have employed 
have helped to see the spatiality of fantasy ‘other’ world texts as something other 
than lost or liminal spaces settled uncomfortably between binary extremes. 
Instead, it has allowed for their consideration in terms of the extent to which they 
are created, alternate, and contingent spaces, and the degree to which they 
display the potential to break down any absolute distinction between fantasy and 
real. I have suggested that the literary space of ‘other world’ fantasy texts can be 
seen as being no different from constructed social spaces in that, as Gillian Rose 
argues for social spatiality, spaces are “practised, a matrix of play, dynamic and 
iterative” (248). Thus, Hume’s somewhat broad description of fantasy as “any 
departure from consensus reality” (21, original emphasis), can actually be 
reiterated, but with a more specific focus for, in the realm of the spatial, fantasy 
is indeed a “departure” from consensus reality, but not one that leaves consensus 
reality behind; the real and imagined operate in tandem. 
In addition, I have proposed that, by considering the notion of thirdspace 
as a way to understand the spatial dynamics of different fantasy ‘other world’ 
texts, it is possible to see that the space protagonists occupy can be, with varying 
degrees of openness and practice on the part of protagonists, “a site of 
meaningful action for individuals,” and it is “more of a dynamic web than a 
specific site or location” (Oakes 510). By considering the extent to which this is 
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so, the degree to which protagonists are able to move within an undifferentiated 
space that is constructed by the agency of the protagonists themselves as a 
performative act of playing (where the sense of playing is far removed from any 
idea of romanticised childhood innocence, or that it might lie in opposition to 
seriousness), other possible ways to view fantasy ‘other worlds’ are made 
available.  
If the possibility of other routes, and the potential for multiple spaces (not 
all of which will be occupied by the protagonist) is acknowledged, then each 
narrative potentially holds within itself a number of possibilities that simply 
remain unactualised. In respect of this idea, as Trish Lunt points out,  
[t]he acknowledgement of multiple registers and negotiations (and 
renegotiations) of space, place, identity and power relations [...], 
opens up a space of networks of power and subjectivity that 
displace hegemonically-coded theoretical positionings of us-them, 
here-there, global-local, home-away. (70) 
 
Based on this multiplicity of spatial possibilities,, the approach I have taken 
argues against the absolutes of binaries by opening up a spatiality that is no 
longer subject to the references of centre and margin, or even real and unreal. In 
this respect, the concern becomes not one of determining what the spaces and 
places of fantasy ‘other world’ literature for children are, but more a matter of 
how they are known through what use is made of them, by the movements and 
actions and playing that create and establish them.  
It would seem far more appropriate to understand that, instead of 
considering fantasy worlds as an other world, each of them is more usefully 
viewed as another world, one that exists in relation to the real world and many 
other potential worlds awaiting actualisation. Depending upon the extent to 
which worlds are spatially dynamic or not, these ‘other worlds’ are not actually 
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‘other’ in respect of being opposed to consensus reality at all, but are in effect a 
particular representation of one of many others all of which potentially exist at 
the same time. At the same time, this does not argue that all such texts are 
opened up in the same way. When place is allowed to limit space (as in the 
binary of home-away-home, for example), it can be seen as a conservative means 
of ensuring certain required social practices; that is, it seeks to control the 
protagonists spatially within socially acceptable codes of conduct and being. 
This shift in the critical point of view moves to a position that recognises 
that “the idea of the child itself signifies contradiction, movement, contingency” 
(Owen 265), and that the spatiality of these narratives is, potentially, unbounded 
(it is simply not necessarily revealed to the reader). ‘Fantasy’ becomes not a 
matter of dissolving a putative ‘real’; it is a fixing of ‘a real’ for or by 
protagonists, a real that is appropriate to the moment. With such a formulation, it 
is possible to theorise the spatial in this type of fiction in terms of an “open-
ended set of defining moments” (Soja, Thirdspace 260), as a space of pure 
performance and activity, of playing, a space within which there are different 
possibilities within realms of the same experience, the chronotope of fantasy 
‘other world’ fiction for children. 
In these texts, then, the fantasy space need not necessarily be seen as 
metaphorical, as a separation from reality that reflects consensus reality in some 
way, nor should it be seen as metonymical. Instead, depending upon the level of 
freedom available to a protagonist, the process of territorialisation of the spatial, 
can be viewed as an expression of the subject’s role as the agent in enacting 
place into space. In this sense, the literary thirdspace is entirely a space of praxis, 
of practised experience which, in turn, points to how the experience of the space 
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itself, and the movement and activity that takes place within it, are what is 
important, rather than detailed depictions of the places and landscapes 
encountered (and it is the case that detailed descriptive passages are rarely found 
in these texts anyway). This is because, ultimately, the space-making imagination 
does more than merely produce images of place or space.  
The departure that is not escape, therefore, is a spatial imagining that does 
not take the child protagonist out of the place, or out of the real of consensus 
reality for “[a] real voyage, by itself, lacks the force necessary to be reflected in 
the imagination; the imaginary voyage, by itself, does not have the force [...] to 
be verified in the real” (Deleuze, Essays 62–3). Rather, it is a measure of the 
degree to which child protagonists can creatively enact a space of their own in a 
form where the extent to which the author allows that spatial imaginary to be 
both constructed and dwelt in, and for agency to be exercised in the process, 
suggests alternative ways to read the nature of the adult author–child reader 
relationship, which I will discuss further in Chapter Four.  
 By opening up the way fantasy worlds are considered, and by including 
the possibility of multiple contingent creations, the notion of thirdspace becomes 
a useful analytical tool with which to examine ‘other world’ fantasy texts. As 
Soja explains it, thirdspace is “a purposefully tentative and flexible term that 
attempts to capture what is actually a constantly shifting and changing milieu of 
ideas, events, appearances, and meanings,” and it is “creatively open to 
redefinition and expansion in new directions” (Thirdspace 2). Rather than simply 
generalising the notion of thirdspace as another catch-all totalising theory that 
superimposes a grand model onto literary texts without regard for each one’s 
intricacies and individuality, it is actually the case that it can be applied to each 
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individual text in order to examine the nature of the spatiality as it is individually 
presented (although this does not preclude the possibility that different texts will 
operate in similar ways).  
With this in mind, then, and, wary of not generalising from the particular, 
there is a need to examine different novels in order to see what is happening 
spatially in each of them. Inevitably, the extent to which this thirdspace is 
actualised will differ from novel to novel because, as Jack Zipes observes of 
fantasy novels, each “sets out to contravene not only the laws of nature and the 
conventions of society and aesthetics, but also seeks to establish itself as unique, 
to conceive a totally new world which has its own laws and values” (188) despite 
the similarity of the home-away-home as a pattern that can be overlaid. 
Each text, then, will have its own peculiarities. Whilst it will be possible 
to group different novels in terms of the degree of spatial openness allowed to 
protagonists, different novels will offer different approaches to spatiality and, 
therefore, different degrees of thirdspace—from the openly oppositional to the 
less so, from the controlled and minimal, to the expansive and unrestricted—with 
individual texts offering varying levels of access to this spatiality and varying 
opportunities for protagonists to exercise spatial agency constructively, to move 
within spaces and undertake activities of different kinds within those spaces. In 
the following two chapters, therefore, I will examine a number of texts in light of 
the notion of thirdspace as “the barrier-less world of the imaginary” (Fox 255) in 
order to see the extent to which different texts offer the potential for their 
protagonists to operate within different degrees of created, spatially enabled and 
enabling locations.56 
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Chapter Two: No Place Like Home 
 
 
In my Introduction, I pointed out that, rather than always exhibiting a 
similar—or even the same—spatiality, different fantasy ‘other world’ novels are 
more likely to offer spaces to protagonists in varying degrees and kinds. In the 
next two chapters, therefore, I will apply the theoretical perspectives I outlined in 
Chapter Two in order to examine different texts and the way they operate within 
the concept of a thirdspace. However, in doing this, I am conscious that, as Said 
observes, it is important to recognise “that there is no theory capable of covering, 
closing off, predicting all the situations in which it might be useful” (241), and 
the variety displayed in different texts broadly placed within the same genre 
offers some proof to this point.  
Nevertheless, texts where the spaces are not directly constructed by 
protagonists, or are less open to manipulation by them, can, I have suggested, be 
considered spatially inert in terms of the understanding of thirdspace that I 
outlined in the previous chapter. In between this type of spatial display and that 
of texts that allow protagonists to create and manipulate spaces for themselves, 
and which can be seen to operate as more spatially active or dynamic, there are 
numerous different possibilities that might open up based on how authors work 
with their own understandings of the space of the ‘other worlds’ and the notions 
of the child and childhood. 
The discussion of texts in this chapter begins with Mrs Molesworth’s The 
Cuckoo Clock as an early example of ‘other world’ fantasy that explicitly 
eschews the process of the child protagonist’s space-making in favour of the 
contained, restrained and regimented world of the adult. I will then examine C. S. 
Lewis’ Chronicles of Narnia series which, on the surface level, offers a much 
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more open depiction of spatiality than does The Cuckoo Clock, and yet does not 
necessarily move so far from that earlier text in respect of the level of access to 
and control over spatiality displayed by, in this case, a number of characters 
rather than just one. Lewis’s series will then be compared and contrasted with 
Philip Pullman’s more recent His Dark Materials trilogy, particularly in light of 
the fact that, despite overt ideological differences in terms or religious beliefs 
espoused by the two authors, their novels both ultimately posit the spatial as 
controlled by the adult and unavailable to child protagonists other than for the 
children’s contribution to the existing space’s well-being. Finally, Neil Gaiman’s 
Coraline provides further consideration of the nature of home, and the way in 
which protagonists can often be seen to learn the lesson that home is best and the 
urge to explore other spaces needs to be contained, a feature of all the novels, to 
varying degrees, that I discuss in this chapter. 
Thus, I will be looking at this set of texts in terms of a literary thirdspace 
and examining how, in their different ways and through different forms of 
presentation of spatiality, they are similar in the way they present spatial 
opportunities for protagonists. I will also consider how the depiction of spatial 
confinement in all these particular texts is a way to examine how restrictions on 
movement can relate to both the level of authorial control and the freedom of 
protagonists to enact their own spaces. In particular, I will consider how the 
novels discussed show that contradictory spatial situations can appear to open up 
spatial possibilities for child protagonists before these potential spaces are 
ultimately closed down again.  
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Controlled Spaces in Mrs Molesworth’s The Cuckoo Clock 
 
Mary Louisa Molesworth was a prolific writer of novels for children, and 
The Cuckoo Clock is one of the better remembered of her works. It emerged at an 
interesting time in fantasy writing for children for, as Manlove suggests, early 
children’s fantasy fiction negotiated a path between the two “contrary impulses” 
of morality and imagination and that, for this reason, fictions that offered a clear 
cut moral didacticism, “founded not just on the imagination but on moral 
certainties and an ordered and just universe (Manlove, Alice 17) was welcomed. 
Within these “contrary impulses,” The Cuckoo Clock tells the story of the young 
female protagonist, Griselda, who has been sent from her home abroad by her 
father and brothers in order to stay with her ageing great aunts, Tabitha and 
Grizzel, who live in a strange old house with an equally old servant, Dorcas. In 
the course of the novel, Griselda makes journeys to increasingly marvellous 
places through magical means with the help of a cuckoo from a cuckoo clock in 
the house. 
However, despite the fantasy element in the novel, the spatial for Griselda 
is never something that she is allowed to master for herself. Even when Griselda 
is indoors, in the safety of the domestic, her experience of the spatiality of the 
house is seen to be both confusing and confining. As Griselda observes, “every 
room has so many doors, and you come back to where you were just when you 
think you are ever so far off. I shall never be able to find my way about” (13). 
Apart from its confusing layout, the house is where Griselda receives school 
lessons, and it is a domestic space that does not, in any way, allow for 
amusement or playing.  
 89 
This idea of the protagonist situated in a confined space is a common 
trope in fantasy other world fiction and, in Griselda’s case, as with other 
protagonists, she clearly wants the opportunity to explore for herself and to play. 
However, she has no toys or books to entertain her in her free time; she cannot 
make friends, and she is not allowed to play; she is not allowed to operate within 
spaces of her making. When the old servant, Dorcas, calls her indoors from what 
the servant terms ‘play,’ Griselda indignantly exclaims,  
“Play! Do you call walking up and down the terrace ‘play,’ 
Dorcas? I mustn’t loiter even to pick a flower, if there were any, 
for fear of catching cold, and I mustn’t run for fear of overheating 
myself. I declare, Dorcas, if I don’t have some play soon, or 
something to amuse me, I think I’ll run away.” (36) 
 
This outburst marks not only the way children seem to naturally gravitate 
towards playing, but also suggests that Griselda feels the need to exercise her 
creative capabilities in some way or other. Instead, Griselda’s freedom to move is 
confined to a striated location, walking up and down the terrace. 
 Griselda’s frustration at the spatial restrictions placed upon her make it 
clear that this is not a place where children can be a part of the social matrix. 
Indeed, quite early in the novel, the ways of the child are considered to be both 
undesirable and unwanted, as seen in a conversation between Griselda and the 
cuckoo: 
“What’s wrong here, then?” said the cuckoo. “It isn’t often 
that things go wrong in this house.” 
“That’s what Dorcas says,” said Griselda. “It must be with 
my being a child—my aunts and the house and everything have 
got out of children’s ways.” 
“About time they did,” remarked the cuckoo drily. (32) 
The cuckoo’s final retort is an early indication that Griselda will not have things 
her own way, and that “children’s ways,” which clearly includes play and the 
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freedom to move as one wishes, will not be possible; Griselda appears to be a 
cuckoo in the nest in the house, out of her proper place. 
When Griselda does think about getting a wish from a fairy, her wish is 
for movement (although, interestingly, she does not wish to be back abroad at 
home with her father and brothers). As she tells the cuckoo, 
“I’d far rather have the fairy carpet that would take you anywhere 
you liked in a minute. I’d go to China to see if all the people there 
look like Aunt Grizzel’s mandarins; and I’d first of all, of course, 
go to fairyland.” (36) 
 
Again, there is another instance of Griselda wishing to move within creative 
spaces, although movement of any kind would fire her imagination it seems. 
Later, however, when a miniaturised Griselda is in the cuckoo clock, she 
relinquishes any desire to visit places in consensus reality at all, focusing instead 
on the spaces that are imagined: 
“Oh yes, there are lots of places I wouldn’t mind seeing. 
Not geography sort of places—it would be just like lessons to go 
to India and Africa and all those places—but queer places, like the 
mines where the goblins make diamonds and precious stones, and 
the caves down under the sea where the mermaids live. And—oh, 
I’ve just thought—now I’m so nice and little, I would like to go all 
over the mandarins’ palace in the great saloon.” (47) 
 
Having been made aware of the possibility to broaden her spatial horizons, she 
begins to consider the spatial opportunities that might be available to her, and she 
suggests to the cuckoo that, “if you are a fairy you might take me with you to 
fairyland” (46), a more creatively conceived of location.  
However, the cuckoo refuses her request and states that few have been to 
fairyland anyway: 
“Some may have been, but not lots. And some may have 
thought they had been there who hadn’t really been there at all. 
And as to those who have been there, you may be sure of one 
thing—they were not taken, they found their own way. No one 
ever was taken to fairyland—to the real fairyland. They may have 
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been taken to the neighbouring countries, but not to fairyland 
itself.” (46–7) 
 
This admission by the cuckoo is significant because it suggests precisely that 
access to a thirdspace is an act of agency on the part of an individual, something 
that only “some” can achieve. Here, however, for Griselda’s travels to happen at 
all, she must first make her way up to (and into) the cuckoo clock, high up on the 
wall. Significantly, to get there, the movement is effected by the cuckoo, not by 
Griselda herself, for “The clock was far, very far above her reach, and there was 
no high piece of furniture standing near, upon which she could have climbed to 
get to it” (18). In addition to the cuckoo being the means of travel, Griselda also 
needs a magic cloak from the cuckoo in order to travel to other spaces. Clearly, 
she is given no agency over her own movement or actualise her spatial potential. 
 Griselda’s first journey, for example, is to the Country of the Nodding 
Mandarins, which takes her inside the cabinet in the saloon, with Griselda having 
been miniaturised by the cuckoo. Here, although she enjoys her time, her visit 
there is cut short by the cuckoo: 
“Griselda, it’s time to go.” 
“Oh dear, why?” she asked. “I’m not a bit tired. Why need we go 
yet?” 
“Obeying orders,” said the cuckoo; and after that, Griselda 
dared not say another word. It was very nearly as bad as being told 
she had a great deal to learn. (62) 
 
Being told that she has a great deal to learn is something Griselda hears 
frequently from the cuckoo. Here, however, the order is a forestalling of her time 
in the other place; control of the space remains beyond Griselda and at the behest 
of another. In fact, as Griselda comes to recognise, “it’s all about obeying 
orders” (154) in a universe where even the motions of the heavens are, as the 
cuckoo says, the result of “obeying orders” (140), controlled and defined.  
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Her second major excursion is to Butterfly land. This journey occurs after 
Griselda shouts in annoyance to the cuckoo:  
  “I do hate winter, and I do hate lessons, and I do think it  
  would be nicer to be a butterfly than a little girl.” (83) 
Once in Butterfly Land, in a sunny beautiful garden, Griselda’s only 
disappointment is that butterfly land is not truly fairyland as she originally 
thinks. Here, however, she learns the important lesson that butterflies are 
industrious creatures (and, therefore, so should she be). As Rosenthal observes of 
Griselda’s travels, “her two worlds begin to interlock as in ‘real’ life she begins 
to obey her aunts’ instructions” (Rosenthal 190).57 At the end of the visit, too, 
Griselda becomes frightened as the butterflies mass to “kiss” her: “‘Cuckoo, 
cuckoo,’ she screamed, ‘they’ll suffocate me. Oh, cuckoo!’” (105). She closes 
her eyes, only to open them again back in bed as though she had been dreaming, 
a ruse that can be considered as almost a standard frame used to deny the 
substance of other spaces. 
In her final fantasy excursion, the far side of the moon is where Griselda 
wants to go but, oddly, it this side of the Moon that the cuckoo says he cannot 
take her to, describing it as unpleasant to the point that Griselda recoils from the 
idea: “‘Horrid!’ said Griselda, with a shudder” (142). The cuckoo evens warns 
Griselda that, if he were to take her to this side of the Moon, “you wouldn’t be 
yourself when you got there” (143). When Griselda presses him as to what she 
would be, the cuckoo silences her request: “There are a great many things you 
are not intended to know” (143). Even so, the other side of the moon is 
something that the narrator describes as “something so strange and unlike what 
she had ever seen before, that only in a dream could you see it as Griselda saw it” 
(144); Griselda awakes to find herself on the shores of a “great, strange, silent 
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sea” (144), a “still, lifeless ocean” (145) where, as Griselda says, “I feel a little 
frightened” (145). This, again, is not a space that Griselda has either created or 
has control over. 
 In each of her fantasy travels, therefore, Griselda is taken in order to learn 
lessons, one of which implicitly suggests that such fantasy spaces are not as 
desirable as one might think. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sanjay Sircar 
believes the novel “depicts the growth of an exemplary fictive child for didactic 
purposes” (“Classic” 164, original emphasis), where the fantasy travel is, he 
says, “the sugarcoating for the moral pill” (“Victorian” 15). Certainly, movement 
of any kind into a different spatiality is only possible when Griselda is well-
behaved and repents her bad behaviour (she had thrown a book at the cuckoo 
clock in frustration): “Have you learnt to obey orders yet, Griselda?” asks the 
cuckoo (40). Alternatively, it comes in response to her behaviour for, as Lynne 
Rosenthal points out, it is “when Griselda is most rebellious and reverts to 
feelings of isolation and resistance to growth that the Cuckoo calls to her.” (190).  
 In terms of the spatial, Griselda’s opportunity to move within such 
spaces is always controlled. As Karen Smith notes, “Griselda has a desperate 
desire to believe that other worlds can exist” (Fabulous 149) but, when Griselda 
asks how anyone might get to fairyland, the cuckoo is coy: 
“That I cannot tell you either,” replied the cuckoo. “There 
are many roads there; you may find yours some day. And if ever 
you do find it, be sure you keep what you see of it well swept and 
clean, and then you may see further after a while. Ah, yes, there 
are many roads and many doors into fairyland!” 
“Doors!” cried Griselda. “Are there any doors into 
fairyland in this house?” 
“Several,” said the cuckoo; “but don’t waste your time 
looking for them at present. It would be no use.” (47) 
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Ultimately, however, it will become clear that there is no point in looking for 
doors into fairyland herself because, although they might exist, she should not 
really try to find them.  
Instead, Griselda’s spatial opportunities are, for a large part of the novel, 
limited to the interior of the house (a place on which she no opportunity to act 
independently), for even the Country of the Nodding Mandarins is effectively 
still within the confines of the house (these figures being decorative household 
ornaments and the land being inside a cabinet). Thus, as Susan Ang observes, the 
novel can be seen as a tale “of escape from mundane reality into magical space” 
(113), a fantasy fiction that suggests children “create alternative worlds as an 
antidote to the convention bound notions of his or her elders’ reality” (Immel et 
al. 227). This “antidote” is a short-lived escapism, however, “since the maturing 
child must eventually relinquish the empowering immersion in those early 
imaginings” (Immel et al. 227). For Griselda, these immersions are thrilling, but 
not empowering because of the lack of control she has over the places she visits. 
There is, therefore, a constant deference to adult requirements and thus, as 
Ang also notes, “the child never goes unaccompanied by an adult in disguise” 
(113). Even when the excursions do go further than the interior of the house, 
such as into the garden to see Butterfly Land, or to the moon, they are always in 
the company of the cuckoo, and the cuckoo directs Griselda’s movement and 
actions. These trips are taken in order for her to be taught (rather than explore 
and learn for herself, for this is no adventure story), and when she is transported 
to such places, she is exposed to elements of control, or else she experiences fear 
of some kind; both house and garden, then, remain constricting spaces of the 
domestic and local.  
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It is only when Griselda moves unaccompanied by the cuckoo, going out 
into the garden and the wood beyond, that something more expansive seems to 
happen in terms of space-making. One particular excursion, when Griselda and 
Phil finally go out into the wood to play, offers a parallel storyline that reinforces 
the necessity of staying within the ‘real’ (and, concomitantly, that, “Be it ever so 
humble, there’s no place like home”58). The path into the wood has “a sort of 
mystery about it,” and  
it might have been the path leading to the cottage of Red-
Ridinghood’s grandmother, or a path leading to fairyland itself. 
There were all kinds of queer, nice, funny noises to be heard 
there—in one part of it especially, where Griselda made herself a 
seat of some moss-grown stones, and where she came so often that 
she got to know all the little flowers growing close round about, 
and even the particular birds whose nests were hard by. (110) 
 
It may seem that this woodland place has become Griselda’s own space, but 
although there is a sense of potential in the mention of fairyland, it is never 
allowed to open up into a thirdspace; that would require the creation of her own 
space out of the structures of consensus reality.  
However it is in this wood, when Griselda and Phil do try to construct 
their own space (albeit a house), that their subsequent sense of helplessness 
shows them that they cannot stray from the domestic that is all that has been 
made available to them, a domestic situation that is still in adult control and 
suffused with the values of adult society. When the two children try to return 
from the wood, Griselda becomes disorientated: 
They had followed the little path till it came to a point where two 
roads, rough cart-ruts only, met; or, rather, where the path ran 
across the road. Right, or left, or straight on, which should it be? 
Griselda stood still in perplexity. (160) 
 
In this instance, the potential opening up of space is shown to place Griselda into 
a position of difficulty rather than providing an opportunity. Indeed, it is Phil, a 
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secondary character (a boy, and also younger than Griselda) who generally seems 
to have more mobility, although he too becomes lost.59 
Once again, moreover, it is the cuckoo that arrives to provide direction 
and lead the lost children back to the correct path: 
They had some way to go, for they had wandered far in a wrong 
direction, but the cuckoo never failed them. Whenever they were 
at a loss—whenever the path turned or divided, they heard his 
clear, sweet call; and, without the least misgiving, they followed 
it, till at last it brought them out upon the high-road, a stone’s 
throw from Farmer Crouch’s gate. (161) 
 
When the adult voice directs, it seems, the children should follow, “without the 
least misgiving.” Indeed, when Griselda and Phil have finally found their way 
home with the help of the cuckoo, Phil’s mother asks what they were doing to 
have lost their way, and Phil admits that, 
“I took Griselda to see a place that I thought was the way 
to fairyland, and then we stayed to build a house for the fairies, in 
case they come, and then we came out at the wrong side, and it got 
dark,” explained Phil. 
“And was it the way to fairyland?” asked his mother, 
smiling. 
Griselda shook her head as she replied— 
“Phil doesn’t understand yet,” she said gently. “He isn’t 
old enough. The way to the true fairyland is hard to find, and we 
must each find it for ourselves, mustn’t we?” (162–3) 
 
Griselda thus learns that ventures into other spaces and the act of creative play 
provide only a guided lesson in growing into a more adult, responsible young 
person. The act of playing is usurped and removed from the control of the young.  
Space is never available for real movement on the part of the protagonists unless 
it is in the company of one who is more knowing, and even when Griselda does 
try to create her own space in the wood, it is still a restricted space in that it is 
shown to be a recreation of the home space (and, here, an adoption of the adult 
role of homemaker).  
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 A similar situation occurs in Mrs Molesworth’s slightly later novel, The 
Tapestry Room: A Child’s Romance (1879), where a raven, Dudu, functions very 
much as does the cuckoo in The Cuckoo Clock. Although the children, seven 
year old Jeanne and eight year old Hugh, appear to want to exercise thirdspace 
imaginations in their own limited way, Dudu always acts as an adult guide and, 
despite tours of fantastic places, the children’s own search for fairyland at the 
end of the novel ultimately ends with them emerging onto the far more mundane 
roof of the house where, perhaps inevitably, they find Dudu waiting for them 
with a moral lesson about friendship in much the same way as The Cuckoo Clock 
ends. 
 In The Cuckoo Clock, then, it is clear that there is a restricted (and 
restrictive) spatiality for the child protagonist. Childhood is seen as a 
developmental stage, where an adult figure (here the cuckoo) guides the child 
within an ultimately domestic context (for even the fantasy place in which 
Griselda starts her travels is the cuckoo clock, shaped like a little house). Free 
movement is not allowed, and the child’s ambit is always proscribed; when 
possibly wider vistas do open up, the children are shown to be unable to take 
advantage of the possibilities and crate space for themselves.  
Here, the spatial operates as a closed area for instruction, a playground 
built by adults rather than a space for playing created by the child, and even that 
limited place for play is something that must ultimately be renounced in favour 
of the requirements of adult consensus reality. At the end of the novel, Griselda 
has a dream about the cuckoo expressing just such a sentiment: 
“For you will not need me now,” he said. “I leave you in 
good hands, Griselda. You have friends now who will understand 
you—friends who will help you both to work and to play. Better 
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friends than the mandarins, or the butterflies, or even than your 
faithful old cuckoo.” (164–5) 
 
Interestingly here, work and play are not opposites but are conjoined and this is 
no surprise for, as Nadel points out,  
[p]lay for the Victorians became the means to teach the very 
qualities that best characterized Victorian behavior, or at least its 
ideal: industry, competitiveness, probity, determination, and 
judgment. (19) 
 
Play as instruction, however, is little more than a game in disguise. 
On the nature of the way the places that Griselda visits evolve, Sircar also 
states that The Cuckoo Clock is  
the first major full-length English juvenile fantasy that makes an 
explicit connection between the psychological needs of the 
protagonist and the compensatory and perhaps imaginary 
(“phantasy”) nature of the fantasy adventure. (“Locating” 170)  
 
This argument suggests even more strongly that the spatial is largely an unreal 
figment of the imagination, rather than a constructed and experienced space. The 
psychological, as an alternative view to the creation of thirdspace, is something I 
deal with in the next chapter. Clearly, whether the psychological line is taken 
here or not, the moral of the story is that one must leave behind childish things—
including efforts to create one’s own space—and take on the responsibilities of 
‘adult’ life such as duty and responsibility. 
 The next day, it seems, any sense of loss at that fact that access to other 
spaces is no longer available is more than compensated for by Griselda’s new 
found adultness for 
when Griselda awoke, her pillow was wet with tears. Thus many 
stories end. She was happy, very happy in the thought of her kind 
new friends; but there were tears for the one she felt she had said 
farewell to, even though he was only a cuckoo in a clock. (165) 
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After all that has happened, the magical guide has now become for Griselda 
“only a cuckoo in a clock.” Thus, Griselda is seen to grasp the fact that, however 
painful, important lessons must be learned if one is to correctly fit in to the 
defined spatiality of her social milieu and be a part of adult society, and she has 
shown herself to have developed that ‘adult’ awareness by eschewing any wish 
to look for other spaces, thirdspace or otherwise.  
The lack of opportunity for Griselda to create anything other than a pale 
imitation of a thirdspace, seems to send the clear message that such other worlds 
and other spaces are to be sought for only in very early childhood if at all, they 
can only be temporary fancies if considered and, even then, they are acceptable 
only when they can provide for the kind of moral instruction that is appropriate 
for young (Victorian) children. Thus, although Karen Smith observes that 
Griselda “finds herself going back and forth as easily as if she had done it all her 
life,” and she “re-orients herself quite well to the variety of magical worlds to 
which she is exposed and enjoys the variety” (Fabulous 149), it seems that the 
child may be permitted to toy with the idea of such spatial playing (albeit in a 
fairly limited and fanciful way), but such ambitions must be rejected ultimately 
in favour of a return to the orderly and controlled environment of the home. The 
length of time spent back in the home at the end of novel also suggests that it is 
the more desirable location. 
There is, of course, a certain inevitability that Victorian texts will show 
space, and access to it, as restricted for, as Roderick McGillis notes of this type 
of narrative,  
[o]nce the adventure in a fantastic realm is over it is best to leave 
it behind, perhaps even to forget it, since it threatens to remove 
permanently those who experience it [...] from the duties and 
responsibilities of mature social activity. (19) 
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Indeed, in The Cuckoo Clock, there is only the slightest hint of the possibility of 
freedom of movement, a freedom that is then removed through a more 
imperative sense of moral instruction, self-restraint, and with an emphasis on 
duty and self-sacrifice: traditional, socially required, adult qualities. Griselda is 
seen to be incapable of (or, at the very least, discouraged from developing) the 
kind of constructive imagination that is required to create a thirdspace, and she 
has neither control over access to new spaces, nor control over the spaces 
themselves when she is taken to them; the spatial, therefore, is not of her own 
making. She is, then, a child protagonist bound to walk the planned pathways and 
places of a Victorian world. 
 
The Confused Spatiality of C. S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia 
One account, typified by Manlove, sees the trend in fantasy fiction after 
the Victorian period, as a development and expansion of spatial opportunities for 
child protagonists, and that, unlike Mrs Molesworth’s texts, which emerge from a 
Victorian sensibility and a particular approach to the construct of childhood, 
more recent texts will operate to develop a more accessible thirdspace, one for 
more liberated child protagonists. Manlove asserts, for example, that the 
development of English children’s fantasy can be grouped into different periods 
and that “[t]hese periods, from the Victorian to the 1990s, tell a story of the slow 
liberation of children’s fantasy from adult control” (Alice 198). However, 
Manlove wisely includes a caveat in his assessment of the post-Victorian 
children’s fantasy novel: “Yet at the same time there are ways in which it repeats 
itself” (Alice 198). “It,” here, refers to a more restricted sense of spatiality. 
It is not necessarily the case that the passage of time brings progressively 
more open understandings of, and access to, thirdspace. This can be seen in C. S. 
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Lewis’s seven book series, The Chronicles of Narnia. Apart from The Horse and 
His Boy (1954), where there is no travel between worlds because the events are 
contemporary with those in The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe (1950), the 
series tells the story of various child protagonists (and some adults) and their 
travels to, and adventures in, Narnia, a marvellous world of magic and talking 
animals, where the protagonists assist Aslan, the lion, as he both creates the 
world and maintains order in it. In this series, the other world takes on more 
substance and plays a far larger role in the scope of the narrative than do the 
fantasy places of The Cuckoo Clock, where the majority of the narrative occurs 
within the confines of the house. In fact, very little is mentioned of the ‘home’ 
space in The Chronicles of Narnia (although its physical absence will not 
necessarily detract from its anchoring position).  
For Manlove, the Narnia books present the spatial in such a way that “we 
and the children are prevented from settling to any one level of reality: always 
there is something further beyond what appears” (“Narnia” 90). However, 
compared to The Cuckoo Clock, where no effort is made to present the places 
that Griselda visits as being anything other than fantasy and illusion, The 
Chronicles of Narnia show a concerted effort to emphasise the ‘reality’ of 
Narnia’s existence.  
In The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, the Pevensie children—Lucy, 
Susan, Peter and Edmund—have been evacuated from London to the house of 
Professor Digory Kirke in the country, where Lucy and then the other children 
find their way into the world of Narnia. Professor Kirke’s explanation to Susan 
and Peter as to how, logically, Narnia must exist as a reality and that it is more 
than simply the product of Lucy’s (or the reader’s) fanciful imagination. When 
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Peter retorts, “if it was real why doesn’t everyone find this country every time 
they go into the wardrobe,” and that “if things are real, they’re there all the time” 
(56), the professor is clear that this is no hindrance and that such places do, 
indeed, exist: 
“But do you really mean, sir,” said Peter, “that there could 
be other worlds—all over the place, just around the corner—like 
that? 
“Nothing is more probable,” said the Professor. (57) 
Similarly, at the end of Prince Caspian (1951), when the children return to 
consensus reality, Edmund bemoans the fact that he has left his new torch in 
Narnia, suggesting that physical objects can have an existence in both worlds, 
with both worlds being equally real. This idea of Narnia as a real place is 
something that is returned to later in the series, in The Voyage of the Dawn 
Treader (1952), when Edmund and Lucy are discussing their previous 
adventures in Narnia, the narrator gives a more specific confirmation when 
noting that Narnia “was the name of their own private and secret country,” and 
then adding that, 
[m]ost of us, I suppose, have a secret country but for most of us it 
is only an imaginary country. Edmund and Lucy were luckier than 
other people in that respect. Their secret country was real. They 
had already visited it twice; not in a game or a dream but in 
reality. (3) 
 
Here, in addition to claims for the real nature of Narnia, the narratorial voice also 
suggests that ownership of Narnia belongs to the children; it was “their” country.  
At times too, there is a sense that the child protagonists are always ‘home’ 
and do not leave that space, which itself might argue for the creative construction 
of the space of Narnia. In The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, when the 
Pevensie children go into Narnia together for the first time, they discuss the 
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moral issue of taking something that is not theirs, the fur coats hanging up in the 
wardrobe: 
“I am sure nobody would mind,” said Susan; “it isn’t as if 
we wanted to take them out of the house; we shan’t take them 
even out of the wardrobe.”  
“I never thought of that, Su,” said Peter. “Of course, now 
you put it that way, I see. No one could say you had bagged a coat 
as long as you leave it in the wardrobe where you found it. And I 
suppose this whole country is in the wardrobe.” (62) 
 
Thus, as the children themselves theorise, in a sense, they never actually leave 
the house to get to the other world.  
This is also true of The Magician’s Nephew in that the magic rings 
transport Digory and Polly from the attic room of the house, and of The Voyage 
of the Dawn Treader, where Lucy, Edmund and Eustace are in the house before 
being pulled into Narnia through the painting. Thus, at least until the last book in 
the series, the reality of Narnia is constantly emphasised. However, as with the 
places that Griselda visits, the world of Narnia is not actually one of the 
protagonists’ making, and nor do they exercise any control over its spatiality. 
Throughout most of the series, the worlds available to protagonists are 
limited to just two: the consensus reality of England, and the ‘other’ world of 
Narnia. The Magician’s Nephew (1955) opens up the possibility of the existence 
of a greater number of other worlds (although only three of them are actually 
seen: consensus reality, Charn, and the newly founded Narnia). It is in this novel 
that the creation of Narnia is revealed as part of the narrative about two young 
neighbours, Digory Kirke (who, as an adult, will be the professor in The Lion, the 
Witch and the Wardrobe) and Polly Plummer, and their travel to other worlds. 
Deceived into travelling between worlds by Digory’s Uncle Andrew, and with 
the help of magic rings, the children find themselves taken from Uncle Andrew’s 
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study not into another world as such, but rushing up to the surface of a pool in 
the Wood Between the Worlds.  
However, although neither child makes the initial journey voluntarily, 
once they arrive at the Wood Between the Worlds, Digory realises that it is “a 
sort of in-between place” (34), with each pool leading to a different universe, and 
that they can go anywhere by jumping into different pools. Arguably, having 
arrived in the Wood Between the Worlds by trickery, it is now that the two 
children realise the spatial opportunity and seek to exercise autonomous choice 
over movement (even to the point of recklessness, before Polly points out they 
should mark the pool which will take them home). The Wood Between the 
Worlds operates, therefore, very much like the attic space that connects Digory 
and Polly’s houses in London. It is while in this attic space that they find a door 
into Uncle Andrew’s study, which effectively curtails their playing as they 
become embroiled in Uncle Andrew’s machinations.  
In fact, Digory and Polly’s first adventure together occurs when exploring 
the attic space that straddles their two homes. Compared to Narnia, this is a 
potential space for playing for, as Kort notes, “the attic is an expansive, 
alternative world, a spacious exception to the rest of the house,” that has both 
“rational and imaginative potentials” (Lewis 55). Digory’s description of the 
space under the eaves of the houses in which he and Polly live is revealing: 
“Think of our tunnel under the slates at home. It isn’t a room in 
any of the houses. In a way, it isn’t really part of any of the 
houses” (34). 
 
In this, the attic space seems very similar to the Wood Between the Worlds as an 
unactualised thirdspace that is a location for playing. However, when the two 
children go back to London after their first excursion to the Wood between the 
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Worlds, Polly is about to go back to her own house through the tunnel under the 
eaves, but  
that dark place among the rafters which had seemed so exciting 
and adventurous a few hours ago, seemed quite tame and homely 
now. (74) 
 
The potential of the attic space, and therefore thirdspace, no longer appeals; the 
spatial has been closed down.  
Whilst in the Wood between the Worlds, Jill and Digory’s choice of 
which pool to jump into and explore takes them to Charn, where they unwittingly 
wake the evil Queen Jadis (later to be the wintry ruler in The Lion, the Witch, and 
the Wardrobe). After Jadis follows the children back to London and causes 
mayhem, the children manage to bring her back to the Wood Between the 
Worlds using their magic rings. They jump into a pool hoping it will take them to 
Charn, but it is not where they arrive: 
“This is not Charn,” came the Witch’s voice. “This is an 
empty world. This is Nothing.”  
 
And really it was uncommonly like Nothing. There were no stars. 
It was so dark that they couldn’t see one another at all and it made 
no difference whether you kept your eyes shut or open. Under 
their feet there was a cool, flat something which might have been 
earth, and was certainly not grass or wood. The air was cold and 
dry and there was no wind. (96) 
 
However, this world is then filled with the song of Aslan as he sings the world 
into life; this, then, is the founding of Narnia. Thus, the attic space that promised 
a space of playing for the protagonists is overshadowed by spaces that are 
created by another, the ultimately powerful lion, Aslan. 
 Here, however, the words of Puddleglum in The Silver Chair (1953) 
come to mind. When the Queen of Underland is attempting to dissuade 
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Puddleglum, the children and the Prince of their belief in Overland (the world 
above the surface) and in Aslan, Puddleglum responds by saying,  
“Suppose we have only dreamed, or made up, all those things—
trees and grass and sun and moon and stars and Aslan himself. 
Suppose we have. Then all I can say is that, in that case, the made-
up things seem a good deal more important than the real ones. 
Suppose this black pit of a kingdom of yours is the only world. 
Well, it strikes me as a pretty poor one. And that’s a funny thing, 
when you come to think of it. We’re just babies making up a 
game, if you’re right. But four babies playing a game can make a 
play-world which licks your real world hollow. That’s why I’m 
going to stand by the play-world.” (164) 
 
Thus, having opened up and then closed down the potential thirdspace that is 
represented by the attic space in The Magician’s Nephew, this novel gives a 
description of Narnia as just such a thirdspace, a “play-world” created by others 
rather than Aslan. This is an interesting aside, however, in a continuous stream of 
information that points only to Narnia as Aslan’s creation. 
 Moreover, not only is the world of Narnia shown to be the product of an 
entity other than the child protagonists, but also the nature of movement between 
Narnia and consensus reality is not one that protagonists have control over. Child 
protagonist’s movements into Narnia are not a matter of their own choice and, as 
the narratorial comment from The Voyage of the Dawn Treader notes about how 
the Pevensies had entered Narnia, “They had got there of course by Magic, 
which is the only way of getting to Narnia” (3). The question is, however, whose 
magic?  
In fact, the children are usually summoned into Narnia by some 
mechanism, be it Aslan or some other individual or device. I have already 
mentioned how, in The Magician’s Nephew, Uncle Andrew tricks Polly by 
getting her to touch a yellow ring devised to effect travel between worlds, with 
Digory tricked into following her and taking two green rings that will enable 
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them both to return to consensus reality. However, consistently in the series, 
child protagonists do not make the journey voluntarily (even though, after their 
initial visit, they may wish to return). As explained in final book of the series, 
The Last Battle (1956), “the Sons and Daughters of Adam and Eve were brought 
out of their own strange world into Narnia only at times when Narnia was stirred 
and upset” (81). 
In The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, for example, Lucy’s first entry 
into Narnia is completely unplanned (and, therefore, not created by her); she 
stumbles upon the way in through the wardrobe whilst hiding from her siblings 
during a game of hide and seek. When the other three children finally accompany 
Lucy into Narnia through the wardrobe, their sole aim is to hide from the 
Professor’s housekeeper, Mrs Macready, and the narrator even suggests that 
possibly, “some magic in the house had come to life and was chasing them into 
Narnia” (60). Their eventual return at the end of the novel is also something of a 
chance event when they happen upon the portal that will return them to the world 
of consensus reality, and it is only a sense of curiosity (mingled, it is true, with 
some vague memory of the place they find themselves in) that makes them push 
their way back though the coats until “they all came tumbling out of a wardrobe 
door into an empty room” (195).  
Significantly, after this return from Narnia, the wardrobe is no longer 
available to them; the opportunity for movement within spaces is not within the 
children’s control. As the Professor tells them, 
“I don’t think it will be any good trying to go back through the 
wardrobe door to get the coats. You won’t get into Narnia again 
by that route.” (196) 
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The door, it seems, has been closed to them. Reassuringly, however, the 
Professor continues: 
“Yes, of course you’ll get back to Narnia again some day. Once a 
King in Narnia, always a King in Narnia. But don’t go trying to 
use the same route twice. Indeed, don’t try to get there at all. It’ll 
happen when you’re not looking for it.” (196–7) 
 
The children should not even try to enter Narnia using their own devices because 
to do such a thing would be fruitless. Thus, although there is movement, it is not 
initiated by the protagonists, but is foisted upon them. 
Similarly, in Prince Caspian (1951), set one year after the Pevensie 
children’s first trip to Narnia, there is again no special or identifiable portal 
between spaces; the Pevensie children are simply whisked from a railway station 
platform as if by magic. In fact, the magic is the sounding of Susan’s horn in 
Narnia by Prince Caspian, calling them back to Narnia’s aid once again: 
“Great Scott!” said Peter. “So it was the horn—your own 
horn, Su—that dragged us all off that seat on the platform 
yesterday morning! I can hardly believe it; yet it all fits in.”  
“I don’t know why you shouldn’t believe it,” said Lucy, “if you 
believe in magic at all. Aren’t there lots of stories about magic 
forcing people out of one place—out of one world—into another? 
I mean, when a magician in The Arabian Nights calls up a Jinn, it 
has to come. We had to come, just like that.”  
“Yes,” said Peter, “I suppose what makes it feel so queer is 
that in the stories it’s always someone in our world who does the 
calling. One doesn’t really think about where the Jinn’s coming 
from.” (83–4) 
 
As Edmund comments: “Golly! It’s a bit uncomfortable to know that we can be 
whistled for like that” (84). The children are, it would seem, not in control of 
their own movements; rather, their movement is at the behest of others, which 
suggests that their control over the spaces they move within are also not in their 
control. 
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At the end of Prince Caspian, it is specifically Aslan who is seen to 
arrange the Pevensie children’s return to consensus reality (along with the 
Telmarines, pirates from consensus reality who hundreds of years earlier had 
entered Narnia through a portal and then had taken over the lands thus leading to 
the events of this book and the need to rescue Prince Caspian and restore him to 
his rightful position). As Aslan explains to them, 
“You came into Telmar from another place. You do not belong to 
this world at all. You came hither, certain generations ago, out of 
that same world to which the High King Peter belongs.” (180) 
 
Indeed, the Telmarines original entry into Narnia is something of an anomaly in 
terms of movement into Narnia. Prior to this, the series has suggested that only 
certain individuals can enter Narnia, and yet clearly the Telmarines found their 
own way into the land in some way that is never fully explained.  
For the movement of return, it is Aslan again who sets up a portal to 
return those Telmarines who want to leave Narnia for their own world, which 
consists of 
two stakes of wood, higher than a man’s head and about three feet 
apart. A third, and lighter, piece of wood was bound across the top 
uniting them, so that the whole thing looked like a doorway from 
nowhere to nowhere. (179–80) 
 
After the Telmarines leave Narnia (their destination in consensus reality is not 
revealed), the Pevensie children return through the same portal. However, when 
they emerge they find themselves, again, on 
a platform in a country station, and a seat with luggage around it, 
where they were all sitting as if they had never moved from it—a 
little flat and dreary for a moment after all they had been through, 
but also, unexpectedly, nice in its own way, what with the familiar 
railway smell and the English sky and the summer term before 
them. (186) 
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They are, once gain, exactly where they started from, having been taken and 
returned without their express intent. 
 In The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, Edmund and Lucy are staying with 
their aunt and uncle, and they, along with their cousin Eustace Scrubb, are 
summoned into Narnia through a painting on the wall in order to go on a mission 
to find lost friends of Caspian’s father. They sail on the Dawn Treader across 
seas to the End of the World. When the Dawn Treader finally reaches as far as it 
can go, and the only thing ahead is, apparently, the End of the World, the ship 
turns about and sets sail westwards for home, whilst Lucy, Edmund and Eustace 
(and the mouse Reepicheep) carry on travelling eastwards in a boat until they 
finally arrive at a place where 
they got the strangest impression that here at last the sky did really 
come down and join the earth—a blue wall, very bright, but real 
and solid: more like glass than anything else. (207) 
 
Here they meet Aslan, in the form of a lamb and, after learning that it is not yet 
time for them to go to Aslan’s country and that, as Aslan tells them, “the door 
into Aslan’s country is from your own world” (208), it is once again Aslan who 
organises the return: “And now come; I will open the door in the sky and send 
you to your own land” (209). The passive children wait: 
Then all in one moment there was a rending of the blue wall (like 
a curtain being torn) and a terrible white light from beyond the 
sky, and the feel of Aslan’s mane and a Lion’s kiss on their 
foreheads and then—the back bedroom in Aunt Alberta’s home in 
Cambridge. (210) 
 
Once more, they are returned, without action on their part, to consensus reality, 
their task for Narnia done. 
Although the protagonists in The Silver Chair have changed—the story 
now tells of Eustace and Jill Pole, who are away from home at school, 
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Experiment House—the situation is no different; the nature of Narnia, and entry 
into it, remains the same. As Eustace and Jill try to escape from school bullies, 
Eustace’s mind turns to Narnia and the possibility of finding a way there. 
However, this is as close as any of the children ever get to creating their own 
way into Narnia. Eustace and Jill run to a door in a wall that would take them 
outside the school grounds and enable them to escape the pursuing bullies. The 
door is usually locked but, on this occasion, it opens and Eustace shouts to Jill: 
“Quick!” said Scrubb. “Here. Hold hands. We mustn’t get 
separated.”  
And before she quite knew what was happening, he had 
grabbed her hand and pulled her through the door, out of the 
school grounds, out of England, out of our whole world into That 
Place. (18–19) 
 
Here, Aslan even directly tell the children that they have travelled to Narnia at 
his will: “The task for which I called you and him here out of your own world” 
(28); that is, to rescue King Caspian’s son, Rilian. The rescue effected, and 
Narnia set to rights again, Eustace and Jill are returned by Aslan but, this time, 
they simply walk out of Narnia and back into consensus reality: 
He led them rapidly through the wood, and before they had gone 
many paces, the wall of Experiment House appeared before them. 
(215) 
 
In Aslan’s power alone it seems is the ability to freely move between spaces just 
as it his in his power alone to create the spaces. 
For Manlove, the series “raises the question of whether our own world is 
more or less real or fictional than Narnia,” and he decides the answer comes “in 
The Last Battle when both are shown to be of equal (un)reality” (“Narnia” 90). 
Indeed, The Last Battle tells of one final move into Narnia, when the King of 
Narnia, Tirian, captured, tied to a tree, and in despair at Narnia’s plight, calls out 
for help from Aslan and the children who have always come to Narnia’s rescue 
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in the past. He falls into a dream vision and sees the seven who had been to 
Narnia. When he awakens, he believes it was just a dream but,  
Almost at once there came a bump, and then a second bump, and 
two children were standing before him [. . .] They had in fact 
simply appeared from nowhere. (46) 
 
It is Jill and Eustace, come to rescue him, whisked away whilst on a train and on 
their way to find the magic rings, originally used by Digory and Polly, so that 
they can force their way into Narnia. This does not happen, of course, because it 
is not possible to move oneself into Narnia; instead, “suddenly there came a most 
frightful jerk and a noise: and there we were in Narnia” (51). In consensus 
reality, the children are in a train crash, and immediately they find themselves 
talking with King Tirian. They do not learn, until later, that they are dead, and 
the spatiality of Narnia takes on a new dimension by making the difference 
between real and unreal yet more complex. 
Now, with the child (and adult) protagonists no longer alive, the space of 
Narnia becomes no longer simply that of a ‘real’ Narnia reached from the ‘real’ 
of consensus reality. As the protagonists look down from a vantage point from on 
high, Lucy finds that she can see Narnia and England at the same time. As the 
fawn, Mr Tumnus explains, 
“That country and this country—all the real countries—are only 
spurs jutting out from the great mountains of Aslan. We have only 
to walk along the ridge, upward and inward, till it joins on.” (164) 
 
However, they are not in the same Narnia, as Lucy realises: 
“I see,” she said. “This is still Narnia, and more real and more 
beautiful then the Narnia down below, just as it was more real and 
more beautiful than the Narnia outside the stable door! I see... 
world within world, Narnia within Narnia...” (162–3) 
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Mr Tumnus reveals that the Narnia the children have been to before is not 
actually the real Narnia, just as the England of consensus reality is not the real 
England—it is “the Shadowlands” (165)—and, as the faun says, 
“But you are now looking at the England within England, the real  
England just as this is the real Narnia.” (163) 
The original Narnia, the space to which the children had been travelling, is no 
longer the real Narnia, and it is Digory who explains the new spatiality in more 
detail: 
“When Aslan said you could never go back to Narnia, he meant 
the Narnia you were thinking of. But that was not the real Narnia. 
That had a beginning and an end. It was only a shadow or a copy 
of the real Narnia which has always been here and always will be 
here: just as our world, England and all, is only a shadow or copy 
of something in Aslan’s real world.” (153–4) 
 
This ‘new’ Narnia, the copy Narnia, throws into question understandings of 
much of the spatial representations that have gone before. The real Narnia is “as 
different as a real thing is from a shadow or as waking life is from a dream” 
(154), and this Platonic understanding of an ideal space set against the imperfect 
other copies questions the validity of the spaces and the spatial practices that 
have comprised most of the series. In effect, it provides a decisive separation of 
spaces as either real (albeit here spiritually so) and imperfect unreal. 
 That Lewis should both open and close doors for child protagonists is 
perhaps also a condition of his time and his own personal convictions. Here, 
then, a sense that only in childhood can there be there the unfettered creativity to 
walk within spaces that are not the fixed and familiar of consensus reality is 
ultimately tempered and over-ruled by a different and more theological concept 
of spatiality that does not rely upon the world of the real nor of the imagination, 
nor on any combination of the two.  
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Considered in this more spiritual context, the structure of the Narnia 
series is, as Mervyn Nicholson observes, is framed within 
a cosmic plot of divinely ordained creation, destruction and re- 
creation. Everything in the world [Lewis] invents is connected to 
this framework and to a divine creator. Everything that happens is 
part of a divine scheme. (21). 
 
Ultimately, perhaps, this is why Manlove believes that Lewis’ fantasies “have 
little or nothing to do with this world, being set in a Christian fairyland which is 
reached by the ‘cut off’ device of walking through the back of a wardrobe” and 
thus “Narnia is a relatively closed system. Children from this world are drawn 
into it, and do things for it, but there is scarcely a glance back at life in our 
world” (Alice 83). There does not necessarily need to be a “look back,” of 
course, in the context of thirdspace, but the closed nature of Narnia and the fact 
that the children are “drawn” into it are telling indications of an ‘authorly’ 
spatiality at work.  
The child protagonists return, their job done, the space closed to them 
once again. Indeed, although Narnia clearly remains in existence, throughout the 
series (until The Last Battle), the child protagonists’ return effectively closes off 
that space to them until a time they are not able to determine for themselves. 
Thus, the world of Narnia, and entry into it, is not a creative or constructive act 
on the part of protagonists, and The Chronicles of Narnia offers a confused 
picture of spatiality. As Karen Smith notes of authors of Lewis’s time, they 
“sought to expand the world of the child” but, at the same time, they felt the need 
to “present an ordered cosmos to the audience; chaotic situations were avoided” 
(Fabulous 223). In a sense, however, these two ambitions are largely 
incompatible for, although the Chronicles of Narnia series does, at times, give 
glimpses of the potential of playing in a thirdspace, and even hints at possibilities 
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of child protagonists being enabled to do so, the series is complicated by the 
dynamics of the forces that operate within it. These forces both recognise the 
creative potential of the child protagonist in terms of the spatial, and argues for 
the overarching need to control that creativity for a greater purpose within a 
spatial that is, ultimately beyond any real, be it consensus reality or the real of a 
constructed thirdspace. 
 
Castles in the Air: Philip Pullman’s His Dark Materials 
 
As with the time difference between The Cuckoo Clock and The 
Chronicles of Narnia, Philip Pullman’s His Dark Materials trilogy emerged some 
fifty years after the Narnia books, in a world that was radically different from 
Lewis’s in terms of mobility and understandings of the spatial. For Manlove, for 
example, “Pullman’s books are based on a continual finding out of more about 
how the universe works, and we explore ever outwards, into worlds beyond” 
(Alice 190), and David Gooderham describes the trilogy as being “markedly 
different from what has gone before” (157). At first sight, therefore, it may seem 
odd to set the work of Pullman in the same chapter as that of Lewis, especially 
given Pullman’s criticism of the Narnia books, which is based primarily on 
theological differences.60 However, whatever ideological differences there might 
be between the two authors, in spatial terms the similarities vastly exceed the 
differences. On a basic level, both series relate the narratives of child 
protagonists who travel from their own consensus realities into other words and 
encounter such things as witches and magic and talking animals (in Pullman’s 
case, armour wearing bears and dæmons—the individual’s soul or spirit in 
visible, animal form—amongst others). More than this basic connection, 
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however, is the similarity in the way that both series seemingly open up the 
spatial for child protagonists, only to close it down again. 
The trilogy narrates the story of two twelve year olds, Lyra Belacqua and 
Will Parry, both from different worlds, who each venture into other worlds 
against a wider backdrop of revolution against the overbearing powers of a 
religious authority in Lyra’s world by opening up ways into other worlds. The 
two meet, and they are eventually to prove a key element in the demise of the 
theocracy in Lyra’s world. In his own world, Will, with his father missing, looks 
after his psychologically troubled mother as though she were the child. Thus, 
Will’s life and opportunities have already been curtailed by his role as carer and, 
before Will first discovers an opening into another world, his main concern is 
about maintaining the family home, as is explained in The Subtle Knife (1997): 
What Will feared more than anything was that the authorities 
would find out about [his mother], and take her away, and put him 
in a home among strangers. Any difficulty was better than that. 
(10) 
 
Indeed, for Will, ‘home’ was “the place he kept safe for his mother, not the place 
others kept safe for him” (Subtle 272). Lyra, apparently orphaned (her real 
parents, Mrs Coulter and Lord Asriel are both alive, but Lyra is ignorant of this 
fact at the outset), lives in Jordan College, in her world’s Oxford, and loosely 
under the control and guidance of the scholars of the college.  
Will may not have the opportunity to play because of his restrictive 
familial circumstances, but this is not the case for Lyra, at least at the start of the 
trilogy. In The Golden Compass (1995), Lyra’s personal space is a narrow, 
“shabby bedroom on Staircase Twelve” at Jordan College (84) in the Oxford of 
her world, but she has the run of the buildings, and, “[w]hat she liked best was 
clambering over the College roofs [...], or racing through [Oxford’s] narrow 
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streets” (31). When Lyra discovers there are underground elements to the 
College, “tunnels, shafts, vaults, cellars, staircases,” she “abandoned her usual 
haunt, the irregular alps of the college roofs, and plunged [...] into this 
netherworld” (43). Although Lyra is also dimly aware at the same time that this 
“wasn’t her whole world” (33), her “world and delight” (33) revolve around her 
escapades in and around Jordan College and the environs of Oxford and her 
ability, it seems, to wander where she pleases; “[t]his was her world” (55). In 
essence, Lyra treats the places of her Oxford as a personal space of playing. 
Indeed, when asked by Lord Asriel about how she occupies her time 
when she is not studying, Lyra confirms that playing is her main occupation: “I 
just play. Sort of around the College. Just . . . play, really” (34). Indeed, it is 
probably the case that Lyra’s only real freedom of movement in the series is 
when she is playing in her Oxford. However, such activities are dealt with 
pejoratively by a narratorial voice that describes the playing Lyra less than 
favourably: “In many ways Lyra was a barbarian” (31), and “a coarse and greedy 
little savage, for the most part,” one who “had passed her childhood, like a half-
wild cat” (33). The negative voice aside, there is no indication that Lyra’s play is 
necessarily creative or of a kind that constructs thirdspace worlds.  
However, the denigration of play is not necessarily a problem when 
considering the trilogy from a spatial perspective given that the existence of 
‘other worlds’ is an explicit feature of the narrative. Pullman himself, explains 
the principles in operation in the pages preceding the start of the first book, The 
Golden Compass, that it  
forms the first part of a story in three volumes. The first volume is 
set in a universe like ours, but different in many ways. The second 
volume is set partly in the universe we know. The third volume 
will move between the universes. (n.pag.)61 
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Lyra first learns of the existence of these other worlds from Kaisa, the goose 
dæmon of the witch, Serafina Pekkala, for the witches live “so close to the place 
where the veil between the worlds is thin” (Golden 154). Later in The Golden 
Compass, As Lyra travel north by boat to rescue children that have been 
abducted, Kaisa explains the witches’ understanding of multiple worlds: 
“Witches have known of other worlds for thousands of years. You 
can see them sometimes in the Northern lights. They aren’t part of 
this universe at all; even the furthest stars are part of this universe, 
but the lights show us a different universe entirely. Not further 
away, but interpenetrating with this one. Here on this deck, 
millions of other universes exist, unaware of one another ….” 
(164) 
 
Lord Asriel also confirms to her that there are “uncountable billions of parallel 
worlds” (330), a multiverse in fact, although the existence of these many worlds 
is not well received by everyone in Lyra’s world.  
 For the authoritarian powers of Lyra’s world, such thoughts and ideas 
regarding the existence of so many other, real, worlds is seen as antithetical to 
their beliefs. As the Master of Jordan College explains, this relates to the so 
called Barnard–Stokes heresy: 
“As I understand it, the Holy Church teaches that there are two 
worlds: the world of everything we can see and touch, and another 
world, the spiritual world of heaven and hell. Barnard and Stokes 
were two—how shall I put it—renegade theologians who 
postulated the existence of numerous other worlds like this one, 
neither heaven nor hell, but material and sinful. They are there, 
close by, but invisible and unreachable.” (Golden 28–9) 
 
As such, the Church enforced real/unreal binary, cannot permit dangerously 
imaginative notions of multiple worlds where, as Lyra’s mother, Mrs Coulter 
recalls in the trilogy’s final volume, The Amber Spyglass (2000), 
there were more spatial dimensions than the three familiar ones, 
that on a very small scale, there were up to seven or eight other 
dimensions, but that they were impossible to examine directly [...]. 
Folds within folds, corners and edges both containing and being 
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contained: its inside was everywhere and its outside was 
everywhere else. (353) 
 
However, despite the heretical nature of such an idea, as the Master points out, 
“there seem to be sound mathematical arguments for this other-world theory” 
(Golden 28), and the search for ways to prove the existence of these worlds, to 
open up ways to get to them, and the relationship between them is a main feature 
of the trilogy’s narrative arc.  
Thus, early on in the trilogy, the narrative seems to be setting up a 
contrast between the imaginative belief in many worlds as valid in its own right, 
and the opposing, more rationalist (although couched in theological terms) binary 
understanding of just one consensus reality and its spiritual counterpart. The 
theological position aside, this indication of a wealth of spatial possibilities 
would seem to augur well for the protagonists’ experience of thirdspace, and at 
least one critic considers that “Pullman’s most distinctive contribution to the 
fantasy genre is his blurring of the line that separates the ‘real’ from the fantasy 
worlds” (Hatlen 75) since, in its cosmology, His Dark Materials draws on ideas 
from quantum mechanics such that all worlds in the trilogy are presented as 
equally real.62  
 Based on the concept of a literary thirdspace, the other space would 
indeed be a reality but, more importantly, it would be a spatial reality created and 
opened up by the child protagonist; thus, the question to be asked concerns the 
origin of these countless worlds. The answer comes in The Golden Compass, 
when Lord Asriel responds to a question from Lyra about the other universe he 
wants to travel to, the world that can be seen through the Aurora Borealis: “Now 
that world, and every other universe, came about as a result of possibility” (330). 
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To explain this, he gives a very detailed example of what happens for worlds to 
come into being: 
“Take the example of tossing a coin: it can come down 
heads or tails, and we don’t know before it lands which way it’s 
going to fall. If it comes down heads, that means that the 
possibility of its coming down tails has collapsed. Until that 
moment the two possibilities were equal.” 
“But on another world, it does come down tails. And when 
that happens, the two worlds split apart. I’m using the example of 
tossing a coin to make it clearer.” (330) 
 
Lord Asriel’s example is then put into the more concrete terms of physics: 
“In fact, these possibility collapses happen at the level of 
elementary particles, but they happen in just the same way: one 
moment several things are possible, the next moment only one 
happens, and the rest don’t exist. Except that other worlds have 
sprung into being, on which they did happen.” (330–1) 
 
New worlds, it seems, emerge from the splitting of existing worlds on the basis 
of something akin to chance. In other words, it is a random action that follows a 
principle of theoretical physics and is not in any way the result of a creative act 
of world-building; all worlds, here, are ontologically real, a plethora of consensus 
realities, each of which is, technically, autonomous and unconnected to any 
other. However, that autonomy has already been compromised, and connections 
do exist.  
The narrative has already revealed the fact that the witches know that 
Lyra has “a great destiny that can only be fulfilled elsewhere—not in this world, 
but far beyond” (Golden 154), so Lyra must, therefore, travel between worlds 
even though she will not be able to create portals for herself. At the same time, 
others are also keen to reach other worlds, most notably Lord Asriel. His means 
of crossing into other worlds is with machinery and wires and by using the power 
of the aurora borealis and, significantly, the death of a child (Lyra’s friend, 
Roger). What Lord Asriel cannot make use of, despite his zeal to cross into other 
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worlds, are the already existing “invisible places in the air [...]. Gateways into 
other worlds that angels can see but that others are unaware of” (Subtle 126), and 
these would appear to be the openings that have been created over time.  
In fact, the history of these openings is already known by some. As Lord 
Boreal tells Mrs. Coulter, one of the worlds, Cittàgazze, is “one of millions. 
There are openings between them, but they’re not easily found” (Subtle 175). 
Will’s first encounter with one of these openings into a different world gives an 
idea as to their nature: 
It looked as if someone had cut a patch out of the air, about two 
yards from the edge of the road, a patch roughly square in shape 
and less than a yard across. If you were level with the patch so that 
it was edge-on, it was nearly invisible, and it was completely 
invisible from behind. (Subtle 13) 
 
As with many openings or portals into other worlds in fantasy ‘other world’ 
fiction, these openings are not meant to be seen by everyone. Here, however, in 
contrast to the more typical nature of portals—where only certain individuals 
(and usually only children) can go through—these ways through are available to 
anyone, human or animal, that happens to chance upon them. 
 In the long ago past of the multiverse, it appears that there had been no 
openings between worlds; those that exist now had been created. Even so, there 
had been some kind of control over their use for, as Lord Boreal explains, 
“[p]reviously, all the doorways opened into one world, which was a sort of 
crossroads. That is the world of Cittàgazze” (Subtle 176). The scientists from the 
world of Cittàgazze had been opening portals between worlds for three hundred 
years using the Subtle knife, which, despite its incredible power, is an 
unremarkable looking object, “not a special-looking knife, just a dull blade about 
eight inches long” (Subtle 151), but it is the very knife that Lord Asriel needs to 
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fulfil his plan, and without which he will be defeated. As Lord Boreal further 
reveals, the original openings are now no longer the sole means of travel between 
worlds because the actions of Lord Asriel have opened up the barriers that had 
previously existed between worlds, so that “[i]t seems we can now pass directly 
from this world into our own, and probably into many others too” (Subtle 175).  
Certainly, such a state of affairs allows for free movement for all 
characters, and this situation is broadened yet further when Will acquires the 
Subtle Knife and learns how to make openings between worlds. However, the 
movement is not perhaps as free as it seems for the child protagonists. It is clear 
that making an opening is a stab in the dark; there is no guarantee of what other 
world is available once the opening is made until Will masters the technique and 
begins to understand the power that the Subtle Knife has and how to use it in a 
more controlled way.  
At the same time, Lyra’s movement is not something she has direct 
control over. In general, she travels to other spaces when she accompanies Will, 
and her unaccompanied movement between worlds occurs when she crosses 
from her own world into Cittàgazze, after passing through the opening in the sky 
in the north of her world that Lord Asriel had created. It is there that she first 
meets Will, who has also crossed through an opening that he had chanced across 
while trying to evade the police in his own world. However, although Will can 
make openings once he obtains the Subtle Knife, the holes he cuts do not lead to 
worlds that he constructs or even takes ownership of; the entrances he creates are 
into existing worlds. 
 That these spaces are very much not those of the child protagonists is 
indicated by Lyra’s reaction when she travels with Will into his Oxford from 
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Cittàgazze. As Sarah Cantrell notes, “[t]he space of Will’s Oxford is an 
uncomfortable reminder of her dependence and the limits of her own knowledge” 
(313). This Oxford, despite there being a certain sense of familiarity, is 
“disconcertingly different” (Subtle 66) for Lyra, and it is a place almost beyond 
her understanding: 
[W]hy had they painted those yellow lines on the road? What 
where those little white patches dotting every sidewalk? (In her 
own world, they had never heard of chewing gum.) What could 
those red and green lights mean at the corner of the road? It was 
all much harder to read than the alethiometer. (Subtle 66) 
 
As such, rather than Lyra unhesitatingly adopting the new space, she is “bereft of 
a navigational code” (Cantrell 313). In this instance, then, it is clear that, unlike 
the agentive actions of other child protagonists, when Lyra is in Will’s Oxford 
she is, as the narrator says, no more that “a lost little girl in a strange world, 
belonging nowhere” (Subtle 62), which reinforces the lack of spatial control that 
she has. 
 In fact, the only real degree of spatial control that is seen in the series is 
through the action of closing down spaces rather than opening them, when Will 
is tasked with undoing the work of the scientists from Cittàgazze and finding and 
securing all of the openings between worlds that had already been made. On this 
element of the plot, Karen Smith suggests that the trilogy 
uses conventional means for entry into new worlds but goes 
beyond the fact of entry by posing the questions: What are the 
consequences of creating portals? And what can (and should) be 
done about portals once they have been created? (“Tradition” 143) 
 
Clearly, the consequences are dire (the open portals are not only a means for 
travel between worlds, but they are the way that the worlds are leaking Dust—the 
conscious and invisible particles whose disappearance would bring about the 
destruction of all worlds), and the required action is also plain to see; all the 
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openings must be closed, an absolute restriction of the spatial that is presented as 
a necessity.  
However, on the matter of deciding whether to close the openings or not, 
the narrative does also suggest that the choice is one that Will can make or not as 
he wishes. Witness, for example, Will’s understanding of this when he says to his 
father, “I can’t choose my nature, but I can choose what I do. And I will choose 
because now I’m free” (Amber 373). This claim to independence on Will’s part is 
echoed later when Will, realising the task ahead of him to close all the openings 
between worlds, avers, “I shall decide what to do [...]. Whatever I do, I will 
choose it, no one else” (Amber 444). Will may indeed make the final decision 
regarding closing the openings to worlds, but his claim to agency is undermined 
because his decision-making process has already been tampered with when 
Will’s father explains the spatial situation to him:  
“We can travel, if there are openings into other worlds, but we can 
only live in our own. [...] we have to build the Republic of Heaven 
where we are, because for us there is nowhere else.” (Amber 325) 
 
Here, the adult voice tells the child that the option for movement into other 
spaces is, and must be, contained and closed down. The nature of that “nowhere 
else” is clearly seen when, near the end of trilogy, Will and others must return to 
their own worlds:  
While they had been speaking, the window had been open 
beside them. The lights were glowing in the factory, the work was 
going on; machines were turning, chemicals were combining, 
people were producing goods and earning their livings. That was 
the world where Will belonged. (Amber 443) 
 
It is significant again that the narrative voice dictates that it is in the ‘real’ world 
that Will actually “belonged,” and it is also pertinent to note that this is the world 
of work, of the concrete and mechanical: the rational, the accepted real. 
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Lyra, too, has learned the virtue of being in place rather than space for, 
echoing the words of Will’s father, she tells her dæmon, Pantalaimon,  
“where we are is always the most important place [...]. We have to 
be all those difficult things like cheerful and kind and curious and 
patient, and we’ve got to study and think and work hard, all of us, 
in all our different worlds, and then we’ll build [...] The Republic 
of Heaven,” said Lyra. (Amber 464–5). 
 
And this is exactly the point the narrative has sought to make throughout: “where 
we are is always the most important place,” everyone tied to their own consensus 
reality where they will only study, think, and work. Lyra will return to Jordan 
College, no longer able to play, and she will start at a proper school, St. Sophia’s 
(where she will learn by studying books how to understand the alethiometer, or 
truth measurer, which she had previously understood with her intuition and 
imagination).  
A part of this being tied to consensus reality is the understanding of the 
ultimately closed spatial order of the cosmology of His Dark Materials: 
when all the openings were closed, then the worlds would all be 
restored to their proper relations with one another, and Lyra’s 
Oxford and Will’s would lie over each other again, like 
transparent images on two sheets of film being moved closer and 
closer until they merged—although they would never truly touch. 
(Amber 451)63 
 
Only by closing contact with other worlds will “proper relations” be restored, 
which means that, having been granted access to a host of other spaces, Will and 
Lyra quite simply must rid themselves of any desire to travel between spaces (the 
only way they can be together) because to be out of their own worlds is to die. As 
Gooderham comments, “[t]he two young people thus embark on conventionally 
responsible and useful careers in their respective worlds” (172), where Will and 
Lyra will accept a life lived only in their own worlds, cut off from other spaces 
(and each other), a life of hard work and discipline; “[b]eing an adult entails 
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accepting the narrowing of one’s potential possible ‘shapes,’ learning to live with 
a diminishment of protean possibilities” (Lenz 140). 
 To reinforce this separation in the cruellest of ways, perhaps, for the child 
protagonists, it emerges that the different worlds are not, in fact, totally separated 
and unreachable at all, even after Will has closed all but the opening between the 
Land of the Dead and the world of the Mulefa in order for the elementary 
particles of the dead to become Dust again and replenish what has been lost from 
worlds. When Lyra asks the angel, Xaphania, if the fact that Will must close all 
the openings between the different worlds means that, from then on, angels will 
also be “confined to one world as we are” (Amber 443), the answer is intriguing. 
Xaphania—who has also learned from Will the technique of closing openings to 
other worlds in order to assist with the task—tells Lyra and Will that angels do 
not need windows to access other worlds because they use another way to travel 
through space: 
“It uses the faculty of what you call imagination. But that 
does not mean making things up. It is a form of seeing.” 
   “Not real traveling, then,” said Lyra. “Just pretend . . .”  
“No,” said Xaphania, “nothing like pretend. Pretending is 
easy. This way is hard, but much truer.” (443). 
 
It is only at this point, in the entirety of the trilogy, that an understanding of the 
constructive faculty of thirdspace as a “form of seeing” comes close to being 
touched upon. 
Two things emerge from this consideration of the potential of thirdspace 
space-making. First, it is not everyone (and certainly not child protagonists) but 
only angels that have this ability (and so it will not, apparently, be available to 
anyone else) and, second, the imaginative ability to achieve this movement, even 
were someone not an angel to try, “takes long practice,” says Xaphania, and 
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“[y]ou have to work” (443). That childhood will be long past before the effort 
required to achieve this faculty bears fruit is no chance implication; such an 
ability is not for the young. In effect, the act of opening up spaces is largely the 
province of adult characters, for even Will, with the marvellous knife, is using a 
tool created by adults for adult ends and ultimately his task is to undo and deny 
access to spaces (however noble that purpose is since this safely re-establishes 
the flow of Dust in the different worlds). 
 The narrative obliquely and in various ways arrives, therefore, as a 
restatement of the Protestant work ethic, albeit it within a humanist rather than a 
religious framework, in a moment that resonates with the Victorian requirements 
placed upon Griselda in The Cuckoo Clock. Perhaps, therefore, it is not 
insignificant that Lyra’s world is described in ways that give it the feel of an 
older England. Moreover, in an inversion of the very same paradigms that the 
characters have struggled to undermine—that independent thinking and agency 
(through free will if not through space-making) is an act of disobedience against 
authority—His Dark Materials is ultimately premised upon an abandonment of 
notions of accessing other worlds, an essential forbidding of the possibility of 
such things. Thus, although Naomi Wood argues that Pullman “advocates 
repeatedly the disobedient pursuit of knowledge as the key to maturity” (239), 
the implicit concerns in the narrative work within much the same binary that the 
church in Lyra’s world had preached (although now it offers a somewhat 
distorted version); that there is just one consensus reality of importance to 
individuals, that this consensus reality is where individuals should be happy to be 
and remain, and that other worlds should remain a spiritual (for which one should 
read unreachable) counterpart. 
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As with The Chronicles of Narnia, His Dark Materials sets up a paradox; 
it looks to the opening up of worlds and, at the same time, argues for closing 
them down again and denying access. As with the Narnia books (and in line with 
events in The Cuckoo Clock), the apparently complex world-building here 
operates ultimately to contain and constrict. Susan Matthews notes of the ending 
to the trilogy that it “sounds like the end of an essay—it is the end of an 
argument that is controlled by a single voice” (134). Ultimately, therefore, as 
Wood remarks, Pullman, as with C. S. Lewis “uses his view of cosmic order to 
persuade readers that obedience should be understood as central to coming of 
age” (Wood 238). Thus, as Wood summarises it, the trilogy’s message is that 
“[t]he imagination allows an expansive apprehension of the complexity and 
wonder of worlds—and possible worlds—but finally, our true work is to build 
‘the Republic of Heaven’ independently of Telos” (255); the science of multiple 
worlds is both inviting and restricting, and it is most certainly not something that 
children (nor, indeed, adults it seems) should be investigating, for they should 
really stay at home in the safe and certain knowledge that consensus reality is all 
that people should concern themselves with. 
 
Closing Doors in Neil Gaiman’s Coraline 
In the His Dark Materials trilogy, the understanding that ‘home’ is the 
best place to be, and the idea that one must accept where one is as the only place 
to inhabit is quite diffusely presented within the scope of a wide narrative 
involving epic events and a multitude of different worlds, locations and 
characters. However, this same message can also be seen, and more explicitly, in 
narratives that work within much less expansive spatial environments. One such 
example is Neil Gaiman’s Coraline, the story of a young girl, Coraline, who 
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enters another world that, this time, is of much smaller proportions—another 
domestic space—that she must negotiate and escape from. In Coraline, Gaiman 
mixes gothic, fantasy and fairy-tale motifs in order to demonstrate that there 
really is no place like home. 
 At the start of the story, Coraline Jones and her parents have recently 
moved into a new home: “It was a very old house—it had an attic under the roof 
and a cellar under the ground and an overgrown garden with huge trees in it” 
(11). The house has been subdivided into four flats (already referencing, in a 
way, the less spatially expansive nature of modern domestic dwelling). Two of 
the other flats are occupied, one by an eccentric old man who trains mice, the 
other by two elderly retired actresses. One flat remains empty. Both of Coraline’s 
parents work from home, but they always seem to be too busy to spend enough 
time with Coraline. Coraline is bored, which does not suit her temperament at all; 
she is an explorer. 
 Indeed, throughout most of the novel, this aspect of Coraline’s nature is 
reiterated. It seems that Coraline is most happy when she is being an explorer. 
Sometimes Coraline would forget who she was while she was 
daydreaming that she was exploring the Arctic, or the Amazon 
rain forest, or Darkest Africa, and it was not until someone tapped 
her on the shoulder or said her name that Coraline would come 
back from a million miles away with a start, and all in a fraction of 
a second have to remember who she was, and what her name was, 
and that she was even there at all. (81) 
 
However, Coraline’s exploring extends far beyond simple reverie, for she is also 
an explorer of the places around her, and “[t]he day after they moved in, Coraline 
went exploring” (13). In fact, “[t]hat was how Coraline spent her first two weeks 
at the house—exploring the garden and the grounds” (14) and, with this energy 
to explore, “go out she did, exploring, every day until the day it rained, when 
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Coraline had to stay inside” (14). Confined indoors by the inclement weather, 
Coraline’s exploring nature will eventually lead her into another world and 
danger, and yet Coraline appears to relish such situations. Early in the story, she 
learns that, in addition to the overgrown plants and a dilapidated tennis court, 
there was something else in the garden: a well. The two old ladies from the 
upstairs flat  
made a point of telling Coraline how dangerous the well was, and 
they warned her to be sure she kept away from it. So Coraline set 
off to explore for it, so that she knew where it was, to keep away 
from it properly. (13) 
 
Coraline takes three days to do it, but eventually she finds the well; rather than 
staying away, she deliberately goes to look for it.  
Unable to go out on a rainy day, a bored Coraline seeks ways to amuse 
herself and explores the house at the suggestion of her father. It is on this mission 
to count things in the house that Coraline discovers something that piques her 
explorer curiosity: “Of the doors that she found, thirteen opened and closed. The 
other—the big, carved, brown wooden door at the far corner of the drawing 
room—was locked” (17). The drawing room, it should be noted, is a room that is 
not generally available to Coraline, for she “wasn’t allowed in there. Nobody 
went in there. It was only for best” (16). This room, then, is already a space that 
Coraline is forbidden to enter and use, but the lure of the locked door and what 
might be behind it arouses her desire to move into other spaces beyond the 
confines of the flat: 
She said to her mother, “Where does that door go?”  
“Nowhere, dear.”  
“It has to go somewhere.” (17) 
This response gives an indication of Coraline’s spatial awareness, for how could 
a door simply go nowhere? On this occasion, however, Coraline’s hope that she 
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will discover more places to explore is dashed when her mother unlocks the 
door:  
The door swung open.  
Her mother was right. The door didn’t go anywhere. It opened 
onto a brick wall. (18) 
 
However, the lure of the door and what might be behind it is not totally removed 
and, as with the desire to locate the dangerous well, Coraline’s interest in the 
door is heightened when the old man who lives upstairs brings her a message 
from his mice: “Don’t go through the door” (25). For someone like Coraline, this 
is an incitement to do exactly the opposite. 
The first time Coraline is drawn to return to the door, she finds only 
bricks behind it again. However, when her parents do not come home, and 
Coraline is alone in the house, she takes the key, returns to the door, and decides 
to open it. At this point, the narratorial voice remarks that “[s]he knew she was 
doing something wrong” (37), but the narrative is not clear as to whether 
Coraline feels guilty at being a naughty child, or whether she is responding to the 
confinement and wishing to take some measure of ownership of her spatial 
environment as she had done with the well in the garden. Thus, “Coraline’s first 
entrance into the other house is of a piece with her imagined identity as an 
explorer, but it is also a characteristic act of defiance against adult prohibitions” 
(Gooding 397). 
 This time when she opens the door, “[t]he bricks has gone as if they had 
never been there” (37). Instead, there is a dark corridor. At this point in the 
narrative, there is almost a sense that this other space has been opened by 
Coraline herself. Indeed, When Coraline goes through the door from her ‘real’ 
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home and into the other place, she realises that “[t]here was something very 
familiar about it” (37). Indeed, 
(t)he carpet beneath her feet was the same carpet they had in their 
flat. The wallpaper was the same wallpaper they had. The picture 
hanging in the hall was the same that they had hanging in their 
hallway at home. 
She knew where she was: she was in her own home. She hadn’t 
left. (37). 
 
Of course, once Coraline looks more closely, she can see that things are not 
exactly the same, but the approximation is so close, at least at this point, as to 
almost deny any differences at all. It is almost as if it has been constructed as a 
thirdspace from Coraline’s own real and imaginary. Coraline finds the ‘other’ 
home quite interesting and appealing at first, for there is delicious food and there 
are toys that seem alive for her to play with: “This is more like it, thought 
Coraline” (41). It does not take her long to realise, however, that things are not 
quite as they seem. Most notably, for Coraline to stay in this place, she must truly 
become part of the ‘other’ family by having her eyes replaced by sewn on 
buttons. 
 To escape from this situation, Coraline goes outside, into an ‘other’ 
garden much like her own where she meets a black cat that can, it seems, travel 
freely between both worlds. As she walks with the cat she sees that, unlike in her 
own world, this ‘other’ world’s garden lacks substance and seems incomplete; it 
was “a pale nothingness, like a blank sheet of paper or an enormous, empty white 
room. It had no temperature, no smell, no texture, and no taste” (87). It soon 
becomes clear that this is no thirdspace of Coraline’s construction at all, and the 
space of the ‘other’ house and its gardens has been created, and is controlled, by 
the ‘other’ mother. Inside the other house, again with nothing to do, Coraline 
asks the ‘other’ father what she should do, but he does not answer her at first: 
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“If you won’t even talk to me,” said Coraline, “I am going 
exploring.”  
“No point,” said the other father. “There isn’t anywhere but here. 
This is all she made: the house, the grounds, and the people in the 
house. She made it and she waited.” (85). 
 
One of the promises made to tempt Coraline to stay in the ‘other’ house is that 
“Your other mother will build whole worlds for you to explore, and tear them 
down every night when you are done” (138). Clearly, worlds can be made, but it 
is the adult figure who is seen to be the one who should construct them. 
Had Coraline constructed the space she finds herself in, it would have 
been more real and substantial, but the elements of the spatial, here, lack 
concreteness, especially outside the house itself: 
Where Coraline came from, once you were through the patch of 
trees, you saw nothing but the meadow and the old tennis court. In 
this place, the woods went on farther, the trees becoming cruder 
and less treelike the farther you went.  
Pretty soon they seemed very approximate, like the idea of trees: a 
grayish-brown trunk below, a greenish splodge of something that 
might have been leaves above.  
Coraline wondered if the other mother wasn’t interested in trees, 
or if she just hadn’t bothered with this bit properly because 
nobody was expected to come out this far. (86-7) 
 
As Coraline learns, this is not a place that is worth exploring: 
“Nothing to find here,” said the cat. “This is just the outside, the 
part of the place she hasn’t bothered to create.” (88) 
 
Indeed, for Coraline, there seems little purpose in trying to explore the gardens 
outside because 
they didn’t exist; they weren’t real. There was no abandoned 
tennis court in the other mother’s world, no bottomless well. All 
that was real was the house itself. (110) 
 
In addition, when Coraline walks further to explore and thinks she has been 
walking away from the ‘other’ house, she finds she has gone in a circle.  
“But how can you walk away from something and still come back 
to it?”  
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“Easy,” said the cat. “Think of somebody walking around the 
world. You start out walking away from something and end up 
coming back to it.”  
“Small world,” said Coraline. (89) 
This “small world” is less interesting to Coraline. It is not fully imagined, and the 
only space that has defined properties is the house itself which, despite certain 
appealing qualities, has its own reasons for being undesirable as a permanent 
dwelling for Coraline. That this ‘other’ space is not of Coraline’s making is, 
perhaps one more reason for her not to stay in the ‘other’ house. 
However, she cannot simply return to her own home and leave this space 
behind. As Coraline discovers, not only is the ‘other’ house a place of 
confinement for three ghost children, earlier victims of the ‘other’ mother who 
are now trapped, in a “dim space behind the mirror” (95), a place where Coraline 
also spends some time confined, but her parents are also trapped in the ‘other’ 
house too. It quickly becomes apparent to Coraline that if she stays in the ‘other’ 
house, it will be at the expense of her freedom of movement. Staying there will 
mean she will be trapped in the ‘other’ mother’s world. Thus, despite her desire 
to leave, she knows she must return to outwit the ‘other’ mother and rescue the 
trapped souls along with her parents. Although Coraline realises that, in allowing 
her to effect a rescue, the ‘other’ mother is playing a game with her, when asked 
by the ‘other’ mother what kind of game she would like to play in order to try to 
secure the safe return of those trapped, Coraline has no hesitation in deciding 
what kind of game should be played: “An exploring game,” suggested Coraline. 
“A finding-things game” (108). Coraline takes up the challenge because she has 
a belief in her own strengths as an explorer of spaces.  
 As Coraline increasingly succeeds in her rescue attempt, much to the 
‘other’ mother’s frustration, the nature of the ‘other’ house changes accordingly, 
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for Coraline is effectively destroying the ‘other’ mother’s creative hold over the 
space. Slowly, the ‘other’ house—which before had been so fully realised—starts 
to lose its coherence: 
Outside, the world had become a formless, swirling mist with no 
shapes or shadows behind it, while the house itself seemed to have 
twisted and stretched. It seemed to Coraline that it was crouching, 
and staring down at her, as if it were not really a house but only 
the idea of a house. (122) 
 
Gradually, as Coraline observes, 
the house itself was continuing to change, becoming less distinct 
and flattening out, even as she raced down the stairs. It reminded 
her of a photograph of a house, now, not the thing itself. (141) 
 
With more success for Coraline, the house increasingly has less substance and 
becomes more indistinct: 
The house had flattened out even more. It no longer looked like a 
photograph—more like a drawing, a crude, charcoal scribble of a 
house drawn on gray paper. (144) 
 
Finally, Coraline decides that one thing is clear: 
The other mother could not create. She could only transform, and 
twist, and change (144). 
 
This may be Coraline’s assumption, but it contradicts what the other father had 
told her earlier, and this sets up a contradiction. What exactly is the ‘other’ 
mother’s ability? 
 In ascribing to the ‘other’ mother only the role of second-hand creator (or 
even simply transformer), her power is diminished in that she lacks the capacity 
to create a thirdspace that can be fully experienced by others. However, if the 
‘other’ mother is seen as a creator, as the ‘other’ father states, then there is a 
notable association of evil with the creative faculty she exhibits in constructing 
the ‘other’ house. In this latter assumption, therefore, the whole notion of space-
making can be seen as corrupted and corrupting, something that the ‘good’ child 
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protagonist (who is shown not to be capable of such world-building) must 
destroy. How young readers might perceive this is difficult to judge. 
 Coraline ends, in the traditional manner, with Coraline safely at home 
and, as Gooding notes, in doing this the novel largely follows the traditional 
home-away-home pattern. However, as Gooding also adds, “Gaiman’s final 
technical innovations to the pattern, which entail the infection of the “real” world 
[...] by the psychic forces at play in the other house, are tacit recognitions of 
Coraline’s continued developmental struggles” (Gooding 404).64 This reading 
might smack of the psychoanalytical, but it does point to the fact that it is not just 
a case of Coraline curbing her exploring ways; she must also be accepting of the 
home space as it exists, not as she would wish it to be. To this end, “[t]races of 
infection by the fantasy world remain” (Gooding 403)—in the form of the other 
mother’s severed hand—until Coraline traps it in the well in the garden. It is this 
same well that Coraline’s exploring ways had been drawn to at the start of the 
novel, signified by her uncovering the well and opening it up; now, Coraline 
covers it over again in a final act of renunciation of other-worldly inclinations.  
 Ultimately, Coraline’s discovery of, and entry into, the world of the 
‘other’ mother result from her sense of confinement and being spatially curious 
and bored. However, although she is only able to escape the ‘other’ house by 
using the very quality, her exploring nature, the very thing that had pushed her to 
go into it, Coraline is shown that such exploring is not a good thing. The 
message, here, is little different from that offered in the His Dark Materials 
trilogy. In that series, the two child protagonists learn a painful lesson and in 
Coraline, Coraline also finds a lesson is learned. In effect, her fingers have been 
burned, and she will not be doing that again for, in an artful depiction of 
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“stranger danger,” Coraline is shown that her “exploring” nature is an 
unwarranted characteristic, and that she should hold a more mature recognition 
of the benefits of the home space, whether it satisfies her spatial needs or not. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 In the novels I have discussed in this chapter, an underlying 
understanding throughout is the notion of confinement and lack of spatial 
mobility. In numerous instances, child protagonists are first seen in positions of 
confinement in the ‘home’ (and, often, not even in their own homes); 
confinement, or being confining, is a common theme in fantasy other world 
narratives. Confinement can simply mean being unable to leave the house on a 
rainy day, as in the case of Coraline and with the Pevensie children in The Lion, 
the Witch, and the Wardrobe, who are forced to stay indoors in a large house 
they cannot roam about in, and where they have only one room, that the 
Professor “had set apart for them—a long, low room with two windows looking 
out in one direction and two in another” (13), to play in; the old adage that 
children should be seen and not heard (by adults) is confining in spirit if not in 
actuality. Confinement can also mean real incarceration for various reasons as 
happens to Lyra throughout most of the His Dark Materials trilogy, and to 
Coraline when she is put in the space behind the mirror. 
However, confinement can be overcome (as will be seen in the novels I 
discuss in the next chapter), and the other understanding that emerges more 
clearly from these novels is that home is the best place to be, even though the 
home space itself is a confining space. Ann Alston suggest that, “[b]y placing the 
home at the beginning of the narrative it is shown to be integral to the text; it is 
the foundation of the story regardless of whether it is a good or bad home” 
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(Family 75). Certainly, where narratives seek to portray the idea that there is no 
place like home, even if one does wander into incredible other spaces, it’s initial 
positioning in the text at the outset does almost guarantee its superiority over 
other spaces even though, in most cases, it is a “non-place,” a term I take from 
Marc Augé denoting “a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, 
or concerned with identity” (77–8), by which is meant that it does not usually 
function as the prime location of significant action or interaction for protagonists. 
Augé’s non-places include highways, airport departure lounges, supermarkets 
and shopping malls, and ‘non-place’ designates “two complementary but distinct 
realities: spaces formed in relation to certain ends (transport, transit, commerce, 
leisure), and the relations that individuals have with these spaces” (94). Here, the 
house or home also seems to function as a place related to an end, rather than as a 
locus of activity (spatial or otherwise) or identity. 
Unfortunately, however, the return home, as Nikolajeva notes of the 
romantic pattern in children’s literature, is “to the initial order, the 
disempowerment of the hero, and the reestablishment of adult authority,” where 
the child protagonist “is brought back to the ordinary, sometimes being explicitly 
stripped of the attributes of previous power” (“Harry Potter” 128). By taking this 
notion to its logical conclusion, the confining nature of home spaces (whether 
they be good or bad) effectively removes from the child protagonists any real 
sense of constructive spatial agency in consensus reality. As a corollary, it also 
effectively disempowers the child while ‘away’ (through the inherent lack of 
permanence and control of the spatial). 
That having been said, it is clear that “home” can be viewed as a space 
the boundaries of which can be controlled and restricted, and that “[t]he spaces 
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within houses in children’s literature adhere to an ‘all-seeing’ order that re-
confirms adult control” (Alston, “Your” 19). For child protagonists, therefore, 
the regulated home place does seem to deny opportunities, and specifically even 
opportunities for movement to different rooms, areas or even thirdspaces, and 
this is largely seen to be a good thing in the novels I have discussed here.  
Thus, although as Manlove suggests, “adult constructs of children and 
childhood themselves have changed over the past century and a half” (Alice 9), 
this is not always represented textually as a linear progression. In a spatial sense, 
Stuart Aitken’s observation that the nineteenth century view of children as “an 
exclusive category of existence,” one that “resulted in the creation of spaces that 
are designed to regulate behaviour and offer the interpretations, prohibitions and 
examples of adults” (145) can be seen to have entrenched itself in the twentieth 
century and beyond if not in reality, then in the literature produced for young 
readers. 
It is important, however, to consider the potential irony of a situation 
where, although the author takes control of the spatiality presented, and thereby 
restricts how child protagonists operate within it, this does not obviate the fact 
that it presents the possibility of thirdspace as potentially there, even if it is 
restricted and controlled or even denied. Cantrell, for example, believes that 
Pullman’s use of multiple worlds helps to “encourage readers to confront their 
own notions of space in the world outside his narrative” (303). Whilst this might 
not be the message of the novels themselves, this does point to the existence of 
an implicit potential even though it is not realised in quite the same way as the 
texts I discuss in the next chapter, texts that operate more dynamically in terms 
of spatial activity. 
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Chapter Three: Being There 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, I considered texts that, despite differences in their 
dates of publication, in their narrative development, and in the nature of the 
worlds and spaces that they presented, can all be seen as confining and spatially 
restrictive in their own individual ways. In those texts, the ultimate return ‘home’ 
can be seen as a termination, the story’s satisfactory resolution, with space closed 
down and, ultimately, with child protagonists largely seen as bound and spatially 
restricted, their function fulfilled—literary child labour in a sense—and no 
longer given or permitted access to other spatial opportunities. However, this is 
not necessarily the case with all texts for, as I have already noted, different texts 
will exhibit different degrees of spatial openness for protagonists.   
In this chapter, therefore, I turn to the how and why of a number of 
fantasy ‘other world’ texts that can be considered as more spatially active and 
that are representative of the process of constructing a thirdspace through the 
spatial agency of the protagonists.  
I start with Nesbit’s The Magic City as a somewhat rare example of a 
Nesbit text that has a child protagonist constructing his own world, and thus 
presenting an early instance of space-making that, in terms of publication dates, 
is not so far removed in time from Mrs. Molesworth’s The Cuckoo Clock. I will 
then move on to Maurice Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are in order to 
consider how notions of a literary thirdspace are disconnected from strictly 
psychoanalytical readings of inner space and to show how a spatial reading can 
offer different insights and interpretations. This will be further elaborated upon in 
a discussion of William Mayne’s A Game of Dark (1971), a text for older readers 
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and itself long thought of in psychoanalytical terms, as an additional instance of 
the construction of a thirdspace directly through the agency of the protagonist.  
The chapter will then consider The Homeward Bounders (1981), by 
Diana Wynne Jones, something of a departure in that it provides an example of a 
protagonist who, unlike the characters in the texts discussed in Chapter Two, 
manages to take control of movement and the spatial even when it is not 
originally of the protagonist’s making. This novel also brings back into 
consideration ideas of games and play.  
Finally, N. E. Bodes The Slippery Map (2007) is also examined as an 
instance of creative space-making that involves not only a child protagonist who 
takes on a space created by others, but one who actively creates a space of his 
own that interlinks with the original space that was created. It also offers the 
chance to consider how adults can also continue to constructively participate in 
the maintenance of a thirdspace, and what this implies for the ongoing creation of 
spaces throughout life rather than confining is to solely the activity of children. 
Moreover, in the texts I discuss here, I will consider how opening up the spatial 
can be seen to retain the potential for repeated, future actualisation of spaces by 
protagonists, rather than being a restricted glimpse into the possible as was the 
case with the texts considered in the previous chapter. 
 
World-building in Edith Nesbit’s The Magic City 
Although Manlove observes that, “where older fantasy dealt in a fairly 
limited and traditional range of fantastic worlds or beings, the modern type is 
much more novel and various” (Modern 259), this estimation should not be taken 
to mean that older novels have less potency in terms of their depiction of space-
making and, to illustrate this point, I start with a comparatively early text of 
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creative space-making: Edith Nesbit’s The Magic City. 
In contrast to the Victorian period, the Edwardian era has been viewed as 
a time of more freedom, entertainment and play. Karen Smith, for instance, 
marks the period starting from 1900 (and running to the start of the 1950s) as 
noting a change in fantasy fiction, a “diversionary stage” where child 
protagonists were often enabled “to pursue unusual activities freely,” and to be 
“much more enterprising and to be prime movers in their situations” in that they 
“could both initiate action and also become more responsible participants in their 
adventures” (Fabulous 220). Manlove also notes of this period that, “with few 
exceptions, fantasy becomes less a place for learning or growing than a sort of 
prolonged secondary world where the imagination can feel at home” (Alice 40), 
suggesting more open spaces for child protagonists to play in.  
This broadening out of the spatial environment was accompanied, as 
Karen Smith also notes, by “new and more imaginative landscapes often 
involving frequent changes in settings,” and where “[t]he geography of the 
fantastic environment became complex” (Fabulous 220, 235). These changes 
seem to provide opportunities for the imagination to be put into play, for 
protagonists to initiate the action and to be more free in the way they play with 
spaces. Although, as I showed in the previous chapter, date of publication is no 
guarantee of a text’s spatial openness, the fiction I discuss in this chapter is more 
dynamic and active spatially, and is thus of a kind where the opportunity for 
creative spatial play comes closer to the idea of thirdspace than the texts 
discussed in Chapter Two.  
In line with this sense of enlarged freedom and widening of the spatial 
after the Victorian period, Nesbit’s The Magic City, seems to exemplify the claim 
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that, “Nesbit’s books show the child rampaging joyously through time and space 
unchecked” (Ang 113), although rampaging is perhaps too strong a word. 
Certainly, the way space is dealt with in The Magic City moves away from 
Nesbit’s more usual practice of having magical events taking place in the real 
world such as in Five Children and It (1902), where the marvellous Psammead 
appears in consensus reality. Instead, this novel offers a more obvious other 
world fantasy setting, one that is infused with ideas of created spaces.  
Indeed, Nesbit confessed that The Magic City grew out of a passion for 
building her own ‘magic cities’ from household objects (126), and children even 
wrote to ask her how to build their own magic cities, to which Nesbit responded 
that “[t]he only magic in the magic city is the magic of imagination, which is, 
after all, the best magic in the world” (143). Nesbit’s comment underplays the 
influence of the illusory act of magic in favour of a more real magic that is the 
constructed result of imaginative acts. Not surprisingly, then, Manlove observes 
of The Magic City that it “enlarges space rather than time” (Alice 46), and Nesbit 
certainly offers a much more child-centred understanding of the potential of a 
constructed thirdspace. 
 The protagonist of The Magic City is a young boy called Philip, who lives 
with his much older sister, Helen, the two being orphans. Philip and Helen often 
amuse themselves together with imaginings of a dream island: 
The island was a favourite play. Somewhere in the warm seas 
where palm trees are, and rainbow-coloured sands, the island was 
said to be—their own island, beautified by their fancy with 
everything they liked and wanted, and Philip was never tired of 
talking about it. (4) 
 
Although this imagining seems like wishful thinking, even escapist, it is 
important to note Nesbit’s use of the word ‘play’, not games, here, for this is not 
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an activity with ready-made toys, exemplifying Nesbit’s assertion about games 
and play that 
[c]ricket and football, fives and raquets, the games that are played 
with things out of shops, do not need imagination to help them 
out. The games without bought accessories should perhaps be 
termed “plays” than games. (112) 
 
The imagined space that Philip creates with his sister is not a matter of whimsy 
either: 
There were times when he almost believed that the island was 
real. He was king of the island and Helen was queen, and no one 
else was to be allowed on it. Only these two. (4) 
 
This imaginative and constructive “play” has a spatial element, suggesting early 
on in the novel that Philip (and, indeed, his sister) has the potential to construct 
thirdspaces, spaces that can be experienced as real. However, when Helen 
marries, the two move to her new husband’s house, the Grange, and soon after, 
Helen and her husband go away on honeymoon, leaving Philip with his new step-
sister, Lucy, whom he initially dislikes.  
Philip’s new domestic environment is something that he finds troubling, 
being very different from his earlier home life with just his sister. For two whole 
days he lived at the Grange, “hating it and every one in it” (12) because although 
he has “immense liberty” at the Grange, it is “of a desolate, empty sort” (11). 
Indeed, very much like Griselda in The Cuckoo Clock, Philip experiences 
confinement in various subtle ways: 
The great house was his to go to and fro in. But he was not 
allowed to touch anything in it. The garden was his—to wander 
through, but he must not pluck flowers or fruit. He had no lessons, 
it is true; but, then, he had no games either. There was a nursery, 
but he was not imprisoned in it—was not even encouraged to 
spend his time there. He was sent out for walks, and alone, for the 
park was large and safe. (11) 
 
There is no space allowed for play, and yet, unlike the old house that Griselda is 
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sent to, at least the Grange is not completely bereft of the presence of the child, 
for Philip’s step-sister Lucy had been raised there, and there is at least a nursery.  
For Philip, although the nursery is not a room that he is encouraged to 
spend time in, initially it is “the room of all that great house that attracted him 
most, for it was full of toys of the most fascinating kind. (11). Toys, of course, 
are a means of access to activity but, as Barthes has noted, they are “essentially a 
microcosm of the adult world; they are all reduced copies of human objects” 
(Mythologies 53). The toys, however, are initially off-limits to Philip but, 
significantly, when he is finally given permission to play with these miniature 
adult objects, he chooses not to play just with the toys; he takes them out of the 
nursery (that space which was traditionally used to confine children away from 
the adult spaces of the house) and goes to the drawing room. There, rather than 
make use of them as toys in themselves—since to do so would mean, as Barthes 
would suggest, that Philip “does not invent the world, he uses it” (Mythologies 
55)—he mixes them with numerous and varied other objects from around the 
house such as books, bowls, game pieces, and wooden blocks, all in a spatially 
constructive manner. He first builds one city with the things he finds around him, 
and then another, and then he connects both cities with a bridge. This example is 
exactly the kind of creative constructive playing that is redolent of the real and 
imagined of thirdspace construction, of course, and later developments in the 
narrative will take this further.  
Unfortunately for Philip, these efforts to create a new space of his own 
earn him a sound scolding and a rap over the knuckles with a stick from the 
nurse, an adult who is determined that Philip should not construct anything at all. 
However, determined to take one last look at his construction, Philip creeps 
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downstairs later, in the middle of the night, to look at it again: 
He gazed on it for a moment in ecstasy and then turned to shut the 
door. As he did so he felt a slight strange giddiness and stood a 
moment with his hand to his head. He turned and went again 
towards the city, and when he was close to it he gave a little cry, 
hastily stifled, for fear some one should hear him and come down 
and send him to bed. (24–5) 
 
This is the moment of connection of spaces, of transition, where the real and the 
imagined become a new space entirely.  
The movement from one space to the other is almost instantaneous here; 
there is no visible portal or gateway present through which movement will occur 
and, importantly, there is also no overt suggestion of any kind of magic being 
involved: 
He stood and gazed about him bewildered and, once more, rather 
giddy. For the city had, in a quick blink of light, followed by 
darkness, disappeared. So had the drawing-room. So had the chair 
that stood close to the table. He could see mountainous shapes 
raising enormous heights in the distance, and the moonlight shone 
on the tops of them. But he himself seemed to be in a vast, flat 
plain. (25) 
 
Now, Philip is in a new space and, instead of trying to return to consensus reality, 
he ventures on in the new space and makes his way to the city of Polistopolitan, 
where he also discovers that his step-sister has followed him. Both are taken for 
trespassers in this new space, and they are imprisoned by Mr Noah, a toy figure 
now come to life, at the top of a tower and under sentence of death. 
 Interestingly, it is Lucy, not Philip, who first recognises the true nature of 
their location in her recognition of the fact that the two of them are actually in the 
city that Philip had built from various bits and pieces in the drawing room in the 
Grange: 
“Don’t you see? It’s your own city that we’re in, your own city 
that you built on the tables in the drawing-room? It’s all got big by 
magic, so that we could get in. Look,’ she pointed out of the 
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window, ‘see that great golden dome, that’s one of the brass 
finger-bowls, and that white building’s my old model of St. 
Paul’s. And there’s Buckingham Palace over there, with the 
carved squirrel on the top, and the chessmen, and the blue and 
white china pepper-pots; and the building we’re in is the black 
Japanese cabinet.” (54) 
 
Lucy’s explanatory resort to “magic” as the cause of the city’s appearance, here, 
is an inevitable choice given no other way to explain the apparently 
unexplainable. However, it does not disguise the fact that the constructive 
process was originally Philip’s, even if he is initially unable to recognise this to 
be so. It emerges later that the reason Lucy was also able to enter Philip’s 
thirdspace was, as Mr Noah explains to Phil, because “She built up a corner of 
your city that the nurse had knocked down” (84) and, here, it is possible to see an 
example of the joint understanding of a shared spatiality that can operate between 
children at play when they create spaces for that play from the consensus reality 
around them and through their own spatial representations.  
Eventually, the two children escape from their imprisonment, and Philip 
finds himself back in the world of consensus reality, just in time to see the nurse 
destroying the city Philip had built. Philip goes to bed, believing he had simply 
dreamed about the city and the other space he had been in but, when he awakes, 
he finds that Lucy had not escaped from the city with him, and the domestic staff 
at the Grange believe she has been kidnapped by gypsies.  
 It is at this point that Philip meets Mr Noah again, once more a living, 
albeit very small, being, who is now present in consensus reality in the drawing 
room of the Grange. It is from Mr Noah that Philip learns how the space-making 
necessary to bring worlds into being operates: 
“The city you built in this room is pulled down,” said Mr. Noah, 
“but the city you went to wasn’t in this room. Now I put it to 
you—how could it be?” 
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“But it was,” said Philip, “or else how could I have got into it.” 
“It’s a little difficult, I own,’ said Mr. Noah. “But, you see, you 
built those cities in two worlds. It’s pulled down in this world. But 
in the other world it’s going on.”(84) 
 
Indeed, it seems that such creative spaces are always available to be moved into 
since, says Mr Noah, “Everything people make in that world goes on for ever” 
(84). This notion argues for the created space as being substantive rather than 
ephemeral, a space where control over access rests in the hands of the creator of 
the space. It is an idea supported by Mr Noah’s reply when Philip asks how it 
could be that he could enter the other space and experience the city there: 
“Because you belong to both worlds. And you built the cities. So they were 
yours” (84). Unlike the Narnia books, therefore, there is no question in this 
instance about ownership of the created space; it belongs to the constructive 
protagonist(s). 
Thus, with his understanding of how he can construct spaces of his own, 
and with Lucy in need of rescue, Philip builds his city again, and finds himself 
back in his new space. Whilst there for the second time, Philip meets the (human) 
carpenter, Perrin, who has himself found his way into this other world of Philip’s 
construction. It is Perrin who elaborates upon Mr Noah’s earlier explanation of 
how the new space came to be: 
“All the cities and things you ever built is in this country. I don’t 
know how it’s managed, no more’n what you do. But so it is. And 
as you made ‘em, you’ve the right to come to them—if you can 
get there. And you have got there.” (105–6) 
 
The constructedness, rather than ethereal, nature of the space is reiterated here, 
especially when, as a part of his explanation, the carpenter is very clear that the 
space, and the movement into it, is not premised upon a dream or fantastic 
imagining: 
 149 
“We come here,” said the carpenter slowly, “when we’re 
asleep.” 
“Oh!” said Philip, deeply disappointed; “it’s just a dream 
then?” 
“Not it. We come here when we’re too sound asleep to 
dream. You go through the dreams and come out on the other side 
where everything’s real. That’s here.” (107) 
 
The dream is, here, operates as a portal into another real, rather than a narrative 
framework to explain a temporary pretence, and the carpenter continues: 
“And when they go to sleep they go slap through their dreams and 
into the other world, and work and play there, see?” (107) 
 
The other world then is posited as being just as real as that of consensus reality 
by virtue of it being “not unreal, not a dream, but rather a space that comes into 
being through the protagonist’s agency, a creative playing that constructs a space 
and also confers ownership of that space. In addition, the narrative also offers an 
explanation as to why other people, such as Perrin, can enter the world that 
belongs to its maker, Philip: 
“Well, then, you made the cities, but you made ‘em out of what 
other folks had made, things like bricks and chessmen and books 
and candlesticks and dominoes and brass basins and every sort of 
kind of thing. An’ all the people who helped to make all them 
things you used to build with, they’re all here too. D’you see? 
Making’s the thing.” (106) 
 
The making is the thing, making something out of the objects of consensus 
reality, including items used for games, but now finding new, imaginative uses 
for them; the constructive process is all important in space-making. That the 
novel includes crafts people and artisans as symbolic of creative individuals 
suggests, through their absence, that certain kinds of people—those lacking in 
the creative faculties—are not likely to either build or enter such spaces (or even 
want to). 
The fact that the space belongs to Philip does not forestall the possibility 
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of it being a difficult environment, and Philip learns that he has to accomplish 
seven tasks in order to be the “Deliverer” of the world and return again to 
consensus reality, as Mr Noah explains: 
“No one can go out of this place twice unless he’s a King-
Deliverer. You’ve gone out once—without me. Before you can go 
again you’ve got to do seven noble deeds.” (143–4) 
 
Although this apparent restriction on movement is reminiscent of the way that 
The Chronicles of Narnia and the His Dark Materials trilogy subordinates child 
protagonists into the role of saviours of a space or world that is not theirs, here 
the seven tasks become part of an adventure that belongs to the protagonists 
rather than delivering the other space from some threat, even if Philip’s role is to 
become the Deliverer. 
 Philip and Lucy’s efforts to complete the tasks are dogged, however, by 
the Pretenderette, an adult figure attempting to thwart the children and dominate 
the new space. This adversary is none other than Lucy’s nurse, who had been so 
unpleasant to Philip and who had knocked down his city. However, the nurse had 
not only been destroying Philip’s city, for she too had found her way into the 
new city by being a space-maker, albeit inadvertently: 
“When I found he’d been at his building again,” she said, pointing 
a contemptuous thumb at Philip, “I was just going to pull it down, 
and I knocked down a brick or two with my sleeve, and not 
thinking what I was doing I built them up again; and then I got a 
bit giddy and the whole thing seemed to begin to grow—
candlesticks and bricks and dominoes and everything, bigger and 
bigger and bigger, and I looked in.” (324–5) 
 
Thus, the nurse has accidentally entered the space, for she had no prior intention 
to be a part of the world-building (although it is stated at the end of the novel that 
she never returns to consensus reality). Although this provides the opportunity 
for an adult foil in the plot to increase the danger in the created space, it does also 
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suggest that even those, including adults, who would otherwise deny the creative 
impulse can be caught up in the energy of space-making, just as Winnicott 
recognised.  
However, the space is still not the nurse’s, of course, and when she 
captures Philip and sets off with him on a Hippogriff, unbeknown to her, it flies 
them to the “Island-where-you-mayn’t-go,” where she throws Philip to the 
ground. Interestingly, when she tries to find a place to land herself, “she saw that 
every blade of grass was a tiny spear of steel, and every spear was pointed at her” 
(238), and even what appears to be a pool of water is not what it appears: “She 
tried to dismount in a little pool, but fortunately for her she noticed in time that 
what shone in it so silvery was not water but white-hot molten metal. (239). For 
Philip, “there were no white-hot metal and spears and snares of quicksand, only 
dewy grass and sweet flowers and trees and safety and delight” (240); the island 
is his own creation after all. 
 As Philip explores the island and its wonders, he suddenly realises 
something: 
All these wonders were on the island that he and Helen had 
invented long ago—the island that she used to draw maps of. 
“It’s our very own island,” he said, and a glorious feeling of being 
at home glowed through him, warm and delightful. “We said no 
one else might come here! That’s why the Pretenderette couldn’t 
land. And why they call it the Island-where-you-mayn’t-go.” 
(241) 
 
On the island, Philip finds his sister, Helen, for of course, she had been 
instrumental in this particular instance of world-making too: “They spent a whole 
week on the island. It was exactly all that they could wish an island to be; 
because, of course, they had made it themselves, and of course they knew exactly 
what they wanted” (249). Here again, the text is explicit in pointing to the 
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creative playing that constructs a space that is owned by those who build the 
space. 
When Lucy arrives with the Dwellers by the Sea in Noah’s new ark, 
Philip is placed in a quandary; he wants to allow the Dwellers to live on the 
island in safety, but to do so means giving up his “ownership” of the island and 
also something more: 
Helen laughed. “My boy of boys!” she said. And then she looked 
sad. “Boy of my heart,” she said, “you know it’s not only giving 
up our island. If we give it away I must go. It’s the only place that 
there’s a door into and out of my dreams.” (250) 
 
Philip finally decides to allow the others to land on the island, at which point 
Helen disappears, apparently also relinquishing her desire to continue with 
space-making activities now that she is a married woman.  
 Philip and Lucy then travel to visit the Dwellers by the Sea, and here 
again the space is a part of Philip’s world-building: 
The Dwelling seemed to be a sort of town of rounded buildings 
more like lime-kilns than anything else, with arched doors leading 
to dark insides. They were all built of tiny stones, such as lay on 
the beach. Beyond the huts or houses towered the castle, a vast 
rough structure with towers and arches and buttresses and bastions 
and glacis and bridges and a great moat all round it. (191–2) 
 
At first, Lucy is perplexed for, although she too recognises the creative agency of 
space-making, the dwelling appears to be something she did not herself make:  
“But I never built a city like that, did you?” Lucy asked as they 
drew near. 
“No,” Philip answered; “at least—do you know, I do believe it’s 
the sand castle Helen and I built last summer at Dymchurch. And 
those huts are the moulds I made of my pail—with the edges worn 
off, you know.” (192) 
 
This discovery reiterates the earlier point that such spaces need not only be the 
result of individual activity; groups can also work within the same (or almost the 
same) perceptions of the thirdspace in a shared understanding of the environment 
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in which they are all moving and performing. 
At the end of the adventure, with their seven deeds completed, Lucy and 
Philip decide it is time to go home, and they ask Mr Noah how they will achieve 
this return: 
   “How shall we get home? All in a hurry, like this?” 
“How did you get here?” 
“By building a house and getting into it.” 
“Then build your own house. Oh, we have models of all 
the houses you were ever in. The pieces are all numbered. You 
only have to put them together.” 
He led them to a large room behind the hall of Public 
Amusements and took down from a shelf a stout box labelled ‘The 
Grange.’ On another box Philip saw ‘Laburnum Cottage.’ 
Mr. Noah, kneeling on his yellow mat, tumbled the 
contents of the box out on the floor, and Philip and Lucy set to 
work to build a house with the exquisitely finished little blocks 
and stones and beams and windows and chimneys. (329–30) 
 
As if to reiterate the difference between moving into a thirdspace—which occurs 
by imaginatively using all manner of real objects and adapting them as part of the 
creative process—and moving back into consensus reality, the means of 
constructing a way back into the concrete, empirical space is by using precisely 
modelled parts that require little in the way of imagination in order to put them 
together correctly. The children construct the model, and they find themselves 
once again in front of the Grange. However, that space of adventure has not 
disappeared if ever Philip should choose to visit it again; as the novel makes 
clear, it is his space, and he may return, should he so choose, whenever he 
wishes. 
 Nesbit’s novel thus exhibits a much more open sense of the spatial and 
the way that child protagonists both construct and operate within the spaces they 
create for themselves (and, in this case, others too) than the more closed novels I 
discussed in the previous chapter. That Nesbit has a spatiality sensibility that is 
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quite different from that of, for example, Mrs Molesworth is testament to an 
understanding of how space should be more open for child protagonists (and 
children in the world of consensus reality) as a performative space of play. More 
than this, however, Nesbit’s working through of the ‘as if’ potential of thirdspace 
in the way the created space is posited as real and experienced is something that 
much predates the social theories of space and the multiple world fantasy novels 
that were to come later.  
Indeed, Nesbit is something of a pioneer in this respect. As Julia Briggs 
argues, Nesbit “invented the children’s adventure story more or less single-
handed, and then she added further magic ingredients such as wishing rings and 
time travel” (xi). What Briggs’s statement suggests is that such narratives (not 
just those of Nesbit) are primarily adventures—what I describe as performances 
of movement through spaces—with the very much additional narrative feature of 
magical elements. Magic, of course can provide an explanation for such events 
without deep philosophising or recourse to the scientific, although, at the same 
time, such world-building is a kind of magic, in a creative sense, by producing 
something new from the imagination.  
Ultimately, however, the real ‘magic’ that is at work in The Magic City is 
seen to be the constructive ability that protagonists have (when so enabled) to 
combine the real and the imagined into something that is very new, a new space, 
one that can be experienced by protagonists ‘as if’ it were real, a space that can 
be moved into and out of as a result of the protagonist’s performance of space-
making because the space is owned by the protagonist as its creator. It is a 
constructive ‘magic’ that will be seen in other texts as well. 
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Picturing Thirdspace: Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are  
 I turn now to examine a text from the 1960s, which may be a world away 
in time from the Edwardian era of Edith Nesbit, but it is only a short distance in 
terms of space-making. In this instance, however, I will be discussing not a 
novel, but a well-known picture book, one that is highly regarded in the canon of 
children’s literature, but one that is not usually considered as being an obviously 
‘other world’ fantasy narrative: Maurice Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are. 
Apart from the book’s particular depiction of the spatial, one reason for choosing 
it for discussion is that the nature of the picture book format actually helps in 
understanding the depiction of thirdspace because the limited amount of text 
available does not add many other layers of description (although this does not 
detract from all of its levels of meanings) in the same way, perhaps, that a full 
novel would.65   
Where the Wild Things Are tells the story of a young boy, Max, who 
oversteps the adult mark of good behaviour because, when playing 
enthusiastically at home one evening dressed in a wolf costume, he had “made 
mischief of one kind . . . .  or another” (n.pag.). As a punishment for his 
misbehaviour, he is sent to his bedroom by his mother. There, in the confines of 
his small room, a forest and then a sea suddenly emerge. Unperturbed, Max gets 
into a small boat and sails until he comes to the land of the Wild Things, where 
he becomes king of the inhabitants before finally sailing into his own bedroom 
again, now without its forest of trees and wild inhabitants. 
 One reason that Where the Wild Things Are is not thought of primarily as 
a fantasy ‘other world’ text is that a not uncommon response to Sendak’s picture 
book is to view it as a representation of the psychological playing out of a young 
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boy’s rage. Jennifer Shaddock, for example, notes that a standard view of the 
book is that it shows Max’s “successful internal struggle—the struggle that all 
developing children must experience—to tame his transgressive desires in order 
to retain his mother’s love” (156). Francis Spufford also suggests that the book is 
“one of the very few picture books to make an entirely deliberate, and beautiful, 
use of the psychoanalytic story of anger” (60) and, similarly, Kenneth Kidd sees 
the book as being Sendak’s “psychological refashioning of the wild and the civil” 
(155). At the same time, however, Kidd suggest the possibility of Max “[f]alling 
asleep” (155) before travelling to the land of the wild things, suggesting that the 
space of the wild things could also be seen as a fantasised place of escape, a 
dream world, that lasts only while Max sleeps.  
Gooding argues that “the various refinements of the ‘portal’ narrative 
pattern render the form a particularly resonant and nuanced mode for 
representing a child protagonist’s psychic development” (404) and, in theory, any 
such narrative could be subjected to a psychoanalytical approach.66 Certainly, as 
is the case for Philip in The Magic City, Max does not transition to another space 
thRough any obvious portal between worlds, and this might lead to suggestions 
that the space he (and, therefore, many other protagonists) enters is the product 
of “psychical or emotional disturbance” (Nikolajeva, “Fairy” 153). However, can 
this be the only possible option when trying to understand the spatial, especially 
when the mental configures only a part of the construction of thirdspace as both 
imagined and real?  
Moreover, as Nikolajeva quite rightly observes of the psychoanalytical 
approach, “we should remember that literary characters need not behave 
according to patterns described in psychology textbooks” (“Beyond” 8). I 
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pointed out in Chapter One the problem with treating characters as real. 
Worryingly, perhaps, if protagonists are put on the couch and considered to be in 
some way psychologically real, and if the psychoanalytical route is taken in order 
to understand their actions, it would ultimately lead to the conclusion that 
protagonists who create and experience such a thirdspace are nothing short of 
delusional or possibly even psychotic. There is an obvious irony, therefore, in 
arguing for the unrealness of fantasy worlds whilst simultaneously positing the 
psychological ‘realness’ of characters. 
 Whilst a psychoanalytical approach can help to illuminate texts from a 
specific perspective, in this instance, it is also useful to identify Where the Wild 
Things Are as having a narrative form that is, at least in part, as Shaddock 
suggests, “historically and culturally indebted to the nineteenth-century 
adventure/explorer narrative,” where there is a “desire for the freedoms of the 
uncivilized” that is “founded upon the restraints of the domesticated world” (155, 
156). Shaddock’s suggestion makes some sense given that the book opens in the 
space of the home, with young Max clearly rampaging about the house until his 
mischief making finally sees him sent to his bedroom without his supper. U. C. 
Knoeplflmacher suggests that the first main illustration where Max, standing on 
two books, is building a camp, is evidence of Max’s “successful demarcation of a 
child-space,” whereas the place where the wild things live is a “fantasyland” 
(171). The make-shift tent that Max builds in this early scene will be seen again, 
although in much grander form, in his own thirdspace of the land of the wild 
things, visually suggesting the basis of thirdspace in the real and imagined. 
Although the camp might be further indication, perhaps, of the explorer 
narrative, it is a grim-faced Max that is seen building that more conventional 
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play-space in what, to an explorer, must be a very confining domestic setting. In 
these early scenes of the book, therefore, Max is perhaps to be considered as 
playing games as the little boy in the wolf suit but, in the thirdspace scenes that 
come later, Max is truly playing in Winnicott’s terms. There is, for example, an 
obvious shift from that earlier grim-faced young boy to a mischievously smiling 
Max in the fifth illustration, where the forest—his forest, his space—is almost 
fully open to him. That smiling face is a knowing smile, not one of shock or 
surprise as the space around him transforms, a knowing smile born of what can 
be surmised as a full understanding of what is happening to the space of the 
room.  
Here, then, within the apparently confining space of his bedroom, Max 
takes the opportunity to reconstruct the place he has been restricted to as a 
punishment, and he recreates it as a different, thirdspace; his room becomes a 
forest, one that “grew until his ceiling hung with vines and the walls became the 
world all around” (n.pag.), alongside a sea over which he travels to the land 
where the Wild Things live. As with Philip’s first transition into his thirdspace in 
The Magic City, the moment of connection between the real and imagined 
requires no portal (and, here, no opbvious magic either). It is worth noting from 
the illustration that, although the bed posts of Max’s bed do grow into trees, other 
trees grow from nothing, suggesting the “simultaneously real-and-imagined and 
more” that characterises Soja’s thirdspace. It is also noteworthy that these trees 
are already beginning to spread themselves beyond the confines of the borders of 
the illustration’s frame, itself now showing a more expansive view of Max’s 
space than was seen in the first picture of his room. All of this spreading and 
expansion outwards suggests an added significance to the created spatial rather 
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than just signifying the interiority of the mind. 
Indeed, the development of the illustrations does add to the sense of a 
created, and therefore less constrictive, space for Max to move within. The early 
illustrations in the book, where Max is at home, are all confined within the frame 
of a single page. However, once Max’s spatiality starts to opens up, the 
illustrations cover double-page spreads before returning to a final single page 
illustration when Max returns to just his bedroom again. As Paul Arakelian 
observes, 
[t]he early separation of text and drawing gradually broadens to a 
full two-page panel in panel 9 when the boy arrives at where the 
wild things are. The panels shrink again when he leaves in panel 
17 to return to his own room. (123) 
 
For Arakelian, this shifting of dimensions to match the spatial emplacement 
“reinforces the correspondence between the boy’s power in the place he creates 
and his lack of power in his room.” (123). At the same time, the more muted 
colours of the home space at the start of the story give way to the far more 
colourful depictions of the space of the wild things: 
Early in the story when Max is mischievous and in his room, the 
colors are dull and the cross-hatching blends various objects 
together, but later, when Max travels away, yellows, pinks, and 
deeper blues are used, and a variety of textures emerges. 
(Arakelian 126) 
 
Whilst these changes in colour in the illustrations may conjure up something 
reminiscent of a psychedelic experience, this is clearly not a drug-induced trip 
for a young boy. Arakelian does, however, work from the premise that “from the 
beginning of Max’s adventure, violations of place and time are used to separate 
Max and the reader from the ‘real’ world and isolate him in dream or fantasy” 
(125), but such an understanding would tend towards the notion that Max has no 
control over what is going on. 
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 However, when Max finally arrives at an island and encounters the wild 
things, he faces them not fearfully, but in control; there is no shock at this strange 
encounter, no sense of Max experiencing anything Other. The wild things may 
roar and seem menacing, but an unperturbed young (and much smaller) Max 
simply says ‘BE STILL’ (n.pag.). This is, after all, Max’s space, for not only has 
be constructed it from the real and imagined, but he is also, as his mother has 
said, a ‘WILD THING’ (n.pag.) himself. Indeed, as can be seen in the book’s 
second illustration, when Max is chasing the family dog down the stairs, a 
picture of a wild thing, drawn by Max, can be seen on the wall, so it is clear that 
a wild thing will hold no fears for him since the creatures themselves are a part of 
his imagination and his creative space-making.  
It would be quite possible to see Max as taking a home-away-home route, 
returning safely to the care of his family and the safety of home at the end of the 
narrative. Indeed, Nodelman’s discussion of this text’s spatiality maintains a 
binary understanding of what is happening: 
A wildly luxuriant forest may grow in Max’s sparse bedroom, but 
it’s clearly a separate and opposite thing, and it’s obviously gone 
by the time the book ends. The magic is not that two apparently 
opposite things become one larger, more subtle thing, as might 
happen in an adult story, but rather that two opposite things have 
intersected for a time, maybe done a dance with each other, but 
remained finally separate. (“Pleasure” 10) 
 
In this spatial context, then, and contrary to the understanding of thirdspace in 
the literay context, Nodelman believes that “the oppositions do intersect and 
interact but never actually and finally blend” (“Pleasure 10). However, 
Knoepflmacher, having also characterised the land of the wild things as being 
wholly unreal, does hint at something more than just the binary in operation 
when he notes that “[t]he books last illustration returns Max from a bedroom he 
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may never have left” (171, my emphasis). In essence, Max is never really ‘away’ 
at all; he is simply actualising the virtual and moving within a contingent space 
of his own making.  
Here, as in many children’s other world fantasy novels, the territory and 
the process of territorialisation of the spatial, can be seen as expression of the 
subject’s role as the agent in enacting the spatial. That Max has chosen to return 
to a place where “someone loved him best of all”(n.pag.) (for it is never stated in 
the text that Max’s mother does not love him) argues for the level of purposeful 
control Max has over his thirdspace and movement within it. Thus, the departure 
that is not escape in this text is a spatial imagining that does not take the child 
protagonist out of a place at all; rather it is one that allows the child protagonist 
to recreate a space in a form that is appropriate to moment. Max goes and 
returns, of his own free will, into and out of a space of his own creation. 
More than just this level of movement, however, the nature of the 
spatiality of Where the Wild Things Are shows that literary thirdspace can also be 
seen as a lived phenomenon. Max clearly experiences, at the same time, both 
being in the space he has created—and emotions and sensations arising from 
being there—and being at home in his room, and even those few short lines that 
accompany Sendak’s illustrations make it clear that there is no real 
differentiation of space from Max’ perspective. Interestingly, the 2009 film 
adaptation of the book, directed by Spike Jonze, shows Max running out of his 
house after misbehaving and arguing with his mother, going through a wood, and 
finally reaching a pond, at the edge of which is a boat. Max then gets into the 
boat and starts sailing, the pond becomes an ocean, and then Max reaches the 
island of the wild things. All of this movement is shown as spatially contiguous 
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within Max’s consensus reality; that is, there is no separation of fantasy and real 
because it is all a spatial real for Max. 
Indeed, the putative ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ are actually one, something which 
is most clearly observable when Max eventually finds himself once again 
moving “into the night of his very own room” (n.pag.). The main reason for 
Max’s return, it seems, is that the smell of food (the supper that awaits him 
within the ‘real’ of home) wafts through the totality of a hungry Max’s created 
spatiality permeating the land of the Wild Things: “Then all around from far 
across the world he smelled good things to eat” (n.pag.). As the text specifically 
notes, here, the aroma comes from across the world; it does not suggest in any 
way that the smell has crossed from one real world to another, unreal, one. 
Arakelian calls the final line of the book “cryptic” (123), and that the 
supper is “still hot” (n.pag.) does seem to reinforce “reality” and argue for the 
benefits of home. This is a standard reading, although it does seem to necessitate 
taking the position that “Max has dreamt his journey to the Wild Things” (A. 
Chambers 48). However, it still leaves matters open in terms of the extent to 
which Max has created another “real” since it does still serve to reinforce the 
experiential nature of Max’s real and imagined experience that comes from his 
having smelled the food. In addition, readers are not privy to the moment when 
the supper arrives in the consensus reality of Max’s bedroom, and all they can 
know is that it occurs at some point during—and does not interrupt—Max’s time 
in his constructed thirdspace.  
Significantly, the final words of the book are on a plain white background 
divorced from the spatial narrative depicted visually and colourfully earlier. This 
positioning suggests that, rather than relating directly to performative actions on 
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the part of Max, “[t]he hot supper awaiting him might be seen as his mother’s 
acceptance of both his need to go and her obligation to nurture” (Cooper 319). At 
the same time, the final situation represents an adult need for the stability of 
home (and therefore an adult construction of childhood), and yet does not wholly 
diminish the agency of the movement within thirdspace as presented because 
even confining texts that follow the home-away-home pattern still show ways in 
which readers can see spaces as being opened up (a point I discuss further in the 
next chapter). It also goes some way to arguing the Bahktinian point that 
understandings of time and space need to be considered together and that, as I 
noted at the end of my Introduction, space needs to be considered alongside other 
elements of narrative for a richer understanding of texts. 
At the end of Where The Wild Things Are, the obviously wry look on 
Max’s face when he moves again within the space of just his bedroom is surely 
proof enough that he does not return a reformed character; he will continue to be 
a wild thing. Importantly for the specific reading I have set out here, the return 
does not mean that the created space ceases to exist in its virtual state—nor that 
its ‘unreal’ nature is eternally (and pejoratively) set against the real of home—or 
that the constructive ability to combine the real and imagined is only a singular 
event for, as Shaddock observes, 
while the closing illustration has Max smiling and pushing his 
wolf hood off his head, Max nonetheless still occupies his wolf 
suit, the moon shines through his window reminding us of the 
nightscape he has just visited, and the vibrant green of the plant on 
Max’s bedside table hints that it may grow and grow again. (158) 
 
In spatial terms, therefore, Where The Wild Things Are is not only, or primarily, a 
text of psychological growth or learning; it is a presentation of a space of playing 
that gives due consideration not to the fact that children play, but how they play. 
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As with The Magic City, what is most evident here is the ability of a child 
protagonist to move out of a space—here, a particularly confining one—and into 
another constructed by the protagonist, a space that operates as experientially real 
for the protagonist. Whilst the nature of that thirdspace may be limited by both 
Max’s age and that of the intended readers, other texts can offer a more complex 
examination of these processes at work, and I now turn to look at a text written 
for older readers: William Mayne’s A Game of Dark.  
 
The Spatial Presence of William Mayne’s A Game of Dark 
Whilst the picture book format of Where the Wild Things Are gives a 
more direct and, at the same time, visual insight into both the play that creates a 
thirdspace and the performances that are possible within it, novels can often 
cover over the obvious with textual details, especially when the novel is more 
intense and complex, as is the case with William Mayne’s A Game of Dark. 
However, as with Sendak’s work, in Mayne’s fiction, there is an overwhelming 
sense of the author’s affinity with children and childhood and how children think 
and feel, and of his championing the cause of children against adults. Indeed, 
Manlove has noted that an overarching understanding throughout Mayne’s 
novels is “the truth of the vision of young children” (Alice 179).  
Mayne has also been described as having an “extraordinary ability to 
capture the physicality of place intimately perceived from within a child’s 
sensual understanding” (Watson, Reading 113). Whilst Watson may be referring 
more specifically to the physical landscapes of Mayne’s native Yorkshire, this 
does not necessarily exclude Mayne’s use of the spatial as a constructed space in 
fantasy novels, and this is particularly the case with Mayne’s novel for older 
readers, A Game of Dark, where the spatial and that affinity for the child can be 
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seen to combine. 
 As with Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are, a common critical 
approach to A Game of Dark is to take a psychoanalytic perspective. In many 
ways, this is a natural inclination for a novel that tells the story of a fifteen year 
old protagonist, Donald Jackson, who lives with his mother and his sick and 
crippled father in a thin-walled bungalow, and where escape from the 
oppressiveness of his father’s religious belief and the guilt he is made to feel at 
his sister’s earlier death is seemingly impossible. Certainly Donald’s constant 
shifts between two spaces—a constricting, strict Methodist home life, and an 
alternative, more primitive and feudal, world that is being ravaged by a 
devouring worm, where he finds himself called Jackson (his surname, and the 
name used at school), and where he befriends a girl called Carrica—can be seen 
as “the darker kind of imagining of a rather dark boy; it is wholly in his mind” 
(Rees 101). The text does seem to support a psychological explanation of events 
as the main interpretive possibility; a novel where the protagonist’s “movement” 
into another space and out of the miserable existence he experiences at home can 
be seen as offering readers “a fantasy of deliberate escapism for a disturbed 
mind,” where “Donald’s need to escape arises from his situation in the primary 
world” (Swinfen 63). The question is whether such a reading works to fully 
explicate both what happens in the novel and how it happens. 
Diagnosing a “disturbed mind” as the prime cause of the novel’s events 
would also suggest disturbed actions and movements for the protagonist too, but 
the inner space, psychological approach that sees the novel only as an escapist 
fantasy, closes down the possibility for alternative readings. It overlooks the 
constructedness of the space Donald moves within, and it neglects the level of 
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control and participation in the events of the other space that Donald involves 
himself with, especially as Donald’s “escape” is to a world that is, in many ways, 
much less appealing than his original world of consensus reality. It is a world of 
dirt and death, coupled with an awful “stench that rose from the whole of the 
ground around him” (14). Indeed, Donald’s other world is “a much worse place” 
(7) than is his home, at least in physical terms. By taking a spatial perspective, 
what emerges in contrast to psychoanalytical notions is that, throughout the 
novel, Donald is constantly choosing to reposition himself spatially.  
In addition, as with Max, whose senses operate in both spaces that he 
occupies (as can be understood when he smells supper), Donald’s ‘other’ world 
can also be seen to be a part of his individual and personal experience. At the 
start of A Game of Dark the ‘other world’ exerts a powerful enough influence 
over his senses that, even when he ‘returns’ to consensus reality, it remains with 
him: 
His limbs, and particularly his neck, felt very stiff. In his mouth 
and nostrils and throat there was a stench, metallic and rotten and 
piercing, the most foul he had ever known, and that was the worst 
thing and what made him feel so sick. It made him worse than 
sick: the stench was not only felt by the ordinary senses of taste 
and smell but sensed by the whole of his skin, and seemed to 
weigh in every bone. (8) 
 
From this ‘other’ world, he experiences a “powerful and terrible smell [...] that 
filled his throat and made him gag and then bend over and vomit” (13), as he 
finds himself back in the reality of the staff room at his school. His very real 
nausea, as a response to the supposed ‘other’ world, is still present in the ‘real’ 
world of consensus reality, and as Donald, sickened by the filth and stench of his 
‘other’ world, begins to recover, he becomes aware of his access to the spatial: 
Then he was almost in two places at once, or perhaps in a place 
from which he could step into either of two worlds. One was a 
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hillside of bracken and small trees, cold and grey, and the other 
was that small room called the staff room, heavy with polish and 
smoke. (13) 
 
Indeed, the world of what should be consensus reality is as likely to be a part of 
the ‘other’ world for, as Donald steps into that horrible place again, it is twilight 
there, the morning has passed and, as Jackson, he now “knew that something had 
interrupted what he was doing” (13), that something being consensus reality: 
“Then he felt himself vanishing, and the place he was in grew smaller and 
smaller and retreated from him [...] to be replaced by the dull fold of the staff 
room” (16). 
In fact, the swift movement between worlds in A Game of Dark is all the 
more disturbing because, in an even more immediate sense than in the texts I 
have discussed so far in this chapter, there is no obvious portal to signal the 
movement or allow for the passage between spaces. Donald seems to slip 
relatively easily into the place where he becomes Jackson, and this movement is 
usually sudden, happening between sentences or even mid-sentence. In the way 
that these changes happen, the novel seems to work towards the idea that there is 
no discrete separation of real and unreal, for Donald is never not Donald, but he 
is also never not Jackson and, at one point, when Donald is Jackson again, he 
finds that his identity and subject position are an expression of the spatial: 
He was being some other person, he found, in a crisp buzzing 
world of hard light and hard ground and hard people. Then, for a 
moment again he was Donald walking towards the bridge, and the 
boy who that morning, perhaps, had called himself Jackson to a 
girl on a hillside. For a moment he could choose again which he 
would be. One is real, he said to himself. Donald is real. The other 
is a game of darkness, and I can be either and step from one to the 
other as I like. (23–4) 
 
Donald/Jackson is making clear, here, something that is far more implicit in the 
case of Max’s movement within the land of the Wild Things: the act of 
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movement is a matter of choice, and it is a part of the protagonist’s own spatial 
construction. 
 It would be remiss not to note Donald’s voicing of his own separation of 
‘real’ and ‘unreal’ here. However, Donald, as Jackson, also has a substantial past 
to his other world existence: “He had come from the north. He had crossed a 
desolate place, and was in a broken town, full of the ruins of abandonment and 
the misty cold twilight” (21). The substantive history that emerges of the other 
space gives it an authenticity that goes beyond simple fantasy imaginings or 
disturbed projections of the mind. 
Donald’s ability to choose his own space and to be in it is also clearly 
evidenced when, as Jackson, and while performing his duties as ‘boy’ to Lord 
Breakbone, he finds 
there came a glimpse of another place, and for a moment he was 
Donald and Jackson, something different from Donald Jackson as 
one person, and he was seeing both places, and could again chose 
which to take. He chose the one with less shame and guilt to it, 
and found himself again cleaning harnesses in a stable. (52) 
 
Donald’s “shame and guilt” are his reaction to his lack of feelings towards his 
father, coupled with his knowledge of the events surrounding his sister’s death 
and the cause of his father’s ill health: 
He thought he could see all the people around him and found they 
were all in the wrong place. He needed a place to see them from 
so that they were all in the right order. Somewhere, he thought, 
there is a place that is right for me, there is a way of looking at 
things and a time when the world will run smoothly again. (122–
3) 
 
His movement into his own thirdspace, however, seems to show him the need to 
establish his own spatiality in order, at the very least, to maintain his own 
personal perspective. 
Towards the end of the novel, as Donald’s father slips closer to death, and 
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as Jackson slays the worm, Donald finds that 
[h]e was now in two worlds. One of them was the hillside and the 
green grass. The other was the house in Hales Hill, and the bed he 
had slept in and the thin wall he leaned against there, and both 
were actual, and he could choose which to be in. one was silent, 
and in the other the dreadful breathing continued. There was 
movement in the house. Mrs Jackson came through from the 
kitchen and went into the other room. In the other world, here was 
movement too, and Carrica came up to him and found him. (125) 
 
Again, Donald’s presence is seen to operate across spaces, as it was for Max. 
Donald’s thoughts continue: “Carrica was a phantom if he wanted her to be, and 
the house in Hales Hill was another, and he had the choice of which to remain 
with” (126), a thought which argues more clearly that, for Donald, neither space 
is real, and yet nor is it unreal. Indeed, as Manlove says of the spaces Donald 
inhabits in the novel, “the one does not exist simply to reflect the other, indeed 
each is so vivid that it cannot finally be said which of them reflects the other” 
(Alice 118). The division between real and unreal has thus been dissolved in 
favour of a real, one that is constructed and contingent by and for the protagonist, 
and one that exists and operates at the will of the protagonist.  
 Ultimately, Donald removes himself  from the world of Jackson, moving 
himself away 
from the presence of Carrica, so that there was no more sight of 
the lord’s fields or the town beyond or that golden morning, but 
only the golden morning at Hales Hill, where reality was” (126). 
 
Importantly, therefore, it is clearly Donald’s choice to enter or leave this 
thirdspace; there is no magical force at work, pulling him into a wonderland of 
adventure. What is significant, here, is that “he had the choice of which to remain 
with” (126). Swinfen argues that this element of choice shows that, ultimately, 
“Donald chooses the primary world of reality and rejects his secondary world” 
(66), but this argues for two distinct spatial environments, the real and the unreal, 
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and it also precludes the possibility of any other (particularly spatial) potential at 
work in the text.  
Ironically, too, Swinfen’s focus on Donald’s active final choice also 
speaks against the psychological approach precisely because it is specifically 
Donald’s choice as to which world he wishes to inhabit; the decision is lucid and 
consciously made. Moreover, when Donald chooses Hales Hill, “where reality 
was” (126), this is not simply a case of Donald choosing ‘reality’ over the 
‘unreal’ space; the choice is seen to be one of where to locate himself. Donald 
simply no longer exercises his option of moving between the different spaces, 
different realities, available to him such that he does not so much choose reality 
over the unreal (since both are equally real); he merely stops moving between 
spaces within the narrative frame.  
When Lois Kuznets describes A Game of Dark as a “psychofantasy” 
(rather than being a psychological fantasy), she argues that it is a text that is “not 
a work of fantasy per se,” but one where the fantasy is simply “a device within 
the realistic problem novel” (17). Although arriving at it by a different route, I 
also suggest that A Game of Dark (and other texts that exhibit the spatial 
openness it displays) is not a fantasy because, as with the adventure plus magic 
formula of Nesbit’s work, this novel really functions around an understanding of 
the spatiality of child protagonists, a created spatiality of the real and imagined 
that works within the confines of consensus reality’s borders and boundaries and 
makes something more of them.  
Donald’s movements are not, therefore, into and out of a mentally 
disturbed or delusional state. Instead, they represent an act of walking through 
another kind of space that is constructed wholly by and for himself. The novel is, 
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therefore, another presentation—albeit with complex overtones—of an 
understanding of the thirdspace that child protagonists can experientially occupy 
during what is the serious business of playing spatially and of the agency they 
can exert within their own worlds. 
 
Spatial Nomadism: Diana Wynne Jones’s The Homeward Bounders 
 
In the novels I have discussed so far in this chapter, only two world 
spaces were evident. In contrast, many of the novels of Diana Wynne Jones offer 
a multiversial perspective, much like in Pullman’s His Dark Materials trilogy. As 
I noted in chapter two, Manlove considers Wynne Jones’s novels as part of a 
trend in fantasy writing for the presentation of multiple realities that “subvert any 
clear, single or fixed view of the universe” (Alice 149) and, by positing the 
multiverse of a myriad other worlds, Wynne Jones does call into question the 
“consensus” of consensus reality. Manlove also notes that the fantasy of the time 
was “often more extreme, because reality itself is seen as a series of fantasies,” 
wherein “our own world is no longer automatically given primary reality, and we 
may find that it is a fantastic world that is made the objective one, while ours 
becomes fantastic” (Alice 141). However, Manlove’s comments do suggest that 
the kind of space-making that can be considered as thirdspace became a more 
obvious narrative element.  
In The Homeward Bounders, many worlds are already out there, worlds 
that have a prior existence to the main protagonist’s encounter with them. 
However, what this novel exemplifies (and how it contrasts with the many 
worlds of His Dark Materials) is how protagonists can take ownership of a 
spatial that is not theirs. Also providing an obvious contrast with how child 
protagonists enter spaces in The Chronicles of Narnia, The Homeward Bounders 
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shows a transition between the child protagonist as being called or directed into a 
space, and the child protagonist as enabled to make free movement with a 
capacity to make his or her own decisions as to that movement between spaces. 
At the same time, the notion of thirdspace as a space of play, rather than a place 
for games, is also present in this novel, arising from the narrative’s main premise 
that there exists a vast series of parallel universes, all of which have become a 
huge board game for a race of sinister, hooded and cloaked beings, only 
identified as “Them,” beings who seem to be playing dice with the multiverse.  
The novel’s main protagonist, Jamie Hamilton, is a twelve year old boy 
who stumbles across Them playing their game with human (and non-human) 
lives across different worlds. Jamie’s inadvertent discovery means that he can no 
longer be considered a part of the game by Them and, as the creatures discuss his 
fate, Jamie feels “just as if I were a wooden counter or a piece of card in a game” 
(25). In effect, Jamie is but one of many pawns being moved around the board 
and, because he has become aware of this fact, he is made into a discard: 
“We have no further use for you in play. You are free to walk the 
bounds as you please, but it will be against the rules for you to 
enter play in any world. To ensure you keep this rule, you will be 
transferred to another field of play every time a move ends in the 
field where you are.” (27) 
 
That knowledge of the fact of the game requires an individual to be removed, 
isolated, already speaks to imposed conventions of using space rather than there 
being the freedom to determine one’s own use of the spatial.  
Thus, Jamie is forced to become a Homeward Bounder, which means that 
he is compelled to wander from world to world as a nomad until he can find his 
own home again: 
The rules also state that you are allowed to return Home if you 
can. If you succeed in returning Home, then you can enter play in 
 173 
the normal manner.” (27) 
 
Of course, the catch for Jamie is that, whilst finding his home again will mean 
that he no longer has to continue wandering through worlds, once he is back in 
his home world, he will become a part of the game again. Even so, Jamie is 
determined to go home: 
They had told me the rules, and those said I could get Home if I 
could manage it. Well I would. I might be a discard on the 
Bounder circuits, but I was a Homeward Bounder, and They had 
better not forget it. I was going to get Home and spite Them. (29) 
 
It is his search for home that makes Jamie an experienced traveller through 
worlds and affords him a growing understanding of how the spaces operate: 
They are separate universes, stacked in together [...]. These 
universes all touch somewhere—and where they touch is the 
boundary—but they don’t mix. Homeward Bounders seem to be 
the only people who can go from one world to another. And then 
we go by walking the Bounds until we come to a Boundary, when 
[...] we get twitched into the Boundary in another Earth, another 
universe. (35) 
 
At this point, therefore, there seems to be a spatially closed multiverse in 
operation, with a Boundary operating much like the pools in the Wood Between 
the Worlds seen in The Magician’s Nephew. However, a more detailed 
understanding of the nature of the spatial will emerge later. 
 On his journey, Jamie also encounters the legendary ship, the Flying 
Dutchman, and an old tramp who, it seems is Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew. As 
the Flying Dutchman explains to Jamie, all their trials and tribulations, their 
endless wanderings, are “‘[a]ll for a game. A game!’” (53). Ahasuerus, too, had 
witnessed Them playing their game: “I saw the gaming board of Them and I saw 
the game They played with the nations. And I went out to preach and warn my 
people of Their coming ploy” (169). It is for this reason that he has been 
condemned to wander for all eternity. Jamie also meets someone else, an 
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individual chained to a rock by Them and tortured every day by a vulture 
pecking at him. This is Prometheus (although he is never named), who explains 
that he was put there because, as he says, “I discovered about the Bounds, and all 
the ways of the world, and I made the bad mistake of telling Them” (61). This 
error has resulted not only in his own physical confinement, but also a parallel 
‘confinement’ for those like Jamie who are forced to wander ceaselessly; here, 
such movement is enforced rather than voluntary.  
 Jamie wanders through the worlds until he meets Helen Haras-Uquara, 
from the world of Uquar. Helen is also a Homeward Bounder because she, too, 
had seen Them playing their game: “They had our whole world spread out, on a 
table, and were moving people about in it, playing a game with us!” (96). Helen 
and Jamie travel together until they meet Joris, another new Homeward Bounder, 
and the three of them eventually come to a world in which they meet Adam and 
Vanessa. Joined by Konstam, Joris’s master, the six attack Them in an effort to 
end their control, but their failure results in all six of them being made into 
Homeward Bounders. This act fills the Bounder circuits to their maximum 
capacity and They cannot create any more Homeward Bounders, for even They 
must play by Their own rules. Indeed, as Jamie later learns in conversation with 
the Promethean figure, They are indeed caught in the rules:  
“They are bound to keep the rules too?” 
“Yes,” he said. “If you play a game, then you have to keep the 
rules, or there is no game anymore.” (252) 
 
Similarly, Jamie initially believes that, as a Homeward Bounder, he is also bound 
by Their rules, and that he has no control over events or his movement between 
different spaces. 
This sense of being controlled and caught up in someone else’s 
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conventions and game rules is noticeable in the way movement is effected 
between worlds; there is a “sideways twitch” and, suddenly, Jamie finds himself 
“somewhere else entirely” (27). The moving on is relentless, too, for as Jamie 
says, after arriving in a new world, “you’re just getting used to it, when bang! Up 
starts the dragging and yearning, and you’re on your way again” (67). Indeed, the 
apparently uncontrollable call of the Bounds that separate worlds is 
overwhelming and compelling for Homeward Bounders, as Jamie learns: 
It was like being pulled, strongly and remorselessly, sideways 
from the way we were going. With it, came a worse feeling—from 
inside me. It was a terrible yearning and a longing. My throat hurt 
with it. And it was like an itch too. I wanted to get inside my head 
and scratch. Both feelings were so strong that I had to turn my 
horse the way they pulled me. (32) 
 
Thus far, it seems, Jamie is indeed a pawn, moving at the whim of others, unable 
to control or direct his own spatiality. 
 However, Jamie eventually discovers that, rather than simply waiting for 
the call of the Bounds, it is indeed possible to make a personal decision about 
whether or not to move between worlds. It is a discovery that opens up new 
possibilities:  
All of a sudden, hope was roaring in my ears. If this was true, I 
could go anywhere I wanted. I could zip across world after world, 
[...] and end up at Home. Now. Soon. Today! (131) 
 
In fact, as Jamie finds, “There is not even a twitch if you do it of your own free 
will. You are just there” (132). This freedom of movement comes at the same 
time as Joris, Helen and Jamie come to an important realization whilst Jamie is 
explaining to Joris how the Boundaries work: 
I explained to him about the Bounds calling whenever one 
of Them playing the world you were in finished a move, and how 
you always knew roughly when it was due. 
“Yes, I realize,” he said. “That’s how They transfer us to 
stop us entering play. But we can surely go back to the Boundary 
 176 
now and try for a better world if we want.” 
“Can we,” I said. I didn’t think it was possible. 
“Why not?” asked Helen. “We don’t have to keep Their 
rules.” 
“No—” said Joris. “I meant I don’t think it is a rule. They 
didn’t tell me I couldn’t use the Boundaries any time I wanted. 
They said ‘You are free to walk the Bounds’ as if I could. We can 
use Boundaries any time in my world.” (130–1) 
 
In fact, Jamie had already been given this information much earlier by the 
Promethean figure chained to the rocks: 
“There are no rules,” he said. “Only principles and natural laws. 
The rules were made by Them. They are caught inside Their own 
rules now, but there’s no need for you to be caught too. Stay 
outside. If you’re lucky, you might catch Them up in Their own 
rules.” (63) 
 
Helen, too, echoing the Promethean figure’s words almost exactly (he had 
already imparted this information to her in her own world) has also told Jamie of 
this: “‘There are no Rules,’ she said. ‘Only principles and natural laws.’” The 
conclusion is, therefore, obvious: “It must be Them who pretend there are rules” 
(93). Thus, the external rules are, in fact, arbitrarily imposed and can be broken. 
It is not necessary, unless one chooses to bind oneself to them, to abide by the 
game’s rules of movement. 
 It emerges that it was, in fact, the Promethean figure who had caused this 
situation to arise, for it had not always been so: 
“I saw that a place is less real if it is seen from outside, or only 
seen in memory; and also that if a person settles in a place and 
calls that place Home, then it becomes very real indeed.” (249)  
 
This comment argues that the real place is, to use the common expression, 
wherever one lays one’s hat and is contingent and relative. It also opens up the 
way the novel inverts the notion of what is, or is not, a real space. As the 
Promethean figure further explains, 
“Well, it came to me that if reality were removed from the worlds, 
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it could be concentrated in one place. And reality could be 
removed if someone to whom all the worlds were Home never 
went to any world, but only remembered them. And I mentioned 
this idea casually to Them.” (249) 
 
They, it seems, took this information and created the game in order to control 
who has access to real spaces. As the Promethean figure points out, “when I 
discovered all this, each world was its own Real Place. They still seem that way 
to those who are not Homeward Bound. But they aren’t, not now, and that is my 
fault.” (249). It is this removal of reality from worlds that requires Them to have 
Homeward Bounders, as the Promethean says to Jamie: 
“They have to play it that way. You see, even when worlds are real 
Places, they have a way of multiplying—splitting off and making 
new worlds—and they do it even more when they are drained of 
reality. They like that. It means more of Them can play. But after a 
while, there were so many new worlds that They were playing 
with numbers that I hadn’t known. So I couldn’t keep these new 
worlds from becoming dangerously real. They found They had to 
have people to keep these worlds unreal for Them. They did it by 
promising you all a Real Place and making sure you never found 
it. Home.” (253) 
 
This idea of the nature of the “Real Place” is then further elaborated upon by 
Helen:  
“I’d always thought the Real Place was a person’s own world. I 
thought that each world was the Real Place for the people living in 
it. But I looked at Them in that building and I suddenly knew it 
wasn’t. They were in the Real Place there. I think They’ve stolen it 
from people.” (208) 
 
This confirms the inversion that has taken place between the notions of real and 
unreal spaces. Here in Helen’s explanation, it can be seen that what is taken for 
real is actually moving within the game’s rules and conventions; that is, it is 
actually an unreal space. Conversely, what is actually real is the space that one 
has to move around in freely.  
 This notion of individuals having their own personal spaces is further 
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illuminated when Helen’s explains her understanding of the way the multiverse 
works, with each person in a “place of glass”: 
“All round you, at once, there are reflections, going back 
infinitely, until your glass is multiplied many times over. That is 
like the worlds in a way. Except that it is not, because now you 
have to imagine other people in the reflections of your glass place, 
and lights lit on the outside of your place of glass too, so that you 
can see these light reflected, outside and inside also, over and over 
again, along with your own place. By now, there are myriads, all 
shining and overlapping, and you do not know which is real. This 
is the way of the worlds. All are real, lights and reflections alike. 
We pass from one to another, like light.” (95) 
 
Now, the picture of the multiverse is no longer simply one of isolated worlds 
separated by boundaries that only a few can cross. Instead, the picture is of each 
individual having his or her own real space whereby, as Helen explains, “in the 
midst of all the lights you sit in your place of glass, and this you know to be real. 
So it is the Real Place” (95). What has happened, it appears, it that these real 
spaces have been taken and concentrated by Them, so that although people may 
still believe they have a real place, in fact they do not; they move within spaces 
controlled and restricted by others, bound by rules they have no access to. These 
controlled spaces are no different to planned and organised cityscapes.  
Eventually, Jamie does succeed in returning home, but at first he does not 
realise that he is indeed home again, primarily because of the fact that more than 
a century has passed since he was first “twitched” out of his own world, and his 
world as was is now the modern world from which Adam and Vanessa (who are, 
in fact, his descendants) come; his family and his home are no longer there, and 
he has been cheated by Them: 
You’re so busy staggering along hoping, that you can’t see the 
truth. [Ahasuerus] told me the truth. I was too busy hoping to see 
it. He said They lead you along with hope. And that’s just what 
They do! They kick you out and set you going from world to 
world, and They promise you that if you can get Home, the rules 
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allow you to stay there. Rules! Utter cheat. They knew, as well as I 
do now, that no one who’s a Homeward Bounder can ever get 
Home. It just can’t be done. (242) 
 
The situation is as the Promethean figure had foretold. Realising that he can 
never go Home causes Jamie to give up hope and, at that point, he actually takes 
more control of his movement: “‘Why should I keep on letting you push me 
about?’ I said to Them. ‘I’m going where I want to go for once’” (237). Now, 
Jamie knows where he wants to go and, although the call of the Bounds starts to 
pull at him again, he resists, despite the anguish it causes: 
The call is hard enough to bear if something stops you answering 
it. If you turn your back on it on purpose, it gets quite horrible. 
But I knew it could be done. (237) 
 
This time, then, Jamie is going to “go where [he] wanted and spite Them” (237). 
With his hope of ever returning home gone, Jamie returns to Prometheus and 
frees him from his bonds as only one without hope, “someone for whom no place 
is real” (250), can do. With the Promethean figure’s help, Jamie gathers the 
Homeward Bounders for another attack on Them. On this occasion, however, the 
assault is successful, killing many of Them and, in particular, destroying Their 
special place, known as “The Real Place.” 
 Everyone, apart from Jamie, returns to their own home worlds. For Jamie, 
however, with his home as it was now gone, there is nothing to return to, and so 
he chooses to continue to wander through the worlds. When Jamie reveals to his 
friends that he is going to continue being a Homeward Bounder, his explanation 
adds to the information: 
“It’s a matter of this real place, you see. They got it and got to be 
able to play Their games by anchoring it down, sort of [...]. As 
long as we all believed there was a Real place called Home [...], 
They had this Place. And all the worlds were not so real. But now 
all that’s gone [...] and the worlds can be real again, we need an 
anchor for that too. If we don’t have one, They can have the Real 
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Place again. And I’m the anchor.” (264) 
 
In fact, Jamie’s decision to keep moving is, in many ways, forced upon him 
because, as he says, “‘I’m a good hundred years too late for it’” (262). However, 
Jamie’s decision equally results from a conscious choice, one made in full 
recognition of the fact that he has a role to play. As Jamie says, “I had, in a way, 
chosen to stay a Homeward Bounder. Not that there was much choice,” and the 
significance of this is that “I went and chose to go on being a Homeward 
Bounder, and that made me Real” (255). As Jamie explains to the reader, 
You see how it works, do you? As long as I don’t stay anywhere 
long, as long as I keep moving and don’t think of anywhere as 
Home, I shall act as an anchor to keep all the worlds real. And that 
will keep Them out [...]. I’m going to keep Them out as long as I 
can. (266–7) 
 
It is an act of spatial enabling on Jamie’s part, one that is designed to ensure that 
each individual’s space and ability to control and move within can be is assured; 
there will be no more unreal real places. 
 In The Homeward Bounders, spaces have been turned into places and are 
controlled and monitored by the hooded and unknowable creatures called Them, 
creatures who oversee worlds set out and ordered and regulated, and who work to 
ensure that the inhabitants cannot control their own actions and movements 
whilst being unaware of that spatial manipulation and, indeed, that the 
opportunity has been removed from them. The comparison between the sinister 
Them and faceless, nameless city planning bureaucracies is not difficult to make.  
However, at the same time, the novel shows that it is still possible to take 
ownership of a pre-existing spatiality by walking its bounds in one’s own way, 
just as Certeau’s walkers can re-appropriate the grid-like, game-board restrictions 
on movement that are imposed by city planners in the places of the city. Once 
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one knows what to look for, the Boundaries are not hard to find, as Jamie has 
noticed during his wanderings: 
But a funny thing was that the ordinary people in the worlds 
seemed to know the Bounds were there, as well as the Boundaries. 
They never walked the Bounds of course—they never felt the 
call—but they must have felt something. In some worlds there 
were towns and villages all along a Bound. (40) 
 
The suggestion, here, is that all individuals have an innate spatial sense of this 
ability to move freely but, because they believe themselves already to be free in 
their unreal real places, they do not exercise that spatial agency. They are merely 
walkers along the pre-ordained pathways. By looking past the idea of multiple 
worlds and considering them as multiple spaces instead, it is possible to see an 
overall understanding of creative spatial agency and of the construction of 
thirdspaces by comparing it to those who have retreated, consciously or through 
lack of other opportunity, into the familiarity, comfort and reliability of a three 
dimensional world that is actually limiting and confining.  
 Although this novel deals with already created spaces, unlike the 
characters in Narnia or the many worlds of the His Dark Materials trilogy, 
protagonists here are seen as capable—once they understand the option is open to 
them—of making their own ways in the spaces that exists. This is a version of 
the literary thirdspace through the function of movement as a creation of personal 
space rather than simply entry into an ‘other’ space. Indeed, Jamie’s final gift, 
addressed to the reading “you” now, is that his decision not to return home. His 
constant movement, means that, as he says, “You can get on and play your own 
lives as you like, while I just keep moving” (267). That Jamie uses the word 
“play” now rather than referring to lived lives as a “game” can be seen as no 
different from Nesbit’s differentiation of the terms. It also proclaims that having 
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the freedom and agency to create or construct one’s own space and the freedom 
to move within that space, a freedom that everyone has at their disposal, should 
be exercised. 
 
Mapping Imagined Other Worlds in N. E. Bode’s The Slippery Map 
 
The Slippery Map (2007), by N.E. Bode (Julianna Baggott), as a text for 
younger readers, offers what at first sight seems to be a far less complex ‘other 
world’ system than that of Wynne Jones’s The Homeward Bounders. However, 
such appearances can be deceptive and, even though only two worlds are opened 
up in this text, the spatial is again an important element in terms both of how it 
understand the potential of thirdspace, and also how it expresses the possibility 
for anyone, not just the child figure, to access the spatial.  
The narrative tells the story of Oyster R. Motel, a ten year old boy who 
had been found as a baby abandoned outside a nunnery in Baltimore, Maryland, 
“wrapped in a towel from the Royal Motel and placed in a Dorsey’s Pickled 
Foods box” (3). Oyster had been found by a nun he now calls Sister Mary Many 
Pockets (from her practice of carrying around many items in the pockets of her 
nun’s habit), since which time he has lived with the nuns in their world of 
silence, with communication only by pen and paper. For Oyster, “[t]his was his 
home” (3), however confined and bored he might feel as a small energetic young 
boy living in a nunnery, until he is whisked away—apparently a victim of the 
MTDs, “Mysterious Temporary Disappearances,” where children disappear for a 
while and then return—to travel through the Gulf of Wind and Darkness and into 
an IOW—an “Imagined Other World”—where he must vanquish the evil Dark 
Mouth and rescue his parents. However, within what appears to be a standard 
fantasy rescue and other world salvation narrative, there is a very clear 
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understanding of the spatiality of thirdspace and the kind of movement that is 
possible within the spaces available. 
Oyster’s only regular contact with the world outside the nunnery comes 
primarily in the form of Mrs Fishback, an unpleasant woman who arrives every 
day with her overweight dog, Leatherbelly, to cook and run errands for the nuns. 
Mrs. Fishback dislikes all children, but she especially loathes Oyster, and she 
revels in the bad news on the television about children experiencing the MTDs; 
she even hopes that, unlike the cases of the other children who returned, an MTD 
will take Oyster permanently.  
Although Oyster fears the MTDs, “More and more, Oyster wanted to go 
out there into the world, just for a quick exploration” (10), but the nuns remind 
him of the dangers outside the nunnery gates and it seems that the nuns “had 
always been afraid of the outside world” (10). As a result of the nun’s concerns, 
Oyster is mostly confined to the nunnery; indeed,“Oyster wasn’t allowed beyond 
the gate. He didn’t even go to school” (9). When he is allowed outside the 
nunnery, he takes in all the views because “(h)e only got these little whisps of the 
real world once or twice a year” (24). Inevitably, perhaps, for a bored young boy 
closeted in a nunnery, Oyster’s behaviour gets worse, not unlike Max in Where 
the Wild Things Are, eliciting numerous, but silent, complaints from the nuns. 
 On one occasion, when Oyster has got himself into trouble again and he 
feels the wrath of the nuns about to descend upon him, he hides in a broom closet 
in the kitchen. This is his first encounter with the Gulf of Wind and Darkness that 
opens between consensus reality and the other world: “He leaned against the 
back of the broom closet. And then the wall gave. It opened to breezy, cool dark 
air” (18). The parallels with the wardrobe in The Lion, the Witch, and the 
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Wardrobe are clear, especially as it seems that Oyster is being taken into another 
space rather than choosing to go there, with something hitting the back of his 
legs, a metal bucket that feels like “it was trying to scoop him up against his 
will” (19). It is trying to do just that, of course, but Oyster will learn this later.  
On this occasion, Oyster manages, with help of a broom and the nuns, to 
escape the gulf that had opened behind him, but Oyster chips a tooth as he lands 
on the kitchen floor, necessitating a much desired trip for Oyster outside the 
convent to the dentist, accompanied by Mrs. Fishback and Leatherbelly. Whilst 
in the convent’s van, the glove compartment becomes another wind gusty hole 
through which Oyster can hear voices, and through which the broom lost earlier 
suddenly emerges, as does the bucket that had tried to take him earlier. In the 
panic and confusion, an accident ensues resulting in a minor injury to Mrs. 
Fishback, and she sends Oyster for help.  
As Oyster wanders along the street, he finds himself in front of a shop 
with a sign saying “MOVING. CLOSED” but, through the window Oyster can 
see “boxes and rows of shelves filled with rolled-up scrolls of some sort” (33). 
Oyster is intrigued, and this will be an encounter that opens up Oyster’s 
understanding of the spatial. Inside the shop, he meets a woman wearing a badge 
that reads, “CARTOGRAPHER AND KEEPER” (34) who tells him she is a 
Mapkeeper for the “Imagined Other Worlds” (IOWs) of children (36): 
“Imagined Other World. We all have them as children. I’m the 
Mapkeeper of all Imagined Other Worlds, a cartographer by trade. 
I map the Imagined Other Worlds of children, or at least I get 
them started. They usually become self-propelling.” (36) 
 
Here, the Mapkeeper puts forward the idea that such spaces can take on a life of 
their own, growing and expanding, rather than being mere idle fancy, a point 
which lays claim to the substance of the spaces. She also adds that, “Once I get 
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them going, they start to record the child’s imaginary updates on their own” (36) 
and, as the Mapkeeper says in a dream Oyster has towards the end of the novel, 
“So many children, so many Worlds to chart” (260).  
Oyster sees that one of the maps is missing and learns that, many years 
ago, two children, a boy and a girl, had created a map together, and then later, 
when they had happened upon their map, “They stole the map and slipped inside 
it” (37). Apparently, the two had never returned: 
“They were needed, it seems, inside of their map. The Other 
Worlds exist, you know. Fully and completely.” (38) 
 
Here, then, is an explicit statement as to the reality of such spaces, since not only 
is concreteness conferred by the fact that such spaces can be mapped, which 
surprises an unknowing Oyster, but the spaces can also be entered rather than 
simply dreamed about:  
“The maps are slippery,” she explained, peering at him over her 
glasses. “One can slip inside of a slippery map, if it’s large and 
well imagined. One can slip into the world itself. All you need is 
the sharp edge of something and, well, it’s best to travel through 
the Gulf of Wind and darkness in something.” (38) 
 
Again, the Mapkeeper’s comments are an almost exact recitation of the 
principles behind the creation of thirdspace. Being able to travel to another space 
is a new idea for Oyster, but it is one that fires his imagination: “He loved the 
idea of slipping into a map—into his own map” (38), especially since, as Oyster 
exclaims to the Mapkeeper, because of his present circumstances, “I want to 
escape. [...] I want to go and be a hero, and prove to them I’m worthy” (40). 
Oyster thinks the nuns have stopped caring for him and believes himself to be 
rejected and a failure.  
In fact, Oyster “had imagined another world: a green backyard with a 
swing set and his parents” (39) and, when he actually looks at his own, very 
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small map, he sees, “a colored map of a yard, a house, a swing set. It was small 
and lacked detail—it was just a crayon square with a labeled X for the swing set” 
(44). However, now that he has been shown the potential to create space, Oyster 
begins to consider what that might mean: 
If he imagined his green yard and his house and his swing set and 
his parents and the boy with the blue umbrella clearly enough, 
with more detail, would the map become big enough for him to 
slip into that Other World? (47) 
 
His map may be small and ill-formed map, but importantly, as the Mapkeeper 
tells him, “You haven’t given up on it. Not yet! But they usually all do in time” 
(36). This references the idea that adults forget about their “maps” because they 
lose the ability or desire to use their imaginations in a spatial fashion, although it 
is also clear that conforming to the conventions of utilising places is not 
necessarily a feature of all adults. However, as the Mapkeeper explains, 
“I keep the maps. If I don’t, who will? People outgrow 
imaginations, you know, most often when they become adults, but 
I keep the IOWs, just in case.” (36) 
 
Thus, the imaginative potential for space-making may be suppressed, but the 
Mapkeeper argues for the possibility that even adults can return to such creative 
imagining. When the Mapkeeper is distracted, Oyster takes his own map and 
leaves. 
 At the dentist, another MTD incident occurs when the sink opens up into 
a hole just as Oyster is starting to feel somewhat concerned and is trying to 
escape from the dentist, Dr. Fromler; the sink basin opens wide, and Oyster sees 
the silver bucket he had first seen in the convent broom closet. This time, 
however, Oyster sees an opportunity to escape from the dentist’s clutches: 
Oyster held tight to the edge of the bucket and jumped for the 
black hole of the basin. The sink basin’s drain widened so that 
Oyster and Leatherbelly slid through, then fell into darkness. (59) 
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Oyster and the dog emerge out of the darkness, “in Boneland, just west of the 
Pinch-Eye Mountains, about three miles to the Bridge to Nowhere” (66). One of 
the friendly inhabitants of this Imaginary Other World, a Perth, called Hopps, tell 
him, “It’s your parents’ map [...]. They created this World as children, and then 
they joined us” (73). Oyster is in his parents’ Imagined Other World, the map for 
which “was hand-drawn—much like the one in his pocket—with different 
colored inks, but this one was hugely detailed. There were shop names and 
treetops and ripples drawn into a river” (67), a world, as Oyster later describes it, 
that is “So rich! So fully imagined! So terrifying” (106). Oyster’s parents had 
been childhood friends who, stuck in Johns Hopkins University Housing were 
“shushed children, told to be quiet, and with little to do, they made up the stories 
of Perths and the Pinch-Eye Mountains and Boneland” (108). Eventually, they 
had encountered the Mapkeeper and found the map of their fantasy Imaginary 
Other World and, quite by accident, discovered that a small tear in the map 
opened up a portal between the two spaces. Their map had been drawn on the 
back of a map of Baltimore, and this is why the tear or rip opens up a way 
between the two worlds. 
 Oyster learns that his abandonment had actually been his parents’ attempt 
to save him from the dangers in this other world. With his parents now 
imprisoned in their own world, Oyster then finds himself pushed into the position 
of having to rescue the subjugated inhabitants of this other world and rescue his 
parents. To do this, he must journey across this new land and destroy the evil 
Dark Mouth who has the land in his control, and who harbours plans to get 
Oyster’s parents’ map “so that he can go through it and take over the land on the 
other side” (113), the land of consensus reality. Oyster’s journey of adventure 
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takes him across rivers and down through tunnels underground, and encounters 
with strange and dangerous creatures. Even the nuns find themselves pouring 
through the gap to find Oyster (and, as it transpires, help him to victory), 
showing again that movement within spaces is not only the preserve of the very 
young. 
 As part of this rescue mission, Oyster learns that one way that the 
inhabitants of Boneland have been kept subdued is through Dark Mouth’s 
television company showing a populist programme called the Vince Vance 
Show, with it’s “‘Home Sweet Home’ campaign” (81), and the only books 
allowed are “‘Home Sweet Home’ companions” (105). This campaign to keep 
the inhabitants at home and placid marks the home space as another instance of 
confinement, a confinement strengthened by the panopticon of constant 
surveillance for, as Vince Vance confesses,  
“We have ears in every wall. Eyes in every sliver of light. Dark 
Mouth is attentive. He’s watching over you.” (176)  
 
It is an idea that is also reinforced when Oyster is captured and taken to Vince 
Vance’s house, where he is seduced by a wonderful house and toys and, when 
Oyster asks if it is all real, the answer is that “It’s all as real as you want it to be!” 
However, this is an unreal place in the sense that it will also be where Oyster will 
be confined unless he can overcome the temptation and escape. 
 Eventually, Oyster escapes and manages to defeat Dark Mouth. 
Unfortunately, in the struggle, Oyster rips his parents’ map in half: “[i]ts halves 
snapped and rolled into themselves [...]. Oyster knew that the map was ruined. It 
couldn’t be fixed” (248). It seems that Oyster has failed, and, although he has 
freed the inhabitants of Boneland, he and his parents and the nuns are now stuck 
there. This situation places Oyster in a quandary, one much like that which Max 
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encounters in Where the Wild Things Are: “I’m so happy here,” says Oyster, 
“[b]ut I want to go home, too” (263).  
Suddenly, Oyster remembers that he has his own map of his own 
Imagined Other World, a map which now, as he has encountered more and more 
wonders that have sparked his imagination, has grown and developed. As Oyster 
realises, “I’ve been imagining! I really have! I have let my imagination loose” 
(265), and so, now, “[h]is map was full and fat” (265), replete with the 
imaginings of Oyster’s mind. It shows, 
the house he’d imagined with his parents, the backyard with the 
swing set, the garden, the clothesline. On one side of the Map 
there was the Gulf of Wind and Darkness, which led to Boneland 
and what was now called the breathing river of Nunly Snores. 
There was a large section on the underground field with all of the 
eye and fire holes of dragons marked clearly Evil Fishback 
Field—and the Dragons were red. Dark Mouth’s prison, The 
Torch, drawn with exact detail, including the shiny silver hook. 
On the other side, Oyster saw the nunnery and the Dragon Palace 
and the chair where the boy with leg braces sat and the library of 
Johns Hopkins and Dr. Fromler’s Dentistry and, not far off, the 
Mapkeeper’s shop. (266) 
 
Many of these things relate directly to Oyster’s real world experience: the red 
Dragon from the Chinese restaurant near the nunnery, the sound of the nuns 
snores that has become a part of the Breathing River’s noise, even the awful Mrs. 
Fishback. This world of Oyster’s is, therefore, the real and imagined and more. 
With the help of his own map, Oyster returns to the nunnery, sure in the 
knowledge that he (and his parents and new found friends from the Imagined 
Other World) can come and go as he pleases, and that his freedom to move 
within spaces is his to control. 
 In The Slippery Map, the initial narrative thread suggests another 
presentation of an ‘other world’ that is not created by the child protagonist and 
which is not, therefore, a space that can be owned by the protagonists. In this 
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case, much like the novels I discussed in the previous chapter, Oyster finds 
himself being brought into a thirdspace that was created by someone else. 
However, one key difference is that it is a space that is real and imagined and 
experienced, both by Oyster’s parents (who have spent almost all their lives in 
their Imagined Other World) and by Oyster, first as inhabitant (it emerges that 
Oyster had actually been born in the Imagine Other World before being taken to 
Baltimore and the nuns), then as visitor, and finally as creator of his own version 
of the space. 
 In addition, when Oyster asks why his parents had imagined all the bad 
things in their world the explanation he is given that “their own world had 
problems,” and that “they couldn’t leave all of the old world behind while 
imagining the new one” (106), and “the worlds influence each other sometimes” 
(106). Indeed, Oysters parents had “translated things from the old world into the 
new” (106) to create a real and imagined space, and even Oyster recognises this 
to be so: “My old world and this World—it’s a translation” (199). This idea of 
translating spaces is a useful analogy, here, for the process of creating a 
thirdspace; it suggests the involvement of an active imagination, one that is 
connected, but not wholly tied, to the original, and that once one understand the 
potential to create a thirdspace it can grow and develop (and even have 
commonality with the thirdspaces of others, although each develops 
independently). As the Perth, Hopps, says to Oyster: 
“The Imagination is its own force. Once you fully imagine 
something, it is, in a sense, true. It exists. And, once in motion, it 
takes on a life of its own” (113). 
 
This explanation is, perhaps, a succinct summary of the literary thirdspace 
process in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The texts that I have discussed in this chapter can all be seen, in their own 
individual ways, to incline towards the more spatially active end of the 
thirdspace cline as instances of space-making, and as texts that offer 
understandings of the protagonist as owner of the process of creating personal 
spaces. Although, apart from The Homeward Bounders, each of the texts I have 
discussed can still be said to fall within the scope of the broader home-away-
home paradigm, what is seen in the texts is a fluidity within and between 
different spaces, with different spaces offering different and more intricate 
openings of spatiality, than the formula that returns protagonists to the home 
place can fully account for. 
As has also been seen, these spaces do not need to be felicitous either for, 
in all the texts I have discussed, the spaces that protagonists enter are generally 
such that few would willingly venture into them. Whilst it is true that, on 
occasion, ‘other’ places can initially present themselves as a kind of locus 
amoenus, or as “friendly spaces” (Honeyman 117), this initial appearance often 
belies the true nature of the spaces. This being the case, why would a child 
protagonist create such a world as a third space? It seems logical that an 
unappealing place could be a deterring factor in terms of protagonists wishing to 
be emplaced in them, and it also seems to ring true that, by making the spaces 
full of darkness, danger and death, the home location becomes more appealing in 
comparison.  
However, whilst the unappealing nature of the away place may prove an 
advantage in terms of suggesting the message that home is best in the spatially 
inert narratives I discussed in the previous chapter, how can it be the case that 
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more spatially dynamic narratives also exhibit spaces that are less than desirable? 
The answer, here, must be that the dangers of the away space can be seen as 
playing spaces such that, just as with children playing their own war games, 
where players ‘die’ or are injured, it is possible to see that these “dangers and 
difficulties simply heighten the pleasure as they are overcome” (Manlove, Alice 
40); in effect, the more the difficulties, the more the element of playing is 
enhanced. In effect, dangerous spaces can be considered as an integral part of the 
playing that creates the thirdspace. Moreover, as with Max in Where The Wild 
Things Are, or Donald in A Game of Dark, it is more likely to be a moment of 
spontaneity that brings a thirdspace into being, rather than the giving of access to 
an already constructed location such as Narnia, or the ‘other’ house in Coraline 
into which protagonists are subsequently permitted entry  
 What the texts in this chapter point towards, therefore is a situation 
where, when the spatial constraints of consensus reality are removed or shown to 
be impositions, child protagonists are able to exercise a basic agency through 
creating and becoming emplaced in another space. Physical places such as a 
bedroom (and by extension other places both inside and outside the home) can 
become part of a constructed and immersive thirdspace created by protagonists, a 
space that resolves itself into an often complex and lived experience that equates 
in practice to the Cartesian “real” world inasmuch as 
  [t]he reality of everyday life is organized around the “here” of my  
body and the “now” of my present. This “here and now” is the 
focus of my attention to the reality of everyday life. What is “here 
and now” presented to me in everyday life is the realis sunum of 
my consciousness. (Berger and Luckman 36) 
 
This realis sunum of an individual’s consciousness is a spatial position based not 
on the measurements of place, but on the response to the space. It may be 
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temporary for, within the narrative structures of the genre, there is almost always 
the “the inevitable reestablishment of order” at the end, where “[t]he adult norm 
is always restored” (Nikolajeva, “Theory” 17). However, those who create once 
can do so again, and they are able to leave any space of their own volition though 
their own space-making faculties as narrative strolls in a particular act of world-
building. Thus, one act of creation may have reached an endpoint, but the power 
to create and recreate more spaces, and the will to connect them, always remains 
as a virtual resource for protagonists to make use of.  
These instances of literary thirdspace suggest that agency is located in the 
interplay of the constructive subject and the constructed space (which, given the 
variety of constructions seen in ‘other world’ fantasy texts, also implies that there 
should be multiplicity of conceptions of agency). Whilst in those novels where 
creative space-making is restricted, the question is not so much one of 
subjectivity as it is one of subjectivity though space-making, locating the subject 
through the spatial could even argue for the subject existing outside of language. 
If this understanding is correct, it would tend to confirm that “[c]hildren and 
young people probably want spaces suitable less for doing and more for being” 
(Thomson and Philo 126). The the next consideration, therefore, must be that of 
what it is that child readers (or, indeed, any readers) can take from these texts in 
terms of the self and the spatial. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Where Are We Now? 
 
 
I now turn my discussions towards the social and cultural aspects of 
fantasy ‘other world’ fiction on the basis that “freedom of form does not liberate 
fantasy from its social context” (Knowles and Malmkjær 225). Whilst heeding 
Owain Jones’s warning that “‘seeing through the eyes’ of the subject, is 
inevitably trying to enter the other space of children’s worlds and needs to 
recognise the limits” (197), this chapter addresses the connection between 
readers and the spaces they find in fantasy texts as part of an examination of how 
the thirdspace approach to fantasy fiction for children might relate more 
specifically to readers and their experiences of the world of consensus reality. 
and to readers’ own understandings of spatial agency regardless of any authorial 
intent.  
Primarily drawing again on the ideas of Certeau. I discuss first another 
form of presentation of the spatiality of fantasy fiction, specifically the visual, 
through an examination of the endpaper maps that are often found in fantasy 
‘other world’ fiction. From this opeining, I discuss how the reader can become 
involved in the active process of space-making through encountering such 
representations of places and spaces. I will then consider how ideas of the author 
as originator and controller of textual space contrast with notions of the text as a 
form of play and interplay between readers and authors. Then, working through 
Doležel’s suggestion that perceptions of both real and literary world differ little 
in substance, and that this position shifts the argument from a suspension of 
disbelief to a process of creative formation of belief, I will then move on to 
examine how spatial understandings drawn from literary representations can be 
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utilised in the world of consensus reality, thus drawing a path back to social ideas 
of space-making that I set out in Chapter One, and which formed the basis for 
ideas of a literary thirdspace.  
 Finally, I consider Paterson’s Bridge to Terabithia, a novel that is not 
itself a fantasy text, but which can provide an illustration both for the ideas I 
outline in this chapter regarding the influence of spatial epresentations on 
readers’ real world spatial activities and playing, and a basis for commenting on 
the various elements of spatiality outlined in the thesis as a whole. In addition, 
applying notions of a literary thirdspace to consider a text that is not ‘other 
world’ fantasy fiction will also point towards how literary thirdspace can be also 
be used to examine other genres of children’s fiction and further open up 
discussion of how the literary in general is linked to the every day of readers.  
I take this path because, as Hunt has stated, “the poetics of children’s 
literature are bound to the practical, the local, the concrete” (“Poetics” 40), and 
yet that connection is not always made. Many of the theories espoused on fantasy 
fiction to date do not generally, as Jack Zipes observes, “explore the social, 
cultural and political ramifications of fantasy” and—more pertinent to my 
discussions—within their pages, says Zipes, “there is hardly a reference to young 
readers and the different ways which they might perceive fantasy works” (188). 
This is a significant omission given the amount of fantasy literature available for 
child readers.  
Perhaps this lack of reference to the worlds of child readers and how they 
perceive the spaces of fantasy ‘other world’ texts is significant of a general lack 
of appreciation of the value and import of fantasy literature for children from 
critics outside the field of children’s literature studies. Perhaps, too, “the 
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conventional tendency to throw together children and fantasy arises from the 
conviction of both the child’s greater gullibility and fantasy’s inherent 
irrationality” (Veldman 48) in a derogatory nod to both the genre and its 
readership. Hunt even asserts that the automatic association between fantasy and 
children’s literature is “bizarre” because, as he says, fantasy “concentrates on 
worlds other than this one: alternate worlds—desirable, if unattainable options,” 
and, therefore, “[w]hy should this be thought to be of interest to child readers?” 
(“Introduction” 4). This is a point reiterated in Wood’s more specific question: 
“What good does it do to escape to wonderful imaginary places filled with 
satisfactions we can only yearn for, never experience—dæmons, armored bears, 
mulefa?” (256).What good indeed, when even for most adults, “the idea of 
parallel realities is not yet solidly established in our private encyclopedias, and 
the text must give strong cues for us to suspend momentarily our intuitive belief 
in a classical cosmology” (Ryan, “Parallel” 671)? How could child readers gain 
anything from narratives that present a spatiality that is, in theory, beyond their 
knowledge and experience?  
Clearly, however, young readers (and, indeed, older readers) do find 
fantasy texts appealing enough to keep reading and re-reading them, and the 
possible reasons for that demand consideration. It is, of course, all but impossible 
to really know “the process by which interpreters reconstruct the story worlds 
encoded in narrative” (Herman, Story 5), but it is possible to point to what may 
be the case, and clearly the range of spaces available in fantasy texts, whether 
described in detail or not, provides a main focus for attention. Now, therefore, I 
will consider a form of presentation of the spatial in fantasy texts that has 
similarly received relatively little critical attention in the past, a form that is 
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amenable to discussions both of how reader’s might read and perceive 
presentations of the spatial, and how these readings might be understood and 
taken up as spatial tactics, as a means to open up and actualise the spatial within 
their own personal domains and lived lives. I am referring to literary fantasy 
maps.67 
 
Visualising Thirdspace 
 Hunt has pointed out that the very common, structural plot device of the 
journey in children’s novels, something that is particularly the case with fantasy 
‘other world’ fiction, of course, has brought about “a singular use of landscape, 
and the map” (Introduction 179) in children’s fiction. Indeed, in N. E. Bode’s 
The Slippery Map, the key means of movement between world spaces was the 
eponymous map. The Slippery Map, however, does not include an illustration of 
the map itself, but illustrated maps are often found in fantasy ‘other world’ 
novels, either on the endpaper or frontispiece pages. Indeed, fantasy ‘other 
world’ novels lend themselves to the inclusion of maps as an additional 
presentation of the creation of space and, for W. F. H. Nicolaisen, “the more 
imaginary a landscape becomes the more mappable it becomes or the more it 
demands a map to prove its existence” (qtd. in Honeyman 123). Indeed, so strong 
a desire for maps is there that, for texts without an original map, they are often 
drawn later.68  
 In the previous chapter, my examination of Where the Wild Things Are 
noted that the pictorial form can enable a more immediate understanding of the 
spatiality of the narrative. With maps, however, the often close relationship that 
exists between text and image in picture books does not necessarily apply 
because maps usually have a separate existence, and rarely are they found within 
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the text itself. This separation from the text suggests that they can and do exist 
independently and for a larger purpose than being purely illustrations with 
decorative value (however artistic they may be), or as serving only to 
complement the textual content, or even being what Genette would see as 
examples of a “paratext” (Paratexts 1). Instead, as with certain types of 
illustration, they can “create independent story lines which only occasionally 
overlap with the verbal layer of a particular work” (Sikorska 202) as part of what 
Victor Watson suggests is “both a signal and an invitation to a special kind of 
reading game” (Reading 110). This idea is one that I explore further as another 
way to both explain and examine how readers can understand notions of the 
spatial through textual encounters.  
Not everyone possesses such a positive perspective on the creative spatial 
possibilities of literary maps however. Mendlesohn, for example, has claimed 
that “the very presence of maps at the front of many fantasies implies that the 
destination and its meanings are known” (4), which argues for a closure of the 
spatial, and which is compatible with the notion of an enforced return home. 
Mendlesohn also believes that such maps “are no more geography than 
chronology and legend are history,” and that they “fix the interpretation of a 
landscape” and, in so doing, “complete the denial of discourse” (14). By this 
reckoning, as Julia Pond also argues, “[a]s soon as a space is mapped, it loses 
potential” (49), a position that recognises all such maps as being spatially inert. 
With this approach, a literary map can only be considered as something fixed and 
bounded, as a set apart, miniature and entire world that is child-sized and 
manageable, something which also marks these types of texts as being writerly 
rather than readerly.69  
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Deirdre Baker also sees a lack of diversity in these maps, claiming that 
this uniformity is indicative of the poor quality of the fantasy world narratives 
themselves. For Baker, there is a similarity in “the physical layout of a number of 
invented worlds,” and this lack of variety, she states, “often indicates a lack of 
innovation in the ideological or philosophical ideas behind the stories” (237). 
Baker argues that “it’s as if the sameness of geographical layout determines a 
sameness in simplistic moral or metaphysical vision” (242). I have already 
considered how fantasy ‘other world’ narratives are not as simple in spatial terms 
as some might suggest, but such understandings as expressed by Baker overlook 
the way sameness arises from conventions—both textual and visual—that can act 
as a kind of short-cut for authors and readers to move past what would otherwise 
require layers of descriptiveness. Such understandings also defer to an author (or, 
perhaps, illustrator) centred perspective but, as with written texts, once out of the 
hands of the originator, there is no guarantee as to how a text of any kind will be 
received.  
Approaches such as Baker’s also overlook the actual nature of the map-
reading process itself, a process that can provide a very different perspective. To 
an even larger degree than is the case with scientific maps, literary maps ask the 
‘reader’ to trust in evidence that contains any number of omissions or 
unverifiable details, and to believe that symbols, points, lines, and areas viewable 
on a two-dimensional sheet of paper equate to a multidimensional world in space 
and time. In fact, in this respect, literary maps are much like other maps because, 
as Phillip and Juliana Muehrcke point out, any kind of map is 
a paradox in that physically it is mere marks on sheets of paper, 
yet visually it brings to mind a multidimensional world, 
containing objects and even emotions not perceived directly on the 
piece of paper. (323) 
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In light of this ability of maps in general to invoke multiple spatial responses, 
even a map of a real place, say Muehrcke and Muehrcke, is able to make readers  
think in terms of a whole range of scales, even though the map 
itself is limited to one scale. Thus, the same map can evoke things 
as large as a mountain and a river and things as small as ‘a deer’s 
eye’ and ‘a single stone’. (323)  
 
In effect, the paper image becomes another kind of real that can be combined 
with the imagined to create something more. 
Given such a potential to combine the imagined and more, reading maps 
of unreal spaces sets the ground for a constructive process where the 
communicative interaction between reader and map does not fix places; rather, it 
questions the fixedness of places. Thus, places and spaces are replaced rather 
than simply represented; the map becomes the territory. This notion recalls Jean 
Baudrillard’s idea that the perceived world is actually a “precession of 
simulacra,” a product of “the generation by models of a real without origin or 
reality,” and where it is “the map that precedes the territory [...] that engenders 
the territory” (1).70 However, although this may be an accurate assessment, it is 
also the case that these literary maps of unreal places are the territory in the 
minds of its readers; “[r]ecognising its status, fantasy disavows the very 
possibility of a territory which is not its map” (Bould 81). As J. B. Post 
comments,  
[a]ny graphic representation, be it print, a map or a view, has an 
immediacy which compels an acceptance and this is why we 
accept a map of an imaginary land even when we know the 
countryside is a fabrication. (10) 
 
Consequently, maps become available as effectively real spaces for exploration 
just as much as do those spaces described only in words.  
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There is a literary, if magical, example of how this can work in the 
description of the map made by the magician in Lewis’s The Voyage of the Dawn 
Treader, which the magician bases on the itinerary narrated by the Dawn 
Treader’s captain, Drinian, for 
everything he described came out on the parchment in fine clear 
lines till at last each sheet was a splendid map of the Eastern 
Ocean, showing Galma, Terebinthia, the Seven Isles, the Lone 
Islands, Dragon Island, Burnt Island, Deathwater, and the land of 
the Duffers itself, all exactly the right sizes and in the right 
positions. They were the first maps ever made of those seas and 
better than any that have been made since without magic. For on 
these, though the towns and mountains looked at first just as they 
would on an ordinary map, when the Magician lent them a 
magnifying glass you saw that they were perfect little pictures of 
the real things, so that you could see the very castle and slave 
market and streets in Narrowhaven, all very clear though very 
distant, like things seen through the wrong end of a telescope. 
(145–6) 
 
The way such maps can ‘come alive’ suggests the potential for an experiential 
relationship between map-reader and map through the imaginative activity of 
map reading. Map symbols, in themselves, are essentially meaningless without 
some mechanism that can connect them with what they represent and so, rather 
than an act of simply ‘tracing’ the marks of routes and places, the creative reader 
of maps in fact re-maps the territory, creating new connections and 
understandings. To achieve a fuller meaning, the map-reader must go beyond the 
physical presence of ink on paper. While the graphemes that comprise the written 
text can only be read and understood by viewing them in a particular way, the 
possibility of viewing the map from different angles, and even upside down, 
offers more scope for the eye (and the imaginative mind) to travel in different 
directions. 
Moreover, regardless of style, in most literary maps, and particularly 
those of fantasy spaces, it is usually the case that notions of Cartesian spatial 
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certitude can be contradicted or even subverted by the position of objects on the 
map. Objects, for example, may be shown as taller or shorter than they really are 
in comparison to other objects. Typical of this generally less formal, and more 
individually artistic, style when compared to scientific maps, for instance, is that 
they commonly lack a legend or specific measurement of scale other than the 
ubiquitous compass in one corner. However, this is not necessarily a problem for, 
as Katharine Harmon observes of maps generally, those which “ignore mapping 
conventions” are the most intriguing in that they “find their essence in some 
other goal than just taking us from point A to point B” (10). On most literary 
maps in children’s fiction, this lack of indication of the rules of transformation 
between the representation and what is represented means that such a 
relationship remains open to individual interpretation. 
This openness is also true of actions, for movement is not an uncommon 
feature of such maps, whereby “[t]he map expresses the identity of the journey 
and what one journeys through. It merges with its object, when the object itself is 
movement” (Deleuze, Essays 61). On the matter of maps and movement, Certeau 
has observed of the pre-Enlightenment map-making process that it involved a 
combination of both the spatial necessities of map making and the qualities of 
narrative storytelling. As he notes, these early maps included 
only the rectilinear marking out of itineraries (performative 
indications chiefly concerning pilgrimages), along with the stops 
one was to make (cities which one was to pass through, spend the 
night in, pray at, etc.) and distances calculated in hours or in days, 
that is, in terms of the time it would take to cover them on foot. 
Each of these maps is a memorandum prescribing actions. (120)  
 
However, from that original, performance oriented nature of the map—with its 
inherent narrative of movement—the modern, scientific turn in cartography 
demands, says Certeau, the removal of such narrative elements along with iconic 
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figures such as ships, monsters, strange animals, and other characters that 
implicitly refer to the journeys involved. This means, he adds, that “the map has 
slowly disengaged itself from the itineraries that were the condition of its 
possibility” (120); they are no longer potential spaces for the journey. Thus, 
Certeau concludes that the scientific map is now “a totalizing stage on which 
elements of diverse origin are brought together to form the tableau of a ‘state’ of 
geographical knowledge” (121). Such maps no longer function as they had done 
in the past. 
Certeau also separates geographical representations as being one of two 
possible types: ‘maps’ or ‘tours’. ‘Maps’, he believes, are only abstracted 
accounts of spatial relations. As a result, for Certeau ‘maps’ delimit places, 
whereas ‘tours’ are narratives from the traveller or narrator’s viewpoint. ‘Tours’ 
describe movements through spaces, says Certeau, and the rhetoric of the ‘tour’ 
contains within it attention to the effects of the tour, its goals and potentials, its 
limitations and its obligations (118–22).71 In similar vein, Deleuze and Guattari 
distinguish between the processes of ‘mapping’ and ‘tracing’ in that they see 
“Tracing” (Certeau’s “map”) as being a “repetitive mimicry,” whilst “Mapping” 
(Certeau’s “tour”) is “entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with 
the real” and thus (as with Certeau) relates to performance (Thousand 12). In 
addition, they say, “[t]he map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon 
itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields. [...] 
The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions” (12). Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of the rhizomic also connects to the concepts of mapping and 
tracing, since the rhizome is “a map and not a tracing” (12, original emphasis), 
and the rhizome, “pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map 
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that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple 
entryways and exits and its own lines of flight” (21). They are not, therefore, 
fixed and immediately knowable. 
Thus, in much the same way that Barthes suggests that entering a text is 
the “entrance into a network with a thousand entrances” that gives a perspective 
“whose vanishing point is nonetheless ceaselessly pushed back, mysteriously 
opened” (S/Z 12), literary maps tend to have no starting points either. There are 
no ‘You are Here’ signs, and there are rarely ever ‘tracings’ to indicate the 
direction of characters’ movements. Certainly, reading the accompanying text 
can give clues to how the map might relay spatial information about the narrative 
but, even after reading the text, it is not always possible to work out exact points 
of reference on the map. For some, however, the urge to plot and thereby fix 
characters’ routes can be overwhelming, as in the case of Karen Wynn Fonstad’s 
The Atlas of Middle Earth, which marks out every important journey in Tolkien’s 
The Lord of the Rings using textual information and other Tolkien writings. 
However, by doing so, what emerges is a ‘map’ (Certeau) or ‘tracing’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari), confining and delimiting the spatial. 
Similarly, where early cartography left blank spaces for the unknown, or 
filled empty spaces with icons and symbols, and thereby eluded an exhaustive, 
totalising picture, the literary maps in children’s literature often include tracts of 
“white space” or feature unfinished roads and paths. The visual nature of the 
space of a map draws attention to these absences, oddities and instances of 
incompleteness, and these ‘blank’ spaces and unfinished routes on literary maps 
can encourage a greater interaction with the map because, in one sense, this 
strangeness and openness requires and engenders a projection of the reader’s 
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own space-making skills onto the area of the map; the open spaces remain 
available to be played with and filled in whatever way seems suitable.  
Moreover, in a further move away from the empirical, many of these 
maps also offer multiple or shifting perspectives. These unstable perspectives 
mean that the eye is always moving across the space, and so the landscape is 
never fixed, controlled or delimited. Thus, “[a]s a text, the map is inherently 
unstable, its meaning open to challenge and change” (Phillips 19), and this is 
even more likely to be a characteristic of literary maps, one that inevitably brings 
with it the notion of the ‘reader’ and the active, participatory role that is required 
when viewing/reading maps. 
Often, too, areas narrated in the text do not appear on the map. Although 
in the previous chapter, I discussed the limiting nature of the spatiality of the His 
Dark Materials trilogy, in the map that accompanies Pullman’s Lyra’s Oxford 
(2003), a more open understanding of space can be seen.72 The whole of the city 
is shown, even though the actual journey that Lyra takes during the course of the 
narrative is confined to only a few of the roads, and many of the locations on the 
map are not mentioned in the narrative at all. Again, there are shifts in 
perspectives and additional iconography, both of which hark back to early 
cartographic styles but, more specifically, there is the map’s marginalia; “Mary 
Malone lives here,” and “To Sir Charles Latrom’s house,” both of which 
directions refer to characters and places that actually feature in the His Dark 
Materials trilogy, but which do not figure directly in the narrative of Lyra’s 
Oxford, thus sending the reader beyond the frame of both the map and the 
narrative. The space of the map is, therefore, always more than what is contained 
within its arbitrary borders; the space of the map always extends beyond.  
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The notion of there being more beyond means that any suggestion that a 
fixed and singular route is all that should be accounted for in such 
representations is like suggesting that a single track through a dark wood is the 
wood. Any route is inevitably though a particular landscape that stretches much 
further than the borders of the path; indeed, the path through the wood does not 
exist without the other features of the wood that surround it. Extracting the path 
from the landscape through which it passes gives only a minimal understanding 
to the value and purpose of the entirety of the spatial environment.  
Thus, to view any map (literary or not), as a fixed, bounded, bordered 
space is to view it in a rationalist, modernist way that demands order and control. 
To suggest that the borders of the map denote the representation’s spatial 
boundaries is an over-simplification, for “only the most naive map reader would 
assume that the world ends at the edges of a map” (Muehrcke and Muehrcke 
324). There are always other spaces, spaces that exist outside the borders of the 
map.] In Norton Juster’s The Phantom Tollbooth (1961), for example, the space 
that the protagonist, Milo, visits is even called, ‘The Lands Beyond’. The 
endpaper map is said in the novel to be the same map that Milo receives along 
with the self-assembly tollbooth and is as described in the narrative. Playfully, 
the map is said to be “up-to-date and carefully drawn by master cartographers, 
depicting natural and man-made features” (11).73 This is the cartographic nod to 
the real status of the space that is also seen in textual representations. 
Milo’s tollbooth in his very real bedroom, and the narrative fantasy Castle 
in the Air, however, are both shown as ‘off’ the map, suggesting they have the 
same substance, and the Princess of Sweet Rhyme even tells Milo that “many 
places you would like to see are just off the map” (233). This point is reiterated 
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in the note that Milo finds at the end of the novel, after the tollbooth vanishes, 
which informs him that  
IT’S TRUE THAT THERE ARE MANY LANDS YOU’VE 
STILL TO VISIT (SOME OF WHICH ARE NOT EVEN ON 
THE MAP) AND WONDERFUL THINGS TO SEE (THAT NO 
ONE HAS YET IMAGINED) (254). 
 
The absence of places referred to, or the presence on these maps of places not 
referred to, effectively opens the map up as indeterminate space, and opens up 
the potential for constructive readings of that space, even if that possibility is 
never actualised. In this respect, the literary map creates its own territory, and its 
reference is as much to its own identity as it is to the accompanying text (and, in 
many cases, probably more so given the comparative looseness of the illustration 
in terms of geographical specificities).74  
In fact, such maps are more reminiscent of those schematic or topological 
maps that deliberately do not attempt to represent scale or offer a plethora of 
details, a notable example being the London Underground (Tube) map.75 Indeed, 
in the way these topological maps present places and spaces, they relate very 
closely to the kind of literary maps I am discussing in that, even though they 
represent ‘real’ places, they present a particular view of that space that remains 
more open and readerly than perhaps would a scientific, cartographic map and, 
for Ryan, scientific “[r]epresentations of space are not necessarily narratives” 
(“Space” 420). However, this surely depends on the position of the reader. For 
example, the main, fold-out map in the original edition of Richard Adams’ 
Watership Down (1972), drawn by Marilyn Hemmett, shows a part of the county 
of Hampshire in England. With only a few additions locating warrens from the 
narrative, the map has the appearance of a standard British Ordinance Survey 
map (a very scientific, topographical representation), and yet it is still possible 
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for the reader to range over the contour lines and create individual pathways and 
purposes. 
This possibility relates specifically to the narrative presentation of the 
spatial in that any sufficiently well realised landscape in a narrative should 
simultaneously offer not just one, but a multiplicity of possible routes that might 
be taken. One such a novel is Diana Wynne Jones’s The Merlin Conspiracy, 
where the protagonists, Roddy and Nick, follow separate, but ultimately 
converging, routes, separately, at first in different landscapes in different worlds, 
and then in the same one. Usually, however, a narrative will only relate the one 
path actually taken, but this does not in any way deny the possibility of other 
routes, and, in theory at least, each novel has a potential for multiple paths (and 
therefore, multiple possible narratives); there are always other paths not followed 
by the protagonist(s). Indeed, as Shlomith Rimmon-Kennan notes of the novel,  
holes or gaps are so central in narrative fiction because the 
materials the text provides for the reconstruction of a world (or a 
story) are insufficient for saturation. No matter how detailed the 
presentations, further questions can always be asked; story gaps 
always remain open. (127) 
 
Thus, just as with the story world that the reader constructs from the incomplete 
textual narrative, the reader must also complete the picture for a map since each 
map holds a number of spatial possibilities that remain, to varying degrees, 
unactualised until the reader chooses re-make them and thereby to take 
ownership of the space.  
 Reading a literary map presents multiple choices from which the reader 
may select routes or ways through in an ever-changing series of “wandering 
lines” (Certeau xviii). It seems that this activity is not asking too much of young 
readers. Research done by Nora Newcombe and Janellen Huttenlocher suggests 
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that, by the age of three, children manage to “use maps presented to them in 
alignment with the real world to learn about the associatively coded placement of 
objects denoted by somewhat iconic, and even arbitrary, visual elements,” and 
that they have “some ability to learn about distances in simple situations and to 
coordinate oblique and eye-level views of a space” (173) skills which can 
develop rapidly in succeeding years. 
In the real world, as Malpas points out, “[w]e understand a particular 
space through being able to grasp the sorts of ‘narratives of action’ that are 
possible within that space” (186). Certeau’s point was that modern utilisations of 
space often create relationships in which the agency of the individual is restricted 
by social, historical and cultural conventions for using that space, whereas early 
maps, as ‘tours’, were models for, rather than models of. Nevertheless, “[t]he 
map is more a work of the creative imagination than is popularly recognized” 
(Tuan, “Realism” 441) and so, despite Certeau’s pessimism about the totalising 
and restrictive nature of modern maps, even they can be re-read in individual 
ways not envisaged by their makers. 
Similarly, the literary map presents space rather than representing it, and 
presents space that is inherently multiple, heterogeneous, and contingent. To 
‘read’ a literary map, one needs the faculty of imagination, and for Muehrcke and 
Muehrcke, “[a] person with imagination can be inspired by a map to do more 
than look at it, to enter the reality it depicts” (324). Thus, the agency of map 
‘reading’ becomes an enabling enterprise. With the literary map, the original 
creative act is re-made in the act of reading by unfolding potential; territory is 
remade over and over again, each time with new and diverse consequences. 
These maps, then, can offer up spatial potential for the reader, open to repeatedly 
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remaking territory, and constantly producing new and different consequences, 
and representing the potentiality of movement(s), even if that potential is never 
actualised.  
This spatial potential means that, regardless of the original intent in how 
the maps were drawn up, the act of reading literary maps actually reveals their 
full potential, not so much in terms of their direct connection to the texts they 
accompany, but through the reader’s imagination and in the multiple and 
individual traverses of the space that the reader can create. These maps may not 
technically represent depictions of real places, but they do constitute the real of 
the page as a part of the book and as a part of the readers interaction with the 
book in consensus reality. Thus, they are the real that is reimagined and 
reinvented through a creative act of space-making. Whether the presentation is of 
a fantasy place or a real place, therefore, each map reading has the potential to 
become a walk across the stage, each reading creates that map anew with 
different associations, and each reading is a unique narrative that changes with 
each imagined ‘tour’ because it is engendered by a particular viewpoint. 
Such maps offer an invitation to readers to appropriate the space for 
themselves, an opportunity to rewrite the text of the map, and even purposefully 
to misinterpret its original intent; in effect, “[t]he coded visual language of maps 
is one we all know, but in making maps of our worlds we each have our own 
dialect” (Harmon 11). Thus, Honeyman’s suggestion that, “mapping may provide 
a sense of empowerment and control to the child reader, but it also territorializes 
childhood for the author and adult” (122) really refers to the notion of maps as a 
totalising ‘tableau’ of a static, controlled geography (much like a board game). 
An extreme example of this, perhaps, is the map accompanying Philip Pullman’s 
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Once Upon a Time in the North (2008), a companion volume to the His Dark 
Materials trilogy, where the “map” is found in a pocket at the back of the book, 
and is actually designed as a board game that can be played by readers (a game, 
it should be noted, where the object is not to reach the end point). Turning the 
map into a game with fixed rules marks it, if the rules of the game are followed, 
as a fixed space that is unreadable other than as the originator intended. It is not 
coincidental, therefore, that the spatially closed His Dark Materials trilogy should 
also be visually represented as closed in this companion text. Fortunately, of 
course, any reader of this map does not have to play the game, and can still 
remake the space of the map without adherence to the designated rules. 
Such a specifically closed instance aside, a literary map can be better 
thought of as a cartographic stage for playing, upon which any number of spatial 
performances are possible through the act of reading the map. Thus, like 
Certeau’s city walkers, the actualisation of cartographic space by the reader’s 
“entry” into the literary map initiates any number of new narratives that go 
beyond any limit imposed by a more formal understanding of the map as fixed. 
At the same time, the freedom that these maps offer to readers in terms of the 
infinite possibilities to make spatial connections signifies the inability to regulate 
the behaviour of the readers who use them, and who can performatively explore 
them as enabling acts of the imagination in an endless play of map-reading. In 
doing this, they present instances of creative space-making that operate in the 
same way as a thirdspace, and afford readers the opportunity to involve 
themselves in that creative experience directly rather than only seeing the 
potential through the narrative.  
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There is, of course, a risk that, as Jess Edwards suggests, such an 
approach “over-reads the map, reifying and totalizing its meaning; filling its 
apparent silences with misplaced rhetorics from elsewhere,” thereby producing, 
“idealizing analyses of the ‘space’ engendered by cartography and literature” (6, 
8). Clearly, too, maps from non-western cultures might engender or require 
different readings that I have suggested here. However, the possibility that the 
spaces of literary maps can be read in this way is not a totalising gesture since 
each reader, and each reader’s reading of each map, potentially explores a 
different path on each visit for, as Stephen Hall notes, “[o]ut of any one territory, 
one map, can bloom a thousand geographies” (17); there are a countless number 
of different paths and destinations, different spaces and ways through and across, 
that can be created out of any one cartographic area, be it literary or not.  
As such, Watson’s “special kind of reading game” might now more 
usefully be identified as playing, the opening up of unbounded “visual 
chronotopes” that provide for a potential reading experience beyond the written 
word, a visual chronotope of the potential of spatiality that is not always 
described verbally in the narrative itself.76 This playing with reading rather than a 
reading ‘game’ (for any conventional rules can be dispensed with by the map’s 
reader) creates and recreates spaces in that such maps exhibit an open-endedness 
that cannot be completely reduced to the intent or spatial ideology of whoever 
originates them in the first instance, nor to the individual nature of the texts they 
accompany.77 Thus, such maps can be both instances of potential thirdspace in 
themselves and, at the same time, open up the potential for readers to play with 
the space available in creating their own versions of the space, a process through 
which the spatial imaginary can be exercised in a variety of playful ways.  
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The Text in Play 
 Not all fantasy narratives are accompanied by maps, of course, but what I 
have suggested about the possibilities opened up by the visual representation of 
space through literary maps can also be seen to parallel instances of reading 
about fantasy spaces in novels. In the previous two chapters, I discussed texts on 
the basis of an implicit understanding of the manipulation of the spatial that was 
being made or not by the author. As with any other feature of the text, there is no 
reason not to think that there are implied values and ideologies in an author’s 
choice as to setting and how it is used by author and protagonist(s). If space is an 
insistent element of story, then the way space is shown to operate and the way 
space is operated upon must surely also encode some ideological nuance. 
Although “[t]he literary convention of fantasy is not chained to any specific 
ideology” (Oziewicz and Hade 43), any ideology lacks substance, says Lefebvre, 
“without a space to which it refers, a space it describes, whose vocabulary [...] it 
makes use of, and whose code it embodies” (44). Thus, there is always a need to 
have some consideration of the authorial position and how it operates. 
However, as I noted briefly in Chapter One, to take a view that focuses on 
the author as originator and the sole controller of textual space such that texts are 
seen as “the site of adult re-creation of an earlier geography” (Lundin 166), is to 
focus too heavily on the author as maker. It may be true that “[t]he locales of 
many children’s books are the enshrouded landscapes of childhood re-made, re-
visioned” (Lundin 166) but, as my earlier discussion of literary maps showed, it 
is important not to over-emphasise the power of the author in terms of how 
spatiality is re-visioned by readers. Seeing the creation of fantasy worlds as adult 
authors simply “indulging in the escapist pleasure of constructing nostalgic 
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worlds for fictional children” through which authors can “indulge in imaginary 
escapes from ‘real,’ civilized, urban(e) disconnected experiences though fictional 
child-hosts” (Honeyman 131, 117) removes the focus on the differences 
similarities between the fictional world and the consensus reality of the reader 
and, therefore, on the reader’s interpretation of the spatial in the text.  
Certainly, in terms of authorial intent, it is possible that “adult writers 
create fictional spaces based on their presumptions about what young readers 
need and what they are interested in” (Hodges et al 195), but taking this notion at 
its simplest belittles the capacity of the reader. There is no guarantee that a child 
reader has any less understanding of the spatial: 
The child’s world is smaller than the grownup’s; but are we so 
sure that it is shallower? Measured by whose plumbline? Is it not 
safer to say that, until the child begins to merge into the 
adolescent, his mental world, though of course in many respects 
akin to that of his elders, in many others obeys its own private 
laws of motion? (Fadiman 16) 
 
These “private laws of motion” are not necessarily inferior to those of the adult 
(and quite the reverse is probably the case) and, consequently, even if the point is 
accepted that spatial depictions rest solely on how authors might envisage the 
capabilities of their potential readers, this does not in itself hand the whole 
process of spatial imagining over to authorial control because, in tandem with the 
constructs of the author, readers can still read as if the worlds were real, and they 
can make of them their own constructions and employ their own narrative 
schema when doing so. 
 Although the author in the text initially makes the territory, the reader in 
the text can also remake it in that, the textual worlds and spaces similarly offer 
“fictional worlds in which all indications of distance, capacity or arrangement are 
generated in accordance with self-contained assumptions, game like rules that are 
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experienced as axioms” (Wilson, “Metamorphoses” 217). Whilst what any 
particular reader will take from (and bring to) a text is all but impossible to 
know, it is clear that, in some way, the spaces of these uniquely drawn worlds are 
pictured in readers’ minds. Research has shown, for instance, that “[r]eaders 
report that they construct visual images of the scenes being described in stories. 
They say they use the text to construct and enact a play in the theater of their 
mind’s eye” (Black and Bower 247). If this constructive activity is the case, then 
whether or not “writers create fictional space based on their beliefs about 
children’s cognitive ability, their audience’s comprehension,” and that they 
therefore “offer spaces that are less complex and challenging than children 
encounter in their real lives” (Hodges et al. 195) is largely immaterial. 
As I noted earlier, even the simplest map can open up spaces in the mind 
of a reader and, as Jerry Griswold comments, it is an oversimplification to “take 
the high ground and smugly dismiss the ways the young think as mistaken and 
immature simply because they have yet to accept our own adult—no-nonsense 
worldview” (124). Indeed, Watson has described the interaction between text and 
reader as “the imaginative creation of a cultural space, in which writers find a 
way of exploring what they want to say to—and about—children: an area in 
which children and adults can engage in various kinds of dynamic discourse,” 
although he also notes that “the possibilities may not be realised” (“Possibilities” 
11, 22). This dynamic discourse, however it is construed, must surely speak to 
something that is close to a meeting of equals rather than being simply a 
hierarchically situated speaking down to the reader.  
Indeed, in respect of the nature of the play of discourse, it is more likely 
that what is being evidenced is what Foucault terms “subjugated knowledges,” 
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by which he means “an autonomous, non-centralized kind of theoretical 
production,” one whose validity “is not dependent on the approval of the 
established regimes of thought” (“Two” 81). These are knowledges which are 
“disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive 
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of 
cognition or scientificity” (“Two” 81–2). This surely applies to the “knowledges” 
of children as much as to the huddled, adult masses. Subjugated does not mean 
naive or inferior, however, especially when considering spatial awareness, for the 
realms of spatial knowledge are intangible and able to operate in and on places, 
slipping free from the kinds of movement that was originally intended. 
This possibility of slipping free suggests that the constructive and 
imaginative recreation of spaces speaks to how a text can be seen as “a game to 
be played between an author and a reader” (Wilson, Palamedes’ 14). Drawing on 
ideas from Winnicott, William Touponce also notes that it is possible to see the 
text as “a transitional object, a space in which meaning—and the self, 
semiotically conceived—plays,” and that the space where reader text and author 
interact is one that is “not quite the world and not entirely the self” (187).Talking 
of the reading process, Certeau suggests that, “[t]he thin film of writing becomes 
a movement of strata, a play of spaces” (xxi) and, by bringing the reader into the 
constructive equation, whether intentionally on the part of the author or not, the 
ground is set for a contestation of space with the reader, a contestation that is, in 
effect, an instance of playing together in a new space. It is also an activity that 
takes place on an equal playing field for, as Donnarae MacCann suggests,  
[b]y the time a child has reached the age of seven or eight, he has 
gained sufficient mastery of the real world, and sufficient mastery 
of his native tongue in particular, to enjoy the playful 
manipulation that literary fantasies provide. (135)  
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Thus, the child reader need not necessarily be seen as the inferior party in the 
activity. 
This possibility is even more the case with the fantasy novel for, in spatial 
terms, it can be seen as an extension of playing, formulated and elaborated in 
written form, and which is taken by the reader as a basis for something more that 
can cross the boundaries between the text and the world of the reader. In effect, 
each fantasy ‘other world’ text is a potential thirdspace in itself, an invitation “to 
play in the space of the altogether and in-between, in the space of the hyphen that 
both connects things and separates them at the same time” (Lunt 70), for every 
text is the basis for a combination of elements from the author, the real of the 
reader’s consensus reality and what the reader brings to the text in terms of 
spatial awareness, and an imagined new space that is not necessarily how the 
author envisaged the text world to be.  
 
Traversing Worlds—Familiar or Strange 
 This playful negotiation between author and reader also points to a 
connection between the ‘real’ world of consensus reality and the world spaces in 
books, and how readers might negotiate the two, even though, in narrative 
theory, there is a consistent notion of the “sacred frontier between the two 
worlds,” one being “the world in which one tells,” and the other being “the world 
of which one tells” (Genette, Narrative 236). It is a fixed frontier and, as Bakhtin 
argues, “we must never confuse—as has been done up to now and as is still often 
done—the represented world with the world outside the text (“Form” 253), for 
there is, it seems, a “never eliminable gap between extraliterary reality and the 
fictional reality of the realistic frame segments” (Gilead 289). 
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This perceived danger of conflating the world of consensus reality should 
pose no problem in the case of fantasy ‘other world’ fiction since, as Brian 
Attebery pointedly remarks, “[a] magical world cannot be confused with real 
life” (128). Logically, this would make sense given that the very features that 
identify fantasy as such—its very differentness and strangeness from the real of 
consensus reality—show clearly that “it not only is imaginative but is in some 
way or other ‘not of this world’,” so different that “a distinction should be drawn 
between the literature of fantasy and fiction” (Morris 77), at least from one 
perspective.  
For child readers, however, the distinction may not be so clear. Witness 
for example the author Jane Yolen who discusses the fact that adults have full 
knowledge of the fantasy conventions that show clearly that “this is not the real 
world we are talking of, this is a faerie land, a make-believe,” whilst child 
readers are confused, she says, they “do not always understand the convention,” 
and so they “write to Maurice Sendak and ask for directions to the place where 
the wild things are. To them Narnia, Middle Earth and the Land Beneath the 
Waves are as real—indeed often more real—than the every day” (89). Yolen’s 
remarks seem to suggest that children can be duped into taking the unreal for 
real, suggesting that young readers lack the ability to suspend disbelief.  
However, it is not necessarily the case that suspension of disbelief is 
really the process in operation when readers turn the pages of a fantasy ‘other 
world’ novel. As Sarah Worth astutely points out,  
[w]hen we enter into a fictional world, or let the fictional world 
enter into our imaginations, we do not “willingly suspend our 
disbelief.” I cannot willingly decide to believe or disbelieve 
anything. (447) 
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Indeed, research with young children on the development of the fantasy/reality 
distinction, for example, has found that, “children seem to place fantastical 
entities in a separate category—neither unquestionably real nor pretend, but 
somewhere in between,” and they conclude that, “rather than having misplaced 
the boundary between real and fantastical entities, young children are still in the 
process of actively constructing it” (Sharon and Woolley 308). Children, it 
seems, have a more profound understanding of what is happening than might be 
thought, but what might that understanding be?  
More than one critic has noted that, “[w]hen we read literature we 
journey into an imaginary land, while at the same time remaining home” 
(Schwarz 218). Margaret Meek Spencer has suggested that “[w]hen we read we 
seem to be, at first, on the margins of both worlds, for we take the world we 
know into the narrative,” and she also notes that “[y]oung readers cross the 
boundaries of both reality and make-believe to bring different kinds of order into 
their thinking” (130) such that the reading process, in a sense, combines the real 
and the imagined. Indeed, despite Bakhtin’s warning against conflating fiction 
and reality, he does also note the reciprocity of text and ‘real’ world when he 
suggests that 
[t]he work and the world represented in it enter the real world and 
enrich it, and the real world enters the work and its world as part 
of the process of its creation, as well as part of its subsequent life, 
in a continual renewing of the work through the creative 
perception of listeners and readers. (“Form” 254) 
 
This notion of a reciprocal relationship between text world and consensus reality 
is echoed by Deleuze and Guattari when they suggest that, “contrary to a deeply 
rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world;” instead, they say, 
[i]t forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution 
of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization 
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of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the 
book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world (if it is 
capable, if it can). (Plateaus 11) 
 
This connection between book and world can only be mediated, of course, by 
and through the reading process, and thus through the reader, and it is the 
perception of the reader’s imaginative capacity that must take prominence. 
 Doležel claims that “[a]n actual reader can ‘observe’ fictional worlds and 
make them a source of his experience, just as he observes and experientially 
appropriates the actual world” (“Mimesis” 485). The reader’s mental 
representations construct a text world for, “[w]hen engaging with fiction, I do not 
suspend a critical faculty, but rather I exercise a creative faculty. I do not 
actively suspend disbelief—I actively create belief” (Worth 447, original 
emphasis). Moreover, as Worth continues, this process actively reinforces the 
nature of the experience of encountering such spaces for  
[a]s we learn to enter into fictional spaces [...] I can focus my 
attention on the enveloping world, and I use my creative faculties 
to reinforce the reality of the experience, rather than to question it. 
(447)  
 
Indeed, Gavins talks of the mental models, or text worlds, that individuals create 
when reading and observes that 
[o]ur experience of these worlds can be as real to us as our 
experience of the everyday world in which we live. The feeling of 
being so immersed in a text-world as almost to lose sense of who 
and where we are is familiar to just about anyone who has ever 
read a novel. (10) 
 
This active and constructive process suggest that, rather than fantasy texts being 
those where, as Nikolajeva argues, “the reader is outside the secondary world” 
(Magic 37, original emphasis), the reader is, in fact, always inside the text as a 
part of the constructive process.  
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As Certeau puts it, “[a] different world (the reader’s) slips into the 
author’s place” (xxi), and, “[t]his mutation makes the text habitable, like a rented 
apartment. It transforms another person’s property into a space borrowed for a 
moment by a transient” (xxi). As with the case of literary maps, this argues for 
the play that occurs between author and reader in fiction producing a 
repositioning of author and reader into a re-centred reality. Fictionality becomes 
not simply a property of the text, but rather a position that readers take up. Lynne 
Rosenthal’s notion of a “fourth” dimension, therefore, where readers can 
“transcend the strict coordinates of the literal world, in order to experience an 
equally authentic dimension,” reconciling the imagination with the rational “in 
an integrated self-structure,” brings the process back to the notion of a 
constructed thirdspace.78 It is a thirdspace where “[t]he imaginary world does 
unfold under its own power, but only with my (implicit) permission, only 
because I allow it to do so” (Walton 16), which places it in the domain of the 
reader. 
On this basis, if it is possible to see the lived world as discursively and 
creatively constructed, then what ontological difference exists for the reader 
between the constructed world(s) of consensus reality, the constructed world the 
author places the characters in, and the reconstruction of that world by the reader 
who slips into the author’s place? Moreover, if it is the case that propositions 
about the world “are not true or false in a simple objective sense; they are more 
true if we believe and act upon them, and more false if we disbelieve them,” and 
thus [t]heir validity is a function of our belief” (Ruesch and Bateson 217), then 
what is fiction and what is non-fiction “become distinguishable on the basis of 
the stance adopted to given information” (Goldman 27) by the reader. What is 
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fantasy, real or unreal, therefore, is bound to “the expectations of both character 
in the text and reader outside the text toward what is real and what is fantastic” 
(Northrup 814), and real and fantasy themselves are always contingent and 
unfixed.  
In terms of the expectations of the reader when encountering a fantasy 
space in a text, “the principle of minimal departure” argues that readers start 
“processing a text with the assumption that its textual world has an identity with 
the actual world until they are presented with information to the contrary” 
(Gavins 12). The necessary textual markers should, therefore, mark the text as 
strange and not of the reader’s world. Indeed, Armitt asserts that 
“defamiliarization techniques are the presiding characteristic of all fantasy 
forms” (Theorising 25), and this defamiliarisation or encounter with the strange 
and unfamiliar is placed before the reader as a clear marker.  
In the case of ‘other world’ fantasy for children, this does not seem to 
operate, however, and the principle of minimal departure is not troubled when 
one considers the reaction of protagonists to the spaces they enter. Rather than 
expressions of shock or dismay, as a rule, when child protagonists enter an 
‘other’ world, be it safe or dangerous, they are rarely depicted as being either 
distraught at the separation, or as experiencing any of “the anxiety that results 
from losing all our familiar signs and symbols of social intercourse” (Oberg 
177). Certainly, when characters move from other worlds into consensus reality, 
the reverse can be true (as was seen in the case of Lyra in The Subtle Knife).79 
However, when protagonists move from consensus reality into the new space, 
there is usually no obvious sense of alienation or concern at the sight of what 
should be the wholly unfamiliar, and there is rarely, what Tolkien refers to as an 
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“arresting strangeness” (47–8), nor a feeling of being ‘out of place’ in the 
different world. Instead, the characters, just as those in fairy tales, do not hesitate 
between the “two possibilities” (Todorov 26) of the real and the fantastic; they 
accept each equally. 
This absence of concern seems to be something of an anomaly since 
one’s home culture helps to form identity by providing social and cultural cues, 
cues that can take different forms.80 Consequently, when an individual enters a 
strange culture, all or most of these familiar cues are removed, and what should 
ensue is the sense of culture shock. Indeed, as Nesbit suggests, 
[i]t is a mistake to suppose that children are naturally fond of 
change. They love what they know. In strange places they suffer 
violently from homesickness, even when their loved nurse or 
mother is with them. They want to get back to the house they 
know, the toys they know, the books they know. (39) 
 
In such situations, the expectation would surely be that, in addition to a physical 
and geographical displacement, child protagonists would be no different from 
real children; they would experience a cultural displacement, and the encounter 
with the supposedly unfamiliar would bring with it an overwhelming sense of 
loss at being away from the familiar setting (even if it is a setting which is 
constraining and lacking freedom), together with an additional sense of lack of 
control in terms of being able to adjust to, or manipulate, the new landscape. In 
theory, then, child protagonists, removed from the everyday and thrust into the 
strange, ought to feel this sense of loss more intensely, and yet the sense of 
culture shock is generally not present.  
 Although the other world spaces are rarely of a kind that would be called 
perfect, like the fairy tale hero who “does not experience wonder when 
confronted with magical events or beings; they are taken for a granted” 
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(Nikolajeva, “Fairy” 154), by and large, the child protagonists simply accept the 
new space as a part of the normal. In a way, this seems to coincide closely with 
Bakhtin’s suggestion of the chronotope of the road. Despite Bakhtin’s 
description of this chronotope as closely matching the ideas of home-away-home 
and maturation in that “setting out on the road from one’s birthplace, returning 
home, are usually plateaus of age in the life of the individual” (“Forms” 120, 
original emphasis), more importantly Bakhtin notes that the “one crucial feature” 
of this chronotope is that “the road is always one that passes through familiar 
territory, and not through some exotic alien world” (“Forms” 245, original 
emphasis). As with Max in Where the Wild Things Are, or even the Pevensies 
and other children in The Chronicles of Narnia, protagonists automatically feel 
‘at home’ in the new space, regardless of the level of menace they encounter, and 
it is generally the case that, rather than any culture shock occurring, there is an 
immediate cognitive and experiential assimilation of space by the child 
protagonists: Max becomes king of the wild things, the Pevensies become kings 
and queens of Narnia.  
Given what I have noted is a varying level of spatial access in texts, this 
lack of culture shock on the part of protagonist’s can operate in two ways when 
considering children’s novels depicting ‘other worlds.’ One of these ways 
follows the conservative line. Here, if children’s books can be said to represent 
adults’ fantasised view of children and childhood, then ‘other’ world fantasy 
novels might be accounted for by arguing that all children’s books simply 
represent an adult’s romantic, nostalgic view of children and childhood. This 
would position children as being in some way already close to the fantastic such 
that child protagonists will not be perturbed when they find themselves in what 
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would otherwise be seen as a strange and unfamiliar place. In fact, Grenby refers 
to the lack of culture shock in most texts as “a surprising sang-froid” (151), but 
why should it be so surprising unless one subscribes to the view that this absence 
of culture shock represents the figure of the child and childhood as “closer to 
nature and the primitive world, more fluid in its identity and its access to the 
realms of the imagination” (Jenkins 4)? This is a position that assumes that adult 
authors imagine children and childhood as being in some way ‘at one’ with the 
fantasy genre, and that it is this natural affinity that explains why so many 
narratives show child protagonists who unhesitatingly and completely accept 
what might otherwise be seen as the ‘strangeness’ of fantasy ‘other’ worlds. It 
also rests on the constructed child figure that Jacqueline Rose asserts makes 
children’s literature “impossible” precisely because of the “impossible relation 
between adult and child” (1).  
However, the adult position is not necessarily the one to be adopted, 
especially when considering the perspective of the reader simply because, 
“[w]hile many adult readers undoubtedly perceive such moments as uncanny, 
children are theoretically less sensitive to them” (Gooding 394). In this case, the 
lack of culture shock can be seen to take on an alternative function for the reader. 
It can be seen as significant of the will to connect spaces—especially in more 
spatially active narratives, but also in those that are more inert—where the 
absence of reaction from child protagonists can indicate that no real change in 
realities has occurred, and thus it can be a marker of the movement into 
thirdspace.  
Whether authors intend it to happen or not, their reliance on this 
mechanism as a traditional trope gives a clear indication to readers of a spatial 
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contiguity. A consequence of this perception of contiguity is that even texts 
which ultimately try to work in favour of the spatial status quo, the defined and 
delimited, are apt to undermine themselves. This is so because, regardless of the 
indeterminable level of identification between reader and protagonist, the 
understanding of the nature of the spatial that is in play supersedes other 
considerations in that readers can always relate to the potential for movement 
within an individual spatial because that is also a real possibility in their lived 
lives.  
 
Spaces of Lived Lives 
It should be possible to see how readers and texts work together in spatial 
terms to produce social outcomes in lived lives. Readers inhabit consensus reality 
but, as I have already discussed, consensus reality is not so much a consensus as 
a conglomeration of perspectives of reality. The presence of this conglomeration 
is why, for Malpas, “a sense of place consists in having a grasp of a conceptually 
complex structure—a structure that encompasses different forms of spatiality, 
concepts of self, of others and of an objective order of things” (152). In the very 
complexity of this understanding, the opportunities for children to participate in 
the process of gaining a sense of place would seem to be limited. Indeed, 
although as I have already noted, children’s understandings of their positions 
within the world should not be underestimated, a common view, as Allison 
James notes, is that  
[c]hildhood is a social space that is structurally determined by a 
range of social institutions, but, precisely because of this, children 
as subjects are also structurally and culturally determined as social 
actors with specific social roles to play, as children. (“Giving” 
270) 
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In turn, this understanding of the figure of the child suggests that children have 
no agency, and nor are they given the space and “ability to imagine a world 
differently and then act differently” (Chappell 282). In this model, what adults do 
is to create an image of children which presupposes that “children cannot know 
themselves or what is good for them, and so they need us, need our guidance and 
protection” (Owen 256, original emphasis), and thus “adults almost always see 
the importance of creating spaces for young people but are often loath to let them 
do so themselves” (Aitken 167). This level of adult control identifies the child’s 
space in the world as defined and restricted within adult parameters, and yet it is 
also true that “the ways in which children inhabit and experience those common 
spaces can, nonetheless, differ sharply” (A. James, “Giving” 266) because the 
spatial, especially the spatial in play, is a freedom that each individual can 
potentially exercise at any time. 
The urge to use and create spaces is something that emerges early in 
childhood. Children of four or five years old “seem to have no need for a specific 
place; the preoperational mind’s egocentrism allows ‘my space’ to be any space, 
and distance from adults is achieved imaginatively rather than physically” (Sturm 
et al. 84). Within this understanding, the spatial imagination plays an important 
role in the way children consider themselves and, regardless of the social places 
set out for children—the adult designed and constructed playgrounds, for 
example, with their safe “child friendly” surfaces and ready-made constructions, 
much like toys, to play on or with—they can also create their own versions of 
those places: 
Young people find and make spaces beyond the surveillance of 
the adult world, often on the edges of neighborhoods, where they 
improvise and practice their relationships in forms of play, in the 
process creating local cultures of childhood. (Cook 150) 
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In so doing, as Toni Derr observes, “children shape their own place experiences” 
(108), and this is important because “children are and must be seen as active in 
the construction of their own lives” (James and Prout 8). This shaping is both 
through a sense of exploration, or by finding a special, private place that is 
unknown to others for, “the spontaneous aspect of exploration, whether in places 
close to home or far away, in nature or cities, is one of the most significant for 
children” (Derr 112) in that it gives them agency over their spatial activities. 
Thomson and Philo, for example, found from their research that children 
do not locate the spaces of play “straightforwardly in spaces that adults might 
conceive of as ones for children’s play” (16, original emphasis), that is in the 
structured environments that adults set up to allow for play. Other research also 
suggests that 
it is not necessarily the officially designated “places for children” 
that appeal so much as the “children’s places” they make their 
own. These might be particular corners of official play spaces or 
tucked-away spaces which adults might not even notice. 
(Scourfeld et al. 85) 
 
This use of space by children in real world locations is not particularly different 
from the presentation of spaces in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction. Indeed, Manlove 
has also pointed to this possibility in his suggestion that 
[t]he playfulness, the skill in making a believable fantastic world 
out of the most diverse images, is a key part of much English 
children’s fantasy–and fittingly, because play, and play with 
reality, is what children seem to understand with their own games 
of make-believe. (Alice 194)  
 
This connection between the play of spaces in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction and 
the spaces of playing that children engender in quotidian reliaty is no arbitrary 
coincidence.  
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Thirdspace is very much a private or secret space that often does not 
involve the presence of adults (at least not adults form the world of consensus 
reality). In such secret spaces, “children feel both connected (internally to place 
and self) and disconnected (externally from rules, adults, and daily routines), and 
they are able to observe the world without being observed. (Sturm et al. 84). As a 
result of the way children understand their own spaces,  
[w]hile adults remain fascinated with secret places—hence the 
profusion of these places in children’s literature written by them—
playing in them is primarily the purview of childhood and early 
adolescence. (Sturm et al. 84)  
 
This process is no less likely to occur in children and, in its effects, it produces 
worlds within worlds. Grete Lillehammer suggests “the world of children” as a 
way to describe “the interconnected relationships between being children in mind 
and action and the diverse spheres in which children actively move” (20). 
Lillehammer also adds that this includes “a specifically spatial dimension of 
activity which distinguishes it from the concept of childhood, which is seen as 
passively and temporally constructed” (24). It is in the spatial that children can 
designate their own spaces and, therefore, have control over them over and 
themselves.  
It is in child’s play that control of new spaces becomes possible. In 
society, the existence of a space or place tends to be the subjective province of 
adults to designate rather than being defined by children. Moreover, children are 
neither expected, nor allowed, to encroach upon various spaces and places in the 
planned and regulated places of ‘adult” society; instead, the requirement is that 
they remain within designated spaces, forcing them to find their secret spaces to 
play in by recreating and remaking existing places. Conversely, in fantasy ‘other 
world’ fiction, child characters can be allowed the opportunity to play within 
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spaces that, in their nature as not real, operate as secret spaces. The creation of 
such spaces, especially when they are more open and dynamic and, therefore, 
less under the control of adults, can empower the creation of children’s own 
spaces though their own narratives in playing. As a result, it is possible to see 
that “places in narrative have force and meaning; they are related to human 
values and beliefs; and they are part of a larger human world, including actions 
and events” (Kort, Place 11) and this larger human world includes the child.  
Although it is probably true that “[o]ne cannot read ‘through’ a text to the 
world: that is simply the illusion of realism” (Banting 27), Frank Kermode points 
to an obvious relationship between such fictions of the everyday such as those 
that children create for themselves and literary fictions (36), and he sees the 
novel, therefore, as giving the reader an opportunity to relate to a situation “as if” 
it were real, producing a “novel-shaped account of the world” (143). Moreover, 
this view is possible, as I mentioned in Chapter Two, even when the spaces 
presented are ultimately closed for protagonists, something which can be 
examined further by considering a text that is not itself an ‘other’ world fantasy 
novel at all, but is one that serves to illustrate a number of points I have been 
making thus far: Katherine Paterson’s Bridge to Terabithia.  
 
Building Bridges in Katherine Paterson’s Bridge to Terabithia 
 
Although it might seem somewhat circular to use one novel to discuss 
others, especially when they emerge from different genres, the events that unfold 
in what is a realist novel in the conventional sense, means that it can offer a 
particularly apt commentary on what I have been discussing in this chapter and 
earlier ones too. This is because Paterson’s novel narrates the story of two young 
children at play, creating a thirdspace of their own within consensus reality.  
 231 
The narrative revolves around two ten year olds, Jess Aarons and Leslie 
Burke (whose family has just moved from the city to live in the countryside). 
Although new at the school in rural Lark Creek, Leslie beats the boys in a 
running race—a regular, usually all-boy, break-time activity—thereby 
disappointing Jess, who had hoped to prove himself the fastest runner in school. 
Running is important for Jess, for it seems to offer a release from his constricted 
and confined life; apart from the restricting space of school—described as “a 
dirty old cage” (15)—he has to share a bedroom on the farm with his two 
younger sisters, and he has to spend his time doing farmyard chores because his 
father has to go away to work to increase the family’s income. The only outlet 
Jess has apart from running (the desire for freedom of movement) is drawing 
(indicating a propensity for the imaginative and creative).  
Despite Jess losing the running race to Leslie, however, the two become 
firm friends and, one day after school, Leslie and Jess wander off “over the 
empty field behind the old Perkins place and down to the dry creek bed that 
separated farmland from the woods” (49). Here, Leslie makes a suggestion: 
“We need a place,” she said, “just for us. It would be so secret that 
we would never tell anyone in the whole world about it.” (49) 
 
This will be a space of their own making, and one that they will take ownership 
of for, as Leslie continues, 
“[i]t might be a whole secret country [...], and you and I would be 
the rulers of it.” (49–50) 
 
The special nature of the new space is indicated by the method of getting to it: a 
rope swing across a creek. Their first efforts to swing across to the forest on the 
other side are unsuccessful. In fact, because the gully is dry at this time of year, it 
could be crossed relatively easily on foot, yet Jess “couldn’t escape the feeling 
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that one must enter Terabithia only by the prescribed entrance” (76). This 
thirdspace, however, draws not only on an inherent capacity for space-making, 
but also upon the potential inherent in a fantasy ‘other world’ text since, as Leslie 
suggests, 
“it could be like Narnia, and the only way you can get in is by 
swinging across on the enchanted rope.” (50) 
 
Even the spatially restricted Chronicles of Narnia, it appears, can provide the 
impetus for a more open kind of spatial creativity. In fact, “Leslie named their 
secret land ‘Terabithia,’ and she loaned Jess all of her books about Narnia, so he 
would know how things went in a magic kingdom” (51). This use of a textual 
source as an inspiration is not, however, simply an imitative process; Leslie is 
not just trying to recreate Narnia in the woods of Lark Creek. 
 They build in the land of Terabithia, but they do not construct a house, for 
this is not a recreated domestic scene. Instead, they build a “castle stronghold” to 
defend the land against enemies, to protect it as their own: 
They dragged boards and other materials down from the scrap 
heap by Miss Bessie’s pasture and built their castle stronghold in 
the place they had found in the woods. (51) 
 
Of course, this castle stronghold is, simultaneously, a shack, and when it rains, 
the castle/shack leaks water in “icy streams” that Jess tries to avoid but finds 
“there was no escaping the miserable invaders” (115). Here, however, the text 
reveals that the rain is both mundane and real and yet, at the same time, it is 
personified and a part of the imagined, so much so that Leslie believes that it is a 
curse on the land: “Methinks some evil being has put a curse on our beloved 
kingdom” (116). This idea is also found in the way the pine grove that the 
children discover in the woods is both a pine grove and a sacred grove of 
Terabithia without any additional act of construction other than the combination 
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of the real and imagined. Clearly, consensus reality still exists, and it has not 
been subverted or undermined in any way. However, Jess and Leslie have taken 
the wooded area and made a thirdspace of it for themselves, one that is 
simultaneously real and imagined and more for, as Leslie says, “This is not an 
ordinary place” (60).  
Once their creative work is completed, “Like God in the Bible, they 
looked at what they had made and found it very good” (51). It is not coincidental 
that the children are considered godlike in their ability to create their own space, 
for not only have they created the space, but they also assume ownership of it, 
and “between the two of them they owned the world” (52). The castle stronghold 
they have built defends them against intrusion because Terabithia is “just for the 
two of them” (89), and consensus reality is considered “their former world” (60).  
Terabithia is also a thirdspace that is fully experienced. Whilst the 
narrative tells nothing of how Leslie experientially understands the thirdspace 
(and rightly so since her capacity for space-making would seem to be a given), 
how Jess experiences it is a large part of the way the novel develops an 
understanding of the spatial: 
Just walking down the hill towards the woods made something 
warm and liquid steal through his body. The closer he came to the 
dry creek bed and the crab apple tree rope the more he could feel 
the beating of his heart. He grabbed the end of the rope and swung 
out toward the other bank with a kind of wild exhilaration and 
landed on his feet, taller and stronger and wiser in that mysterious 
land. (59) 
 
The change from poor boy to king comes at that moment of movement through 
the air on the end of the rope. It is a moment of transition that does not take Jess 
wholly out of consensus reality but which, at the same time, allows him into 
another spatiality. However, although Jess is able to experience it, throughout 
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most of the novel it seems that his sense that he cannot create the space for 
himself is to the fore. 
 This apparent inability to create space for himself is something that is 
understood about Jess early in the novel when the narrator says that “Terabithia 
was their secret, which was a good thing, for how could Jess have explained it to 
an outsider?” (59). Here, the suggestion is that Jess experiences a certain 
awkwardness about the idea of being part of a real and imagined space, 
especially compared to Leslie’s total adoption of the space as lived and 
experienced. Indeed, for much of the novel, the thirdspace, although experienced, 
remains somewhat alien to Jess. Early in the novel, the narrator revals that 
“Leslie was more than his friend. She was his other, more exciting self—his way 
to Terabithia and all the worlds beyond” (59), something which suggest that Jess 
would not have considered making such movement himself. On one occasion, 
when Leslie cannot come out because she is helping her father to repair their 
house: 
Jess tried going to Terabithia alone, but it was no good. It needed 
Leslie to make the magic. He was afraid he would destroy 
everything by trying to force the magic on his own, when it was 
plain that the magic was reluctant to come for him. (83)  
 
Later in the novel, when Jess considers earlier events, he still recognises Leslie’s 
role as guide rather than any inherent capacity he has within himself: “It was 
Leslie who had taken him from the cow pasture into Terabithia and turned him 
into a king” (160). Jess initially lacks confidence in his own ability to turn place 
into space. 
In fact, after Leslie dies while trying to get to Terabithia, and the rope 
swing snaps, the stump of rope that remains seems to signify to Jess that the 
potential for movement into thirdspace has gone. Initially, he is downcast, 
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believing that it is not possible to enter Terabithia now that Leslie is not there to 
take him. Leslie 
  had made him leave his old self behind and come into her world,  
  and then before he was really at home in it but too late to go back,  
  she had left him stranded there—like an astronaut wandering  
  about on the moon. Alone. (145-6) 
Now, it seems that for Jess, “There was nowhere to go. Nowhere. Ever again” 
(147). Jess feels isolated both physically (having lost his friend) and spatially in 
that, whether he had fully grasped the process or not, he had been able to share in 
Leslie’s creation of thirdspace. Since it had been her creation, or so it seems to 
Jess at this time, it is no longer available to him. 
 This negative reaction could, of course, be proof that one must turn away 
from such space-making as one matures. Indeed, at one point Jess even considers 
the possibility that  
Terabithia was like a castle where you came to be knighted. After 
you stayed for a while and grew strong you had to move on. For 
hadn’t Leslie, even in Terabithia, tried to push back the walls of 
his mind and make him see beyond to the shining world. (160) 
 
The experience of death as a device that brings maturity to the protagonist 
should, in theory therefore, be the moment that Jess can move on in the world of 
consensus reality and put aside such “childish” things. However, despite his 
initial reaction. Jess does not move on. He first builds a temporary bridge with a 
broken branch and, for the first time, crosses into Terabithia on his own:  
He landed slightly upstream from Terabithia. If it was still 
Terabithia. If it could be entered across a branch instead of swung 
into (151).  
 
The earlier entrance, of course, had been the rope swing, which has now gone. 
However, despite his doubts about how one should enter Terabithia, this is a 
turning point in Jess’s understanding of the movement into thirdspace. 
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 Jess’s younger sister, May Belle (who had not been allowed to be part of 
the world-making early on in the novel) has followed Jess and, whilst trying to 
cross the branch over the creek, she gets stuck half-way across and experiences 
the very same kind of fear that Jess himself had experienced when, during a spell 
of persistent rain, the creek fills with water, and turns into “a roaring eight-foot-
wide sea” (13). Jess has to rescue his sister, but this clearly sets in his mind the 
need for a more permanent traversal into Terabithia. He takes planks that, 
significantly, had been left at Leslie’s old house after her parents had moved out, 
and he builds a more permanent crossing. It is over this solid connection between 
the real and the imagined that he takes May Belle,  
he put flowers in her hair and led her across the bridge—the great 
bridge into Terabithia—which might look to someone with no 
magic in him like a few planks across a newly dry gully. (163) 
 
It is now clear to see that, despite his earlier misgivings and doubts, Jess has 
understood the space-making potential he has, for he has built “the great bridge 
into Terabithia” and perceives it as such whereas, to the spatially uninitiated, all 
that exists are a few old planks.  
The bridge thus represents not only the will to connect to thirdspace, but 
it is also conceived of as a permanent structure that opens up Terabithia as a 
thirdspace for both Jess and May Belle. It will also be available in the future for 
the baby, Joyce Ann, who is, as yet, too young to know enough, but who will 
become a future queen of this realm of thirdspace. In Jess’s introduction of May 
Belle to the space-making imagination, just as Leslie had introduced him, Jess 
affirms that he is now able to actualise the space by himself; he no longer needs 
the imagination of Leslie to provide the entrance to the world of Terabithia. He 
has not “moved on” from Terabithia at all; he has understood his ability to 
 237 
recreate the world for himself, and now he is able to initiate his young sisters 
(and, indeed, the reader) into the process.  
On one level, this novel could be seen as a nostalgic idealisation of 
childhood, one that promises perfect world’s that can provide a refuge from the 
responsibility of the real, adult world. In one way, of course, Terabithia does 
provide a refuge for Jess, a place to forget about the cramped conditions of home 
and the workload he is required to bear on behalf of the family. However, Leslie 
needs no such sanctuary. Moreover, as is proven by Leslie’s death, the world of 
Terabithia is no Edenic safe haven.  
What Bridge to Terabithia exemplifies is that act of playing that creates a 
thirdspace from the real and the imagined. It suggests that, whilst the world itself 
cannot be played with (it always remains as the world, it is never destroyed), 
what can be played with is the world in the way we experience it spatially 
through the creation of spaces that are simultaneously real and imagined, and by 
walking through those spaces and making uses of them in order to actualise them 
rather them maintain them only as an insubstantial fancy. The dependence that 
Jess has on Leslie in terms of space-making creativity also shows that, although a 
sense of thirdspace may be intuitively human (as typified by Leslie), its exercise 
may still need to be shown to people as a potential that requires actualisation; it 
is not a passive activity of daydreaming, but a positive, creative mental act. It is a 
mental act that can be stimulated by others and by texts since, although Jess’s 
primary introduction to the creative process of space-making is Leslie, he later 
has access to fantasy ‘other world’ fiction novels. The fictional novels chosen, 
The Chronicles of Narnia, also point to a playful contestation of the spatial 
between the reader (here, Leslie) and the text that is in itself a creative 
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performance, one that is then taken as a basis for the instigation of play to 
produce a newly created thirdspace, that of Terabithia.  
This use of the The Chronicles of Narnia serves to indicate that fantasy 
novels—even those that are not fully spatially open such as the Narnia books—
can provide a stimulus to real space-making. As such, what Leslie is able to take 
from the texts of C. S. Lewis not only exemplifies bell hooks’ contention that 
“[s]paces can be interrupted, appropriated, and transformed through artistic and 
literary practices” (152), but also shows that this process can operate in reverse. 
Indeed, Katherine Paterson herself has commented on the similarity between the 
name of the thirdspace of Terabithia and the island of Terebinthia in Lewis’s The 
Voyage of the Dawn Treader (156), and she has even noted how such thirdspaces 
come into being: 
When children ask me now, “Where is Terabithia?,” I try to 
explain that for most of us it starts out as a place outside 
ourselves—a tree, a hideout in the woods, a corner of our 
backyards, the springhouse on our uncle’s farm. (156) 
 
Paterson’s comments echo those of others I have discussed who have noted how 
the creative and constructive spatial imagination can make of something 
mundane something magical. It shows the difference between the delimited and 
the unbounded, and is also seen in the novel in the way spaces are marked for 
games, in this case, running races: 
The first two out began dragging their toes to make the finish line. 
The ground was rutted from past rains, but had hardened in the 
late summer drought, so they had to give up on sneaker toes and 
draw the line with a stick. (30) 
 
The ground for running is a delimited and fixed space; in effect, it is no more 
than a game. However, there is no such demarcation of the limits of the 
thirdspace of Terabithia. 
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 As a final note, here, it is worth mentioning that, as with the film version 
of Where the Wild Things Are, Gábor Csupó’s 2007 Walden Media/Walt Disney 
Productions film version of Bridge to Terabithia visually depicts the 
protagonists’ spatial imaginary as a part of their experiential real, and also as 
being contiguous with consensus reality. It sees the real and imagined as one new 
space of its own and, whilst this is not how the book presents the thirdspace that 
Leslie and Jess move into, it does signal most clearly that the space of the real 
and imagined has substance, is not illusory or unattainable, and that it is always 
potentially there waiting to be created. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
When attempting to discuss what readers might do with and draw from 
the textual spaces they encounter, there is an obvious danger of falling into the 
trap of speaking for the child with all the concomitant problems that arise. 
However, the nature of the spatial is different; it is a commonality that all human 
beings experience, and in much the same way. Being located spatially is a 
fundamental aspect of human existence, for  
[n]ot to be in a place is to be nowhere, and to be nowhere is to be 
nothing. Therefore it is a sine qua non of human personhood, and 
therefore of human being, to be in place. (Benson 10) 
 
More than this locatedness, however, as Casey suggests “where we are—the 
place we occupy, however briefly—has everything to do with what and who we 
are (and finally, that we are)” (xiii, original emphasis). It is the nature of the 
place or space that individuals find themselves in that is important.  
 The problem is that society requires as a precondition for adulthood that, 
“if children are to reach their potential and make their contribution to humanity, 
they must eventually move beyond a perception of the world as they desire it to 
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be and accept it as it is” (Wolf 66). It is part of a process where, as children 
physically grow, 
powerful social forces buoyed by peer and adult pressure told us 
(overtly or covertly) to put aside that childlike freshness and 
creativity. Expressions of external fantasy were generally no 
longer legitimized or encouraged: play became more structured 
and reality became secondary process oriented. (Michaelis 57) 
 
It is also the point where Foucault’s totalising panopticon regulates and oversees 
the spatial practices of the individual and expects conformity to the grid-like 
patterns set out for everyday life. It is a scenario that requires that the 
imaginative capacity of the child reader be derided as inferior by a conservative 
and rationalist enlightenment argument that requires individuals to be “subtly 
socialized out of the magic, creativity, flexibility, and individuality that is play” 
(Michaelis 65) and, in this case specifically, spatial play. As a result, the control 
of what is or is not reality (and, therefore, what is or is not truth) is self-
validating within a fixed system of spatial use, and those who are positioned so 
as to be able to decide what ‘reality’ is are able to control how others behave 
within that reality. 
 However, “the utility of the reductive worldview adults have settled upon 
is no guarantee of its veracity” (Griswold 124) and, whilst it may seek to delimit 
and define certain spatially creative and imaginative processes as childlike (if not 
childish), as Michaelis notes, everyone has “the potential for creative, playful 
independence” (65). There is a need to not only recognise but foster this potential 
because, “[r]ealism may be necessary to survival, but unless people are also 
touched by fantasy, they risk imprisonment in their own narrow worlds” (Tuan, 
“Realism” 435). Fantasy ‘other world’ fiction, therefore, offers a way to re-
interpret and translate the dominant conceptions of location and emplacement 
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and thus, as Aitken argues, it is necessary to abandon “the notion that in the 
passage from childhood to adulthood there is some irretrievable loss” (2), for it 
need not necessarily be the case.  
What individuals, adult or child, do lose when they allow themselves to 
be tied down, restricted, or limited in their use of the tactics of space-making, 
however, is the power to move throughout the range of potential spaces by 
practising places for themselves. If it is true that “where I find myself implaced 
influences not just the fact of my being but also its nature” (Benson 4), then 
access to the spatial is an important factor in defining who an individual is, and 
what that individual can do.  
When opportunities to explore and act in public spaces are closed down, 
one of the few avenues still open is the realisation that opportunities for 
movement and actualisation of new spatial practices still exist and should still be 
pursued. It is in the fantasy ‘other world’ novel, however it resolves itself, and 
however formulaic it might be at times, that this potential still exists, as a 
reminder that spaces can still be opened up, that they are not forever lost with the 
passing of time as they turn into places, and that they can be created and 
recreated over and again. Perhaps it is not so coincidental that, just as a mass of 
the population began moving from the openness of the countryside into the 
regimented streets and alleyways of an industrial, urban environment, fantasy 
‘other world’ fiction for children begins to flourish since, consciously or not, it 
can be read as opening up the possibility for creative space-making as an antidote 
to the strictures of place that come with urban existence by showing that people 
are able to constantly reconfigure physical spaces and reinterpret them as spaces 
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for their own use as an exercise in agency that unfolds and authors the spaces of 
lived lives.  
For young readers, this capacity is arguably even more the case in a 
modern world that, in addition to the written word, offers so many visual images 
through television films and the kind of electronic games that require traversals 
of landscapes. All of this input can only add to the potential for children’s 
imaginary play and their creation of the necessary spaces in which to play. In 
such a circulating mix of real and imagined images, fantasy and the imagination 
that engenders it are not, therefore, the antithesis of social reality for, “although 
‘realism’ and ‘fantasy’ have clear and opposite meanings conceptually, their 
application to real-life situations is often ambiguous and problematical,” and thus 
“we would do well to hesitate before placing people or a cultural manifestation in 
the camp of realism or of fantasy” (Tuan, “Realism” 435). Indeed, as Arjun 
Appadurai suggests, “the deterritorialization of persons, images, and ideas,” 
where people “see their lives through the prisms of possible lives offered by the 
mass media in all their forms,” now means that fantasy in general is “a social 
practice; it enters, in a host of ways, into the fabrication of social lives for many 
people in many societies” (53–4), and it does so constructively. 
Children’s fantasy other world fiction, therefore, can show spaces that 
operate as largely oblivious to the spaces of the adult world although it is never 
totally separated from them. Moreover, fantasy as a social practice is not a 
whimsical or fanciful affair, and nor is it a process of subversion, of attempting 
to break down the rules of the adult world; it is simply operating with and within 
those rules as part of agentive action in individual spatial domains, and “agency, 
in the end, is an attribute of individual children. It is something which they may 
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or may not choose to exercise” (A. James, “Agency” 44). When they do exercise 
such agency, hwoever, it is a matter of escaping without leaving in the form of 
“contradictory movements that counterbalance and combine themselves outside 
the reach of panoptic power,” and which thus have no “points where one can take 
hold of them” (Certeau 95). In this respect, Certeau argues that a story is 
“delinquent” in that it operates “not on the margins but in the interstices of the 
codes that it undoes and displaces” and because it works to reject social positions 
that delimit and define the possibilities for movement. As Certeau says, it is  
flexible enough to allow the proliferation of this challenging 
mobility that does not respect places, is alternately playful and 
threatening, and extends from the microbe–like forms of everyday 
narration to the carnivalesque celebrations of earlier days. (136) 
 
If all stories have this potential, then those that offer the spatial more explicitly, 
as in the case of ‘other world fantasy texts, can be no less delinquent; they also 
work within and between places and, in their suggestion of the potential for 
mobility, they emphasise the inherent instability of those places.  
However, this does not mean that they are indicative of subversion 
because, as Oakes notes, it is not a question of “disempowered groups resisting 
in various ways the dominant meanings and representations of the places in 
which they live and work” because this “assumes a limited conception of place, 
defined merely in terms of oppositional and contested readings of dominant 
representations” (524). Instead, the literary spatial can open up new ways to see 
the potential everyday spatiality of lived lives, which can be the case, moreover, 
even when texts in themselves serve to close down spaces for their protagonist. It 
is in the multiplicity of relationships between the spatial practices of all the 
different users of space that might ensue that the impossibility of ever totally 
including, excluding, or controlling all human activity and thought lies, for “[i]t 
 244 
can be relatively easy to knock down a building, but it is much harder to 
demolish a space which is composed around memory, experience or 
imagination” (Tonkiss 3). Space making, as Certeau points out, has “no readable 
identity” and the created spaces exist “without points where one can take hold of 
them, without rational transparency,” making them “impossible to administer” 
(95). This inability to take a superior level of control over spaces, in turn, makes 
it impossible to fix all of the possible subject positions that are spatially 
available, both within the worlds of texts, and within the world of consensus 
reality.  
As such, these texts can answer a particularly pertinent question: “Can 
children become narrators of their own lives, or are they fated simply to occupy 
narratives already written for them?” (Wood 238). In reply to this query, it is 
possible to see that fantasy ‘other world’ texts can show that there is always 
space, at all levels of society, for tangential thought and action directed towards 
the development of a different pragmatics of existence that is spatially based, all 
of which allows for the freedom of spatial agency. Children can be authors of 
their own spaces. 
This spatial awareness is not about a nostalgic glance to the past, nor is 
about a hypothetical future; rather, it concerns itself with the present and the 
presences of individuals. Whilst it may indeed be the case that authors can never, 
“inhabit the presentness of childhood” (Hollindale 22), they can inhabit the 
presentness of the spatial when they offer texts that show most clearly the 
potential for space-making that exists in the world. In many areas, child readers 
cannot bring to the reading process the kind of prior knowledge or cultural 
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context that adults can. This absence of a schema is not the case for the spatial, 
however, for as Deleuze has observed, 
[t]here is never a moment when children are not already plunged 
into an actual milieu in which they are moving about, and in 
which the parents as persons simply play the roles of openers or 
closers of doors, guardians of thresholds, connectors or 
disconnectors of zones. (Essays 62) 
 
Thus, regardless of the way that authors present the spatial—as inert or active—
children’s fantasy ‘other world’ novels can both suggest the potential of the 
spatial as well as reflecting the possibilities of space-making in the real world of 
the reader as something that readers can intimately connect with.  
Moreover, even though fantasy ‘other world’ texts primarily value 
instances of children creating their own spaces (or at least moving within spaces 
that become available to them), they suggest to readers of any age that they 
might also have power over themselves, over their surroundings and over the 
places and spaces they inhabit. In turn, this denial of an age bracket casts the 
spatial as one of the ways that can achieve a more equivocal position in terms of 
the reader, and it does so, as Reimer suggests, “by refusing to use child and adult 
as unmarked terms in their analysis of reading positions—by making them 
strange” (Reimer 8, original emphasis). It is a notion that interleaves with the 
way postmodern childhood studies views childhood not as a journey towards 
adult completeness, but rather in a way that sees childhood as a presentness, thus 
“blurring the line between childhood as an unfinished and adulthood as a finished 
state” (Walkerdine 96). The spatial, therefore, does not impress itself on one 
particular type of reader, be that implied, real or any other kind or physical age. 
Ultimately, therefore, the idea that “children’s literature criticism cannot 
move away from its many and varied versions of the ‘real child’” (Lesnik-
 246 
Oberstein 168) should not be taken as a criticism of children’s literature, but as a 
celebration of the multiplicity of positions that different readers (which includes 
the ‘real adult’) can make and take. By showing that the spatial can be more than 
Cartesian fixedness, that it is an ideological construction, allows for movement 
within it, movement that can be playful and paradoxical and individually 
experienced. It also argues that those texts which fully represent the creative act 
of space-making cannot be seen as merely marking ‘traces’ of movement, but 
that they should be more clearly seen as maps and as setting out itineraries that 
can be performatively played out.  
It is axiomatic that the part of life that is termed ‘childhood’ is a time of 
complex changes in an individual, when children are seeking to define both their 
own identity in the face of what they are told to be, and their place in the social 
pattern. When authors of fantasy ‘other world’ fiction create new spaces, new 
versions of the real, they can offer readers of all ages, and in varying degrees, an 
opportunity to experience revisioned spaces, and to create them and move within 
them by themselves. The meanings that emerge from the experiencing of those 
spaces can, if actualised by readers, lead to a different understanding of reality, 
for readers can see in the mix of created and real spaces that neither has to be the 
ultimate and fixed space of lived lives. In this understanding of spaces, there is 
an intimate connection between the literary and the social.  
Whilst fantasy ‘other world’ fiction cannot directly free children (or 
adults) from their social and political limitations and restrictions, it can show 
ways through and around and across that do not necessarily mean that all 
movement and spatial ownership must be prescribed and controlled by others. It 
can point to how each person has access to an indeterminate map without 
 247 
borders, the spaces of which are available to be explored, a view that sees both 
the child protagonists and the real child reader as being “the-child-as-capable-
and-seeking-connection” (Dresang 57). It is, therefore, about the distinction 
between directing children (or, indeed, adults), “telling children what to do—
what we want from them in terms of asking for something—and the kinds of 
telling that construct who they are or who they should be” (Owen 267, original 
emphasis). It is the difference between wishing for the possible and actualising 
the virtual. Finally, it is the difference between being given a place in the world 
to occupy (and choosing to stay put), or having the freedom to make spaces of 
one’s own to inhabit and play both with and within.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
“There are many, many worlds,” says the character Dustfinger in 
Cornelia Funke’s Inkspell (2005), “they’re all different, and they’re written down 
in books!” (285). In one form or another, imaginary narrative spaces have long 
been an integral part of the story-telling repertoire, and fantasy fiction for 
children relies just as much upon there being spaces for protagonists to move 
within as it does on all of the other narrative elements that go into making a well 
told fantasy tale. As Owain Jones argues, however, “[t]he stories of childhood 
that adult societies have told have often been about trying to write (right) 
childhood into one form of space or other” (196) and this is no different in the 
case of the fictional ‘stories’ of childhood in children’s literature. 
In this thesis, therefore, I have attempted to examine a wide range of 
fantasy ‘other world’ texts by translating what are cultural approaches into one 
more specifically pertinent to the literary text, a concept of literary thirdspace, 
and then taken the discussion back again to an understanding of how readers 
might perceive these representations of the spatial—both active and inert—and 
then act upon these perceptions. By drawing on the ideas of social theorists and 
the ways that ordinary people are seen to be capable of opening up spaces for 
themselves within what appear to be fixed domains of activity, I have provided 
the basis for a more expansive examination of the role played by the spatial in 
this kind of fiction in terms of the fictional child, subjectivity, agency and issues 
of control. 
At the outset, I suggested that spatial in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction is an 
important textual element in the communication and reception of meaning, but 
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that narratology theory has not really given due consideration to the spatial at all, 
and that, in children’s literature criticism, approaches to the spatiality of such 
texts have largely rested on identifying difference rather than seeking to 
understand the spatial itself. I also noted that an underlying theme would be the 
constructed and the constructive child on the basis that such texts could reveal 
the way in which authors view, or at least present, the figure of the child and 
childhood.  
I suggested, therefore, that these texts needed to be re-evaluated in terms 
of the spatialities they present, and that this re-evaluation should be done not 
within the parameters of a structural paradigm such as home-away-home 
(applicable as it may be on one level), but in terms of seeking to understand how 
and why the wide variety of places and spaces in fantasy fiction for children 
might function. More particularly, I noted that this required a shift in perspective 
in order to consider a theory of middles, one that asks questions of the nature of 
the spatial and what it represents in such fiction, one that is not descriptive or 
classificatory, but one that can illuminate how agency may or may not be 
exercised spatiality by protagonists and, in turn, readers who experience such 
spaces in the text.  
I also suggested that it is important to ensure that any approach to the 
spaces of fantasy fiction should be integral to an interlinked mesh of possible 
approaches to the study of fantasy ‘other world’ novels for children. Such an 
approach would add the spatiality of fiction as a complement to other approaches 
to fantasy ‘other world’ texts for children and how they might function, rather 
than attempting to replace them. It would be one that could examine middles by 
using theories that are largely from outside the realm of literary studies that allow 
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fantasy spaces to be seen not as a separate, different places, but rather that 
fantasy ‘other’ worlds can structure and maintain a new reality. In this way, 
fantasy texts could be seen not as a barrier separating reality from elsewhere, but 
rather as constructing bridges towards realities and thus they are not trivial or to 
be disregarded as frivolous whimsy. 
Examining fantasy ‘other world’ fiction in this way has confirmed that 
fantasy literature should not be open to criticism on the basis that it requires less 
on the part of readers in terms of cognitive ability, that it is in some way a lesser 
kind of fiction. The inherent complexity of spatial arrangements, whether or not 
they act for or against child protagonists, and in whatever way they subsequently 
have an influence on readers, shows that they do indeed incorporate 
a more complex and more complete understanding of the world 
and people that remains unspoken beyond the simple surface but 
provides that simple surface with its comprehensibility. 
(Nodelman, Hidden 206) 
 
To attempt to grasp all that is happening in such novels, it has been necessary to 
employ theoretical propositions that in themselves are not always easy to grasp, 
positions about the nature of how different kinds of spatiality are made and re-
made, used and, indeed, abused. For this reason, it is unwise to simply consider 
such texts as simply escapist (enjoyable though they may be to read) or 
inconsequential, on the basis that they reflect an element of childhood that should 
be abandoned in order to achieve adulthood. Children’s ‘other world’ fantasy 
fiction is not childish, for it shows an understanding that the world contains 
endless possibilities for acting upon and transforming place into space by being 
open to the possibility of creating new paths, new flows, new patterns and 
escaping without leaving. 
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 Thus, clearly, such spaces, when fully realised and open, do not exist to 
support the ‘real’ in some way, or operate as a site for child protagonists to solve 
personal problems before coming home to apply the solutions. This is simply a 
utilitarian fashioning of space that posits only one knowable reality as truth. In 
the same way, these new spaces need not be seen as being in some way inferior 
to the real, or as in need of salvation by protagonists from the ‘real’ world 
because they do not counter the real except in those instances where authors seek 
to present the case that it is necessary to discard “the licentious ways of knowing 
that constitute fantasy” (Summerfield xiii) in order to grow up. Indeed, the way 
in which I have reconsidered the nature of the spaces shows that the idea of them 
being liminal locations is belied by the kinds of activities that take place within 
them. This argues that these spaces need not be seen as the mechanism for the 
process of maturation, where the other is set up as seemingly desirable, but then 
is ultimately to be rejected by the child who wishes to adopt the adult mode of 
existence.  
 As I have noted, the spatiality of fantasy ‘other world’ texts should be 
seen as locatable within an understanding that there are different degrees of the 
spatially dynamic. In the most spatially open examples, rather than figuring an 
epistemic child, what is presented is the experiential child, with children at play 
(although not in a trivial sense) and exercising their freedom to connect spatially 
by taking up opportunities to performatively act as agents within their own 
spatial domains. 
 Childhood, at least as constructed in those novels where the space of the 
child is made available to be played with and within, is not therefore, a matter of 
status, but one of action. Childhood can therefore be seen not so much as a 
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disposition but as an accomplishment, performatively expressed and enacted 
through and by the ability to create and use space. In this sense then, the figure of 
the child in spatially dynamic narratives is no longer child as such because that 
figure is not called into being but is self-constructing in a process that is not one 
of becoming towards adulthood—since both child and adult are, in theory, able 
to operate spatially in much the same way—but is one that asserts the existence 
of the ontological subject as autonomous entity, where the spatial thirdspace 
operates as an unbounded tactical instance of playing within the present, the here 
and now that is not restricted to the temporality of the novel’s frame.  
That spatial creativity is seen as a power that can be re-utilised on a 
continuing basis, whereby ways of making and re-making spaces are equally 
accessible, in varying degrees, to both child and adult, argues that the thirdspace 
imagination and capacity for play that is usually ascribed only to the figure of the 
child is really a quintessential part of our nature as human beings. This 
availability to all denies, therefore, an idea that Nikolajeva expresses thus: 
“children who do not grow up are confined to their childhood, while a grown-up 
who goes back to the innocence of childhood is undoubtedly regressing, mentally 
and morally” (“Growing Up” 131). In terms of certain kinds of behaviour, this 
might be considered the case, but the spatial does not equivocate between ‘adult’ 
and ‘child’ in that all individuals, young or old, can actualise potential space. 
Physical growth may be a continual process but, as Ursula Le Guin suggests, “an 
adult is not a dead child, but a child who survived” (“Americans” 39); spatially 
speaking, this is certainly the case, even though it is not commonly a feature of 
children’s texts. 
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Indeed, if it is possible to imagine space in the physical world of 
consensus reality as a multiplicity of layers and potential spaces awaiting 
actualisation by adult and child alike, then it is no great leap to see how ‘other 
worlds’ in fantasy fiction can operate in much the same way, and both the 
construction of space in the real world and that of thirdspace in fantasy texts can 
mirror and replicate each other endlessly through the suggestion that children 
(and adults) do possess an ability to construct their own spaces and rules for their 
own spaces, to positively change their own experience of the places they 
encounter and not just be passive game-pieces moved around in an adult directed 
world. 
The structure of physical places may indeed guide and direct individuals’ 
interactions with that location but, reciprocally, individuals are able to restructure 
and reinterpret that place as a space for their own purposes through an exercise of 
the tactics of agency in unfolding and authoring spaces, and in their opportunities 
to interact within the space. Through this display of tactics, spatial forms and 
arrangements in fantasy ‘other world’ literature for children, show that such 
literary spaces (together with the space of the real world, however it might be 
individually configured) are always a contestable, and therefore, contested, 
domain. What we consider to be social reality or social phenomena are 
constructed and continuously reconstructed through the dynamic interrelations of 
protagonists with the spatial context in which they exist and thus, in both the text 
and consensus reality, such a space always “resists theoretical closure” (Oakes 
523) because both protagonists and readers are constantly enabled “to think 
differently about the meanings and significance of space and those related 
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concepts that compose and comprise the inherent spatiality of human life” (Soja, 
Thirdspace 1, original emphasis).  
Constructed child protagonists, even restrictively constructed characters, 
can still be constructive, and even when protagonists and spaces are designed to 
be closed and referential or even deferential to the real, they can still push the 
constructed reader to potential spatial re-enactment. In this way, the author’s 
relationship with the reader can be seen as an instance of playing with spatial 
potential for, even when authors seek to propose a more confined and confining 
message, readers can still wrench something from the constricted spatial setting; 
beyond the immediate experience of the text is the meaning of the experience. 
This also means that any danger that understandings of the spatial in children’s 
literature themselves become a privileged, textual, discursive space accessible 
only to those academic intellectuals who propose them (myself included) is 
thwarted by the very practical everyday practices of the spatial that every 
individual can exercise and perform. 
This thesis has, therefore, directed attention to the fact that spatial forms 
and arrangements in fantasy literature for children cannot and should not be 
totalised or reduced to a minor role, and that this literary space—as is the space 
of the real world, however that might be construed—is always a contestable, and 
therefore, contested, domain. The spatial in fantasy ‘other world’ fiction for 
children is indeed “a site of both meaningful identity and immediate agency” 
(Oakes 510, original emphasis), one that clearly mediates between the aesthetic, 
the cognitive and the social as an integral element of the lived lives of people, 
young and old, in their own personal locations. However, this is not the end of 
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the story, and the point that this thesis has reached inevitably begs a series of 
further questions, four of which seem to have primary importance. 
The first point to emerge is that, with its emphasis on the fluidity between 
real and unreal spaces, both within the text and in the constructed world of 
consensus reality, this thesis has called into question how fantasy literature 
should be understood, and more specifically whether or not the term ‘fantasy 
literature’ itself needs to be redefined. Zipes, for one, is clear that “there is 
something strangely paradoxical about seeking to define fantasy as a genre with 
set conventions and purposes, since its very essence, it seems to me is its 
antigeneric quality” (188), and if it is possible to author the real, both textually 
and in consensus reality, then reality itself is ultimately only a description of a 
more fundamental and spatially fluid condition of existence.  
Marking a text as fantasy simply because it posits a spatiality that is in 
contrast to something else that stands as ‘real’, but which is already in contrast to 
any number of other possible realities becomes like trying to take a firm foothold 
on very shifting sands. As I noted in my introduction, seeing fantasy ‘other 
world’ texts in the way I have outlined does question the nature of literary 
‘fantasy’ and ‘realism’ as exclusive terms. The consideration of thirdspace in a 
literary text works both within and against the codes of representation that 
reference the verisimilitude of quotidian existence and question the status of 
representation and our access to experience. This demands further attention. 
Second, I have only talked of the spatiality of fantasy other worlds, and 
there are other forms of fantasy novel to be considered in this light. In addition, 
there is also the question of the nature of the spatial in other kinds of fiction for 
children (including, for example, historical time-slip novels), and whether or not 
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similar operations apply in those narrative forms, which may lead to a need, 
perhaps, to re-think notions of spatiality in children’s literature generally. This 
also raises the question of how these very much western spatial ideas can be 
considered in light of fantasy and other texts from cultures that do not have this 
same social and cultural history behind them. The concept of a literary thirdspace 
that I have worked with here may be appropriate for the particular kinds of texts I 
have focused upon, yet how the concept of thirdspace might operate in other 
texts and cultures needs thought. Indeed, the complexity of spatial thinking and 
how it operates in both literary spaces and real world spaces requires that 
additional, perhaps even contradictory, ways of approaching the spatial need to 
be developed in order to really come to terms with the spatiality of children’s 
fiction. In turn, since “[e]very age […] has its own realism” (Stern 174), there is 
a need to obtain a greater understanding of the historicity of spatial 
representation in children’s fiction than the very specific approach I have taken 
here would allow.  
 A third important point is the clear need to consider the more nuanced 
and subtle ways in which the spatiality of fiction for children is gendered. The 
novels I have discussed have had a mix of male and female protagonists, but 
even a cursory glance reveals that the texts I have considered to be less open to 
thirdspace interpretations have had female protagonists such as Griselda and 
Lyra, protagonists who are seen to be followers rather than leaders in space-
making. Even Lucy Pevensie, the first of the Pevensie children to enter Narnia, 
has her access taken over and ultimately dominated by her older brother, Peter. 
In contrast, in my examination of texts I promoted as being more spatially active, 
the protagonists were male. Although it is not possible to draw far-reaching 
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conclusions from this, the coincidence should not be overlooked. Nikolajeva, it is 
true, has suggested that novelistic chronotopes are gendered, with “male” texts 
structuring time as linear and space as open, while “female” texts structuring 
time as circular and space as “closed and confined” (Children’s 125), but she 
does not develop this idea. More analysis of such texts in terms of how gender 
might play a role in the construction of space by protagonists in fantasy texts 
(and in other genres) is surely an important next step.  
 Finally, there is the link between what I have said about the spatiality of 
literary texts and what occurs in “reality”; how real child readers really do 
respond to the worlds of fantasy texts, and how these do (or do not) open up 
avenues of action and spatial agency for them. Thus, there is the question of how 
social theories might benefit from an examination of the spatial in children’s 
literature, for “[s]ocial scientists must overcome their distrust in textual 
representations as viable evidence” (Coats 141), studying real children as well as 
representations of children in order to achieve a more complete understanding. 
At the same time, however, at least in the United Kingdom, it would appear that 
children are engaging in fewer playground games and sports activities, and many 
schools have banned such open play activities as snowball fights, conker fights, 
British Bulldog, three–legged races and even hopscotch (Association of Teachers 
and Lecturers). In taking such measures, regardless of motivation on health and 
safety grounds, these actions have defined children’s activities activities within 
adult conceptions of what is or is not appropriate play. Perhaps it is not 
surprising, therefore, that fantasy novels that open up opportunities for the 
freedom of space-making and the playing that such space-making suggest are 
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popular, but how much does popularity alone reveal about the experience and 
effects of these texts, and how can those effects be assessed?  
Arguments in literary criticism (and beyond), such as that typified by 
Jacqueline Rose, have engendered “a neglect of the child as a social being, with a 
voice” (Rudd 16). The philosophically constituted child may be unvoiced, but 
that does not have to be the case with the social child. As Allison James says,  
[g]iving voice to children is not simply or only about letting 
children speak; it is about exploring the unique contribution to our 
understanding of and theorizing about the social world that 
children’s perspectives can provide. (“Giving” 262)  
 
Moreover, what James says about voice here is not just a question of the voice of 
the text (for that may be simply that of the author, however open to the idea of 
being spatially constructive that author might be), nor is it the voice in response 
to text but, as in the case of Leslie and then Jess in Bridge to Terabithia, it relates 
to how texts might subsequently influence lived lives, giving a spatial ‘voice’ to 
individuals, including adults as the other half of the dual audience equation, in 
these lived lives.  
As Soja has commented, “it is space not time that hides consequences 
from us” (Postmodern 23) and, for Foucault, “[a] whole history remains to be 
written of spaces” (“Eye” 149, original emphasis). This is also true of children’s 
fiction, with its ideological import usually tucked neatly away beneath a covering 
of adventure and magic and apparent strangeness. Although it does not uncover 
all of the consequences, my study of the spatiality in fantasy fiction for children 
opens up many other paths that might be followed in search of them. However, 
although I have not travelled along the various other roads, I hope that others will 
also notice the signposts and follow these matters up themselves, for there is a 
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vast body of texts that I have not even touched upon, all of which have spaces 
and places within them that can reveal much more.  
 What I have outlined, therefore, is a starting point, one that is not the 
opening move in a home-away-home again journey that returns only to a place of 
critical safety. It is a starting point which recognises that what is required is a 
narrative approach which takes account of the creation, nature and role of places 
and spaces in children’s literature, both in terms of authors and protagonists, and 
in respect of readers. It involves an understanding of how their differences and 
similarities all bring something to the nature of the narrative, to the nature of the 
child protagonists, and to the nature of readers (both children and adults, 
however those terms might be defined). In this respect, it is the opening of a door 
onto what should be 
a cultural location where the language of place and space has a 
rightful role, generates positive content, emphasizes the 
particularity of places and of people’s relations to them, and 
stands not in opposition but in relation to the language of actions 
and events, of time and history. (Kort, Place 10) 
 
It is the opening of a door, therefore, onto both a discursive and experienced 
spatiality which understands more clearly how and why places and spaces matter. 
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Endnotes 
1. There is, for example, a growing body of work on the “home” in 
children’s literature and on landscape. See, for example, Thiel; and Alston 
(Family). 
2. As Zoran notes, this is true of literature generally, where “research on 
the subject is quite diffuse, and there are few assumptions that have become 
generally accepted” (310). 
3. The terms ‘place’ and ‘space’ are fraught with academic baggage and 
different approaches and writers use them in different ways. For an introduction 
to the variety of implications of the terms, see Agnew. 
4. The term ‘thirdspace’is from Soja (Thirdspace), and will be elaborated 
upon in more detail in Chapter 1. 
5. I am not overlooking the literary aspects of Possible Worlds Theory, 
which does consider the literary spatial in more detail. I address this later in the 
thesis. 
6. For earlier narratological approaches that overlook the spatial element, 
see, among others, Chatman; Prince; Rimmon-Keenan; Martin; Fludernik; Bal 
(Narratology); and Herman (Story).  
7. Chatman, for example, does mention Robert Liddell’s proposed 
categorisation of setting and its relationship to plot and character into five types 
(143), but he does not examine it in any detail. 
8. See, for example, Herman (Basic). Bal has also now called for a 
“description-bound narratology of the novel” (“Over-writing” 571), thereby 
seeking to re-evaluate elements such as the spatial that have traditionally been 
ascribed minor roles. 
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9. See particularly McCallum; and Nikolajeva (Children’s). McCallum 
sets out Bakhtin’s ideas at the start but does not discuss in detail how the 
chronotope’s spatial element adds to her readings. Similarly, Nikolajeva invokes 
the chronotope only to move away from its central premise to focus on the 
Bakhtinian idea that “specific forms of chronotope are unique for particular 
genres” (121). 
10. Eduard Vlasov, for example, notes Bakhtin’s focus on time, but he 
concludes that Bakhtin’s work does contain a comprehensive theory of space 
which, asserts Vlasov, is “one of the most fundamental pillars for the study of 
space in current narratology” (37). However, Vlasov himself does not dwell on 
this, and, to my knowledge, no critic has yet re-examined Bakhtin in the light of 
Vlasov’s claim. 
11. This is also true, of course, for a narrator different than the omniscient 
author, and for the reader. 
12. Although I keep the types separate, Nikolajeva believes this two-
world structure is also present in one-world fantasy novels such as Tolkien’s The 
Hobbit (Magic 13). There is some sense that this is true, although my reasons for 
why this would be the case differ from Nikolajeva’s. 
13. Miéville is commenting on the difference between fantasy and science 
fiction. 
14. Moretti draws his conclusions from a discussion of Propp’s structural 
fairy tale schema. 
15. On the pattern’s circularity, see, amongst others, Nikolajeva 
(Children’s). 
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16. Frankel’s argument draws on the work of D. W. Winnicott, who I also 
discuss in Chapter Two. 
17. For how this notion is developed in the 1960s see, for example, 
Berger and Luckmann. Unfortunately, Berger and Luckmann offer little analysis 
of how reality is constructed, providing only general arguments for such 
construction and exploring their implications for social life. Of relevance here is 
the point that their study focuses on an individual’s experience, perception and 
understanding. 
18. Which also confirms that examining spatiality is but one tool 
available in a complex of approaches to any given text or set of texts.  
19. This compares with an actor who, says Karp, performs action that are 
“rule governed or oriented” (137). 
20. Reimer and Bradford are not talking specifically about fantasy fiction 
here. 
21. Kort does not actually consider the spatiality of children’s fantasy 
novels, which is disappointing given his interest in C. S. Lewis. 
22. See, for example, Zahorski and Boyer; and Mendlesohn. 
23. A notable exception being Linda Hutcheon who, after retiring, 
expressed regret at her lack of awareness of the possibilities children’s literature 
offered (“Harry” 170). 
24. For an introduction to key theorists on space, see Crang and Thrift. 
Casey (Fate) offers an overview of the historical development of philosophical 
spatial thinking. 
25. I do not, however, intend this as a directly oppositional, anti-historical 
approach.  
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26. Jackson’s condemnation is from 1981, of course. It remains the case, 
however, that fantasy literature is still something of a literary Cinderella. 
27. See, for example, Oziewicz and Hade. 
28. Suvin terms this process “topoanalysis” (312) 
29. Soja terms these Firstspace (practice or perceived space) and 
Secondspace (representations of space) respectively (Thirdspace 10). 
30. Unfortunately, Bruner dismisses the child’s ability to multi-view the 
world in this way. 
31. Certeau’s place and space are not opposites; in fact, one merges into 
the other through individual activity (c.f. Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding 
of the way smooth space and striated space can mix). 
32. Fox sees this space, however as “the liminal space between the real 
and the imaginary,” where protagonists live “liminal lives” (255, 265), which I 
see as a misunderstanding of the spatial, especially in terms of the literary 
thirdspace. 
33. Schubert primarily discusses the sensation of ‘being there’ felt by 
video gamers within electronic landscapes, but he broadens this consideration to 
all forms of mediated experiences within any environment. 
34. Clifford uses roots/routes to describe negotiations of cultural identity: 
“roots” refers to cultural homogeneity and fixedness, whilst “routes” implies 
diffusion, intercultural movement and migration. The two are not necessarily 
opposed but rather “intertwined” (4), representing different, but not mutually 
exclusive, considerations of the relationship between people, culture, and place. 
35. For more on fantasy role playing games, see Fines. 
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36. Grenby slightly misreads the nature of the spatiality of Narnia, here, 
but I discuss this further in chapter three. 
37. For ease, however, I continue to refer to these novels as fantasy 
novels. 
38. Walter Mitty appears in the short story, “The Secret Life of Walter 
Mitty”, first published in the March 18th, 1938 issue of The New Yorker, and 
subsequently in book form in Thurber’s collection, My World—and Welcome to 
It (1942). 
39. Vaihinger insists that humans must construct “as if” explanations, but 
he does also note that these have a temporary nature; thus, arguably, they can be 
seen as contingent and recognised as such by those who create them. 
40. And ultimately for readers too (see chapter five for more on this). 
41. The point is moot. Whilst later other world novels often expand on the 
idea of multiple realities, postmodernism is not the (only) catalyst for such 
world-building. Given the earlier precedents, it seems naive to suggest 
postmodernism as a primary initiative for multiverses. 
42. For how Possible Worlds Theory in literary studies applies concepts 
from Possible Worlds logic to the worlds of fictional texts, see for example 
Bruner; Ronen; Doležel (Heterocosmica); and Ryan (Possible). 
43. There is a clear distinction between the nature of the spatial in the 
rites of passage rituals in traditional societies and what might be experienced as 
such in more modern societies, making it problematic when removed from its 
original ritual context. 
44. Bhabha is specifically talking of cultural hybridity here, but his 
understanding of thirdspace is relevant. 
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45. This notion of liminoid rather than liminal also links to Winnicott’s 
notions of the transitional third space discussed later in this chapter. 
46. The exact nature and purpose of children’s play remains unresolved. 
See, amongst others, Sutton-Smith; and Goldman. See also the broad criteria to 
define what constitutes play in Ruben, Fein, and Vandenberg. 
47. Lowe notes that “[g]ames share several striking properties with the 
universes of fiction” (31), where the story world resembles the game board, and 
characters the pieces. Thus, perhaps ludus might be seen as plot, whilst paidia 
might be seen as the performance of actions within the spatial environment of 
that plot. 
48. Although Smith also notes that the “existence of rules is not a clear-
cut criterion to distinguish play and games” (12). 
49. Caillois identifies four types of play—agôn, alea, mimicry and ilinx—
with each being conducted on some point on the scale between paidia and ludus 
(12–13). Thirdspace imagination most resembles what Caillois terms mimicry, 
pretend play revolving around imaginary universes. However, Caillois insists 
that the purpose of mimicry is “to imitate adults” (21), which is not my 
argument. 
50. Unfortunately, Caillois uses play to define the natures of different 
cultures, with a somewhat ethnocentric approach biased towards his concept of 
his own culture’s superiority. 
51. Cohen and MacKeith studied the imaginary worlds of individuals or 
small groups of children, calling such worlds a “paracosm” (a term first coined in 
1976 by Robert Silvey, and also found in Silvey and MacKeith. Cohen and 
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MacKeith believe the creation of paracosms usually emerges at age 7 or 8, and 
lasts until 13 or 14 before gradually subsiding (103). 
52. Postman argues such play is now lost, although my own arguments 
suggests Postman is premature in this. 
53. Britton considers literary fantasy as “the handling of images as play” 
(40, original emphasis) and uses concepts from Winnacott (he was Winnacott’s 
brother-in-law) to see fantasy as located in a third area that offers a space where 
the individual can, temporarily, freely explore and create a reality. However, this 
notion has never really been developed in children’s literature criticism. 
54. The original broadcast is preserved as Utopie et littérature (Utopia 
and Literature), recorded document, 7 December, 1966. Centre Michel Foucault, 
Bibliothèque du Saulchoir, reference C116. 
55. Deleuze and Guattari also refer to a “a ludic model, which would 
compare games according to their type of space” (Plateaus 551). 
56.Parts of this chapter were presented at the IRSCL congress in 
Frankfurt in 2009. 
57. Unfortunately, Rosenthal she sees this as a process of psychological 
reconciliation of the unexplained or unknown for protagonists, thus priviliging 
the psychological reading over the spatial. 
58. From the 1823 song, “Home, Sweet Home” (music by Sir Henry 
Rowley Bishop, lyrics by actor and dramatist John Howard Payne). 
59. This also raises the question of gender and spatiality, a topic 
impossible to pursue here. 
60. See Pullman (“Dark”). 
61. This explanation does not always appear in paperback editions. 
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62. Specifically those emerging from many-worlds theory first outlined in 
the 1950s. See Everett. 
63. An idea that draws upon actual scientific understanding and theories 
in quantum physics that have developed since the 1950s. See also note 62. 
64. Gooding’s psychoanalytical reading of Coraline sees it as “as a mode 
of inquiry into psychic development” (405 n.4). 
65. For copyright reasons, the illustrations are not reproduced. 
66. Gooding’s specific focus is on Gaiman’s Coraline. 
67. For copyright reasons, the maps discussed are not shown. 
68. Examples include E. H. Shepard’s 1933 map for The Wind in the 
Willows (1908), the 1972 Narnia map by Pauline Baynes (the original Narnia 
series illustrator), not printed in the books until the 2006 HarperCollins edition, 
and the maps of, among others, Wonderland and Neverland in Hennessey. 
69. On ‘readerly’ or ‘writerly’ texts, see Barthes’s (S/Z), especially pages 
3–6. 
70. The expression derives from Korzybski’s statement that “the map is 
not the territory” (58, original emphasis). 
71. In her light-hearted book on the fantasy genre, Diana Wynne Jones 
suggests that all fantasy stories ever told actually occur in one, real land, 
“Fantasyland,” that the stories’ creators are the “The Management,” offering 
“tours” of this real land, readers are tourists, writers are their guides, and the 
stories are sight-seeing tours (Tough 9–11). 
72. Map by John Lawrence. 
73. Map by Jules Feiffer. 
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74. Consider, however, Robert Louis Stevenson’s statement about 
Treasure Island (1883) that drawing the map of the island originated the story 
(“First” 37). 
75. Originally designed by Harry Beck in 1932. 
76. This is Ross Johnston’s term for “the representation of time-space in 
picture-book art and illustration” (152). It can, however, also apply to maps. 
77. Much of this section on maps was first presented at the 2008 Child 
and the Book conference in Buffalo, New York, then revised and published in 
International Research in Children’s Literature. 
78. Unfortunately, for Rosenthal, the purpose of the process is to return 
readers to the “three-dimensional world of fact and utility” better prepared for 
real life (188). This reference is to the maturation process, something I have 
already suggested is not at work. 
79. Such culture shock instances work with the trope of the 
stranger/outsider who comments, implicitly or explicitly, on the ‘new’ place and 
so require a different analysis. 
80. These cues could be facial expressions or gestures, customs or beliefs. 
Acquiring such social and cultural cues whilst growing up, they are as much a 
part of our culture as language and, even when operating subconsciously, they 
are essential for social existence. 
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